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Recognition of governments is one of the essential principles of international 
law that confirms the lawful status of an authority holder in a state. It is also one of 
the murkiest principles of international law with lots of controversies.  
 Some scholar suggests that the most suitable way to eradicate the 
controversies affecting this area of international law is to recognise governments that 
adhere strictly to a democratic legitimacy approach. They believe that the use of this 
standard, which relies on the use of democracy to identify the legitimate government 
of a state, will be a suitable replacement for the current recognition of governments 
approach and would end the ongoing debates on the recognition of governments in 
international law.  
By arguing the successful application of this approach in states such as Haiti, 
Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, some scholars believe they have established a solution 
to the recognition of government controversy. This study investigates the claims and 
assesses whether democratic legitimacy could indeed be a suitable replacement for 
the current recognition of governments approach in international law. 
 Further, by using a comparative analysis, the study concludes that the 
modification of the current approach (effective control doctrine) to include a 
rebuttable presumption of consent would serve as a better alternative than the 













Chapter One: Introduction to the Research 
1.1. Background of the Study 
More than three centuries have passed since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia, 
which created two main propositions for the recognition of governments in 
international law.1 The first was that states are sovereign political actors. In the 
international realm, decolonisation, successions and the recognition of states as 
independent sovereign institutions demonstrated this evidence.2 The second 
proposition, which complements the first, was that governments are established to 
act on behalf of states to secure citizen’s inalienable rights.3 These propositions have 
remained relatively unchanged since 1648.  
Of late, legal academics and some state representatives have come to view 
the recognition of governments as problematic.4 They argue that the rules that 
 
1 The Peace of Westphalia marked man’s abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of society 
and option for a new system characterised by the co-existence of a multiplicity of states, each 
sovereign within its territory, equal, and free from any external earthly authority. According to Lee 
Gross "The idea of an authority or organisation above the sovereign states is no longer. What takes its 
place is the notion that all states form a world-wide political system or that, at any rate, the states of 
Western Europe form a single political system. This new system rests on international law and the 
balance of power, a law operating, rather than, above states and a power operating between rather 
than above states." See, Leo Gross "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948" (1948) 42 The American 
Journal of International Law at 29. 
2 Matthias Ruffert "The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the international community" 
(2001) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 613-631. See also, Jean D'Aspremont 
"Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement" (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 
at 649-668. 
3 Russell A Miller & Peer Zumbansen Comparative Law as Transnational Law: A Decade of the German 
Law Journal (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 65 explain that “with the celebration of the Peace of 
Westphalia, each Prince elector had the power to declare war, to sign peace treaties, establish alliances 
with other potencies and govern their respective states as they fancied, such abilities resumed the jus 
foederationi for recognition". 
4 For a detailed analysis of the problems created by the recognition of governments and why 
recognition should of government should be sustain. See Martha Peterson "Recognition of 
Governments Should Not Be Abolished" (1983) 77 The American Journal of International Law at 31-50. 
Apart from Peterson, the following academics analyse the problems relating to recognition of 
governments, their causes and their implication for the status of a government: David Ernest Hudson 
"Recognition of Foreign Governments and Its Effect on Private Rights" (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. at 312-325, 
Thomas Galloway Recognizing Foreign Governments: The Practice of the United States (American 
Enterprise Institute, 1978). See also, Stanley K Hornbeck "Recognition of Governments" (1950) 44 Am. 
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. at 182-192 discussion on the problems facing the United States with regard to the 
recognition of China’s governments. Hornbeck notes that, while recognition of governments confers 
no legal obligations, it has legal consequences. He also identifies recognition as a political act that 
confers legal approval. See also, JJ Lador-Lederer "Recognition-A Historical Stocktaking (Part I)" (1957) 
27 Nordisk Tidsskrift Int'l Ret. at 62 questions whether the recognition of states and governments 
belongs to international law. He discusses the judicial problems surrounding the recognition of 
governments using two theories of recognition, constitutive and declaratory. Hersch Lauterpacht 
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determine the recognition of a government within the international sphere conflict 
with some enshrined principles of international law.5 In particular, they believe that 
the rules empowering states to act on their discretion to decide on the 
constitutionality of a government question the autonomy of states.6 They add that 
the situation where a government is considered sufficiently constitutional by some 
states to warrant military assistance but is regarded as unconstitutional by others 
causes unnecessary diplomatic confusion.7 
In support of these arguments, some academics argue that the failure of the 
August 1991 coup in the former Soviet Union, the restoration of democracy in Haiti, 
and the recent overthrow of undemocratic and authoritarian governments in North 
Africa and some Middle Eastern states undermine the recognition of governments 
 
"Recognition of Governments" I (1945) 45 Columbia Law Review at 815-864 identifies the controversial 
problem of distinguishing between the legal and political views of recognition of governments. Obed 
Y Asamoah "Recognition of States and Governments" (1968) 5 University of  Ghana Law Journal at 123 
was of the view that the confusion surrounding the recognition of governments was the result of 
“different and hypocritical state practice and the attempts of textbook writers to construct coherent 
theories of recognition which are possible only through arbitrary selection of evidence.” Gregory H Fox 
& Brad R Roth Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2000) at 
121-196. See also, Sean D Murphy "Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and 
Governments" (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 545 to 581, Joshua Downer 
"Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition" (2013) 46 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law at 581-612. See also, Robert D Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in 
International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 16 Emory International Law Review 107 at 112-113. 
See also, Pieter Kuyper, Pieter Kuyper "Recognition: Netherlands Theory and State Practise” in HF Van 
Panhuys, WP Heere, JW Josephus Jitta, Ko Swan Sik & AM Stuyt (eds.) International Law in the 
Netherlands (Vol. 1, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen an den Rijn, 1978" (1978) 30 Netherlands 
International Law Review at 371-403. 
5 This argument was first made by then Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations Senor Don Genaro 
Estrada. According to Phillip Jessup, Estrada believed that recognition involves the assumption of a 
right to pass critical judgement on the legal capacity of foreign regimes, a right which is undermines 
the sovereignty of the other state See Philip C Jessup "The Estrada Doctrine" (1931) 25 The American 
Journal of International Law at 721. See also, Cécile Vandewoude "The Democratic Entitlement and 
Pro-Democratic Interventions: Twenty Years After Haiti?" (2012) 12 Mexican Yearbook of International 
Law Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional 779 at 781. 
6 Jean D'Aspremont "Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy" (2005) 38 NYUJ Int'l. L. & 
Pol. at 878- 879 argued that “There are no objective approach to determine governments' legitimacy. 
That means that each state enjoys a comfortable leeway when asked to recognise the power of an 
entity that claims to be another state's representative in their bilateral intercourse. Each state 
evaluates foreign governments' legitimacy through the approach that it chooses. International legal 
relations are therefore replete with situations where a government is deemed legitimate by some 
states and illegitimate by others.” 
7 For example, the recognition of the Syrian opposition forces by the US as against Russia’s policy of 
non-recognition of the opposition. Another example is the US Government’s agreement to military 
intervention and assistance to the Contras Force in Nicaragua. See Nicaragua Case "Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua" (1986) Judgement on the Merits. 
12 
 
practices.8 Others contend that the end of the Cold War, which significantly 
contributed to the formation of unconstitutional regimes, has resulted in a post-Cold 
War legal order that demands democratic legitimacy as the minimum approach for 
the recognition of governments in international law.9  
 Before the recent debates on democratic legitimacy, the customary rule 
governing states decision on granting recognition was the effective control doctrine.10 
Under this rule, a state can recognise a government based on its level of efficacy, i.e., 
a putative government degree of control over a state to the exclusion of other 
entities.11 However, the view that the effective control doctrine is antithetical to the 
“self-determination notion of the people” by overtly relying on the concept of control 
rather than popular acceptance stands as one of its most significant disadvantages.  
 Also, neither is there a benchmark at the time of recognition, in determining 
how the putative government would effectively administer the state functions, 
despite being in control during state conflict.12 Nor, is there any consideration for an 
 
8 Thomas M Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 The American Journal 
of International Law 46 at 46-91. Francis Fukuyama "The End of History?" (1989) 1 The National 
Interest at 3-18, Sean D. Murphy "Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and 
Governments" (1999) 48 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 545-581, Samuel P 
Huntington The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1993) at 31. For an overview of the debate, see Steven Wheatley "The Security Council, 
Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq" (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 
at 531-551, Susan Marks "What has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?" 
European Journal of International Law (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law at 507- 524. Of 
recent, Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic 
Legitimacy in Governmental Recognition" (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law at 201-
207 and Obiora Chinedu Okafor "Democratic Legitimacy as a Criterion for the Recognition of 
Governments: A Response to Professor Erika de Wet" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound 2, at 228-232. 
9 Some of these claims are contentious and therefore need to be addressed with caution. See Jean 
D'Aspremont "The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in International Law: A Reply to Susan 
Marks" (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 549 at 552. Also, Jean D’Aspremont "Post-
Conflict Administrations as Democracy-Building Instruments’ (2008) 9 Chicago Journal of International 
Law at 1-17. 
10 Joshua Downer "Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition" (2013) 46 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law at 583 explains that under the effective control doctrine, the proper 
government to represent a state in international forums is the one that has authority and control over 
a vast portion of a state territory and population. 
11 Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic Legitimacy 
in Governmental Recognition" (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law at 984. According to 
Erika de Wet, the effective control principle “is based on the fiction that control resembles the 
population’s acceptance of (or at least its acquiescence in) the incumbent government’s right to 
represent the state as a whole.  
12 Christopher J Le Mon "Unilateral Intervention by Invitation In Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test 
Tested" (2002) 35 NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. at 745.   
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enquiry into the process by which the government could gain control. In effect, a 
government that comes into power through coup d’état or any other unconstitutional 
means would be recognised as legitimate as long as it is in control of the state. 
  Democratic legitimacy addresses these issues by subjecting the government 
seeking recognition to rules that are enshrined in national constitutions or through 
democratic processes. However, relying on democratic legitimacy to determine 
whom to accord recognition could be problematic for the following reasons: Firstly, 
there is no unified and acceptable definition of democracy by states.13 As Richard 
Burchill observed, “what it means to be democratic or how democracy manifest in 
law and practice are issues that have not been adequately investigated by 
international law.”14 While some academics have cited elections as proof of 
democracy, applying this approach during internal strife where the standard of 
constitutionality in a state could be non-existent would be baseless.  
Secondly, there is insufficient evidence that undemocratic practices on the 
part of opposition forces would result in non-recognition, especially in circumstances 
where human rights are at stake.15 As will be demonstrated in this study, the 
promotion of human rights and democratic values by Libya's opposition group (the 
National Transnational Council of Libyan) prompted its recognition by other states 
despite its undemocratic origins. Hence, the need to exercise caution and investigate 
the claims in favour of democratic legitimacy as a suitable and sustainable approach.  
1.2. Research Aim and Research Question 
The aim of this study and some of the broader issues exemplified in it is concerned 
with investigating to what extent democratic legitimacy could indeed be a suitable 
solution to the recognition of government problems and sustainable replacement of 
the current approach (the effective control doctrine). Further, by using a comparative 
analysis, the study answers as to whether the modification of the current recognition 
 
13 Obiora Chinedu Okafor "Democratic Legitimacy as a Criterion for the Recognition of Governments: 
A Response to Professor Erika de Wet" (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law at 228-232. 
14 Richard Burchill "The Developing International Law of Democracy" (2001) 64 The Modern Law 
Review at 124. 
15 Vasiliki Saranti "Democratic Legitimacy as a Approach for Recognizing a Government: Towards the 
Emergence of a Regional Customary Rule in the Americas? A Reply to Professor Erika de Wet" (2014) 
108 American Journal of International Law at 233-238. 
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of government approach would serve as a better alternative than the acclaimed 
democratic legitimacy. 
  As noted previously, some academics have argued democratic legitimacy as 
the most suitable approach to the recognition of governments in international.16 For 
instance, Sean Murphy explains that “the notions of democratic legitimacy have 
existed in varying degrees in the practice of recognising states and governments. Not 
considering this fact would be an unattractive conclusion.”17 However, Brad Roth 
contends that democratic legitimacy as an international norm is unpromising because 
“democracy requires long-term preservation, a fixed global constitutional order that 
is not available because of the structure of international law and state system.”18  
 In Obiora Okafor's view, democratic legitimacy is a source of mischief because 
states are more interested in installing and recognising friendly regimes than in the 
democratic nature of a government’s climb to power (for example Egypt 2013 and 
Ukraine 2015).19   
 In contributing to the recognition of governments debates, this thesis 
addresses the following issues: 
 
• Why is the recognition of a government necessary in international law? 
 
• Why is this practice controversial? 
 
• To what degree have states eliminated the recognition of governments 
controversies? 
 
• Why is democratic legitimacy, and the current effective control doctrine, not 
the best approach for recognising governments? 
 
 
16 See Gregory H Fox & Brad R Roth "Democracy and International Law" (2001) 27 Review of 
International Studies at 330 to 331; Susan Marks "What has Become of the Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance?" (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law at 507-524 ; Of recent, 
Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic Legitimacy in 
Governmental Recognition" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 201-207 and Obiora Okafor "Democratic 
Legitimacy as a Criterion for the Recognition of Governments: A Response to Professor Erika de Wet" 
( 2014) 108 AJIL Unbound  at 228-232. 
17 Sean D Murphy "Democratic legitimacy and the recognition of states and governments" (1999) 48 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly at 580. 
18 Brad R. Roth "Whither Democratic Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the 
Recognition and Non-recognition of Governments" (2017) 108 AJIL Unbound at 214. 
19 Obiora Okafor "Democratic Legitimacy as a Criterion for the Recognition of Governments: A 
Response to Professor Erika de Wet" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 228. 
15 
 
• What approach may best suit the recognition of governments and address its 
controversies? 
 
1.3. Research Methodology  
This section presents the research methods of this study and explains why Haiti and 
Libya are selected as case studies. Also, it elaborates the primary information sources 
that provided the basis for the argument, assertions, discussions and narrative 
presented in this study.  
1.3.1. Research Methods  
The object of analysis in this study is state practice concerning the recognition of 
governments. As a result, the dominant method in this study is legal doctrinal 
research. As noted by Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan “doctrinal research 
provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, 
analyses the relationship between rules, and explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, 
predicts future development".20 The usage of this method in this study is of utmost 
importance because it helps to shape the structure of the whole thesis by identifying 
the areas of difficulty affecting the recognition of governments in international law, 
the causes of the difficulty, and also helps predict future solution to the problem.  
 In order to facilitate the extraction of the most useful and satisfactory 
information that would address this study research question, a comparative analysis 
approach was adopted in this study. With the use of this approach, the author is able 
to empirically explore how and why some contemporary phenomena called with a 
real-life context occurred. Also, in using this approach, the author can compare the 
similarities and differences in recognition of governments approaches and identify 
most variable features of the approaches.21 
 As a result of the need to foster a complete understanding of the different 
approaches adopted by states in eradicating the recognition of governments 
problems, interdisciplinary research method confine to the realm of international 
 
20 Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan "Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ 
(2012) 17 Deakin Law Review at 101. 
21 Frank Esser & Rens Vliegenthart. "Comparative Research Methods" (2017) The International 
Encyclopaedia of Communication Research Methods at 1-22. Terry Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan 
"Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review at 101. 
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relation theory is applied in this study. By selecting this approach22, the study utilises 
common assumptions and generalisation applied to state practices on recognition 
from an international relation perceptive. The advantage is that, where this study 
analysis relies on assumptions cannot be explained by legal methodology, 
interdisciplinary approach (specifically international relations) would provide an 
account and effect of the customary practices enhancing the analysis.  
 Also, historical methods were adopted in this study to bridge the gap between 
traditional and modern doctrines of recognition of governments; this helps to foster 
an understanding of why some problems originated far back in the Middle Ages and 
the links between these problems until today. 
1.3.2. Case Selection  
One of the significant political events that have engulfed the international sphere 
since Westphalia is the adoption of democracy by states in what became known as 
the waves of democracy.23 Dictatorial and unconstitutional governments were either 
swept away by the waves or saw their tenure challenged by demands for democracy.  
 During the wave of democracy in the Northern Hemisphere, Haiti, a state in 
North America stood out as an atypical case study compared to other states because 
it is the first state where the majority of the states granting recognition collectively 
abandoned the effective control doctrine. In the international realm, it is was also the 
first state where both state and non-state jointly restored democracy after the 
unconstitutional overthrow of a government. Haiti stands out as a reference for the 
end of an epoch with regards to the effective control approach and the first clear 
example of the emergence and development of the democratic legitimacy approach. 
 
22 Van den Besselaar P and Heimeriks G. (2001). Disciplinary, multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary: 
concepts and indicators at 705-716 in David M and Wilson C S (eds), Proceedings of the 8th 
International conference on Scientometrics and Informetrics University of New South Wales, Australia. 
See also, Adams Jonathan, Tamar Loach & Martin Szomszor "Interdisciplinary research: Methodologies 
for identification and assessment" (2016) Digital research reports at 1-7. 
23 These waves were classified into first wave of democracy, second wave of democracy, the third wave 
of democracy and of recent, the fourth wave of democracy following the Arab Spring. For my details, 
see John Markoff Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change (Routledge, 2015); 
Renske Doorenspleet "Reassessing the three waves of democratization" (2000) 52 World Politics at 
384-406. Michael McFaul "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative 
Transitions in the Post-communist World" (2002) 54 World Politics at 212 to 244. 
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 In the Northern part of Africa and the Middle Arab East, some states were 
forced to adopt democracy in what became known as the fourth wave of democracy 
or the Arab Spring.24 Compared to other states that were affected by the waves of 
democracy, Libya ideally stands out as an example of a state where oppositions were 
prematurely recognised. Also, it is the only example of a state where oppositions 
were democratic and of recent became repressive thereby questioning the usefulness 
of democratic legitimacy as an approach for the recognition of governments in 
international law. Given the aim of this study is to investigate whether democratic 
legitimacy can be a suitable approach for the recognition of governments and the 
replacement of the effective control doctrine, Libya stands out as the central case to 
answer the research question.  
1.3.3. Research Information Sources 
The recent debate on democratic legitimacy as a sustainable replacement of the 
effective control doctrine and the best solution to the recognition of government 
controversies was the source of motivation for this study. Hence, this study involves 
the reassessment of the recognition of governments, the approach used for 
recognising governments and investigation into the use of democracy as the best 
approach for the recognition of government. As a result, the study adopted historical 
information written on the recognition of government from books that dates back as 
far as the sixteenth century, records of actions and speeches that are no longer 
available from any source other than selective libraries. 
 As a result of the needs to analyse the suitability of democratic legitimacy, this 
study initially engaged in the analyses of the Libya revolution in relation to state 
recognition of the National Transitional Council of Libya against the incumbent 
government of President Muammar al-Ghaddafi.  However, since 2015, Libya has 
been at war with two governments in control, and one internationally recognised by 
states.  Due to the lack of academic publications on the current war situation in Libya, 
the press releases of national and international news institutions that include 
assertions and assumptions relied upon in this study. 
 
24 Michael McFaul "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in 
the Post-communist World" (2002) 54 World Politics at 212 to 244. 
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 Primary and secondary sources were also relied upon in this study. Some of 
the information was obtained from United Nations websites; others were sourced 
from the internet, published journals, treaties, resolutions, statutes, judicial 
pronouncements, leading texts, legal reviews and articles. Also, the author had the 
privilege to speak with some scholars who are specialists in the area of the 
recognition of government and the use of democratic legitimacy as an approach for 
recognising governments. Besides this, the author has followed discussions between 
contemporary researchers and the most well-known academics who are significant 
contributors to the on-going debates the recognition of governments on online 
platforms such as EJIL Talk and Opinio Juris. 
 A significant part of this study relied on customary international law derived 
from state practices in the domestic jurisprudence of each state. Given the limitation 
in Judicial publication on recognition of government matters by some the states and 
the historical nature of recognition of government, administrative and judicial 
decisions that clarify the importance of recognition of governments in international 
law is limited in this study. A solution for their presentation in this study to selectively 
relied on the most significant judicial decisions from the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America.  
1.4. Research Structure 
Chapter Two examines the recognition of governments in international law. 
The central question in this Chapter is whether recognition of governments is of any 
importance in international law to warrant its continuation. In answering this 
question, the Chapter reviews the purpose of recognition of government. As to 
whether the recognition of a government is vital to international law, the Chapter 
argues in the affirmative by discussing the importance of recognition of governments 
to states and international law. A range of examples, including the protection of state 
sovereignty and the deterring of unconstitutionality such as military coup and 
revolutions, were discussed.  
Chapter Three was divide into three sections. The first section examines the 
controversies surrounding the recognition of governments in international law, 
namely the problem of distinguishing between the recognition of states and 
governments. The second section discusses the difficulty of differentiating between 
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the political and legal act of government recognition, and the third section addresses 
the confusion that arises as a result of the use of unclear and ambiguous recognition 
of government terminologies. The Chapter concluded that the lack of an objective 
approach is the cause of the recognition of government controversies. 
Chapter Four examines the various attempts by states to address the 
controversies surrounding the recognition of governments in international law. It 
considers the degree to which some approaches are unsuitable and argues that while 
some approaches are appropriate in certain situations, they are inadequate in others 
due to factors such as the tendency to violate a state's autonomy or infringe on 
citizen's self-determination.  
Chapter Five adopts the use of comparative analysis to answer the research 
question on whether democratic legitimacy is the best solution and would be a 
sustainable replacement of the effective control doctrine. The similarities and 
differences between the effective control doctrine and democratic legitimacy were 
investigated in order to achieve the Chapter objectives. After that, a case study 
analysis of Haiti (1991) and Libya (2011 till 2019) were conducted to identify the 
sustainability of democratic legitimacy.  
Chapter Six makes recommendations on the rational approach (modified 
effective control control) that may best suit the recognition of governments and 
address its controversies based on results adduce from the comparative analysis of 
the effective control doctrine and the other recognition of government approaches. 
The Chapter concluded that the modification of the current effective control doctrine 
to include a rebuttable presumption of consent would be a better and sustainable 
solution  
Chapter Seven reports the findings of this study, implications, future 








1.5. Research Terminology  
 
This section explains the various terminologies used for this study because of the 
confusion that may arise as a result of multiple linguistic meaning in some of the 
terms, what they entail and their application in this study.25 For instance, there is 
considerable variation in the meaning of recognition because of the lack of an 
acceptable definition. In effect, the meaning of recognition varies among states and 
connotes different linguistic meaning such as acknowledgement, acceptance and 
consideration. Due to the need to achieve a coherent overview of this study and 
ensure that the reader understands the essence of this study, the below section 
explains the following definition of terms as used in this study: 
1.5.1. Recognition of Government 
The definition of a recognised government remains challenging international law. 
According to Stefan Talmon, this is due to the “nebulous nature of the term 
‘recognition’ and the lack of any clear definition of what constitutes recognition.”26 
Annie Schuit explains that inconsistency in state practices and the lack of a treaty 
definition of what constitutes a recognised government resulted in the current 
ambiguity.27 Be that as it may, AM Greig defines the recognition of governments as 
the process by which “one state accepts a new regime as representing another state 
in international intercourse and, renews relations accordingly.”28 While Stefan 
Talmon states that it refers to “indication of the willingness or unwillingness of a 
government to establish or maintain an official relationship with another.”29  
In Malcolm Shaw’s view, recognition of a government implies “the acceptance 
by the government of another, of the opinion that a government fulfils certain 
conditions and that as a result of the conditions the recognising state will deal with 
 
25 Chapter 3 of this study explains in detail some of the confusion that may arise and the effects of 
these confusion on a government.  
26 Stefan Talmon Recognition of Governments in International Law: with Particular Reference to 
Governments in Exile (Clarendon Press, Oxford, New York, 1998) at 23. 
27 Anne Schuit "Recognition of Governments in International Law and the Recent Conflict in Libya" 
(2012) 14 International Community Law Review at 383. 
28 AM Greig "The Effects in Municipal Law of Australia's New Recognition Policy" 11 (1984) Australian 
Yearbook of International Law at 33. 
29 Stefan Talmon Recognition of Governments in International Law: with Particular Reference to 
Governments in Exile (Clarendon Press, New York, 1998) at 23. 
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the government and accept the legal consequence of the act.”30 This study adopts the 
American Restatement definition of the recognition of governments as “the formal 
acknowledgement that a particular regime is the effective government of a state and 
implies a commitment to treat that regime as the government of the state.”31 The 
reason for this selection is because in the most literal sense, acknowledging a 
government as the authorised holder of a state implies acceptance of the 
government. Also, unlike other definition put forward by academics and states, in the 
Restatement definition, there is a "commitment to treating a regime as the 
government of the state." It is from this commitment that rights and privilege could 
be accord to a recognised government. Chapter 2 of this study thoroughly discusses 
this topic.  
1.5.2. Legitimate Government 
As noted by Awol Kassim, “international law does not provide for parameters that 
help determine a ‘legitimate government’ or a government with the ‘legal authority’ 
capable (legally and factually) of speaking on behalf of the state.”32 Despite several 
attempts to address this issue, this area of law remains problematic due to the 
multifaceted nature of legitimacy.33  Thomas Franck defines legitimacy as, “the 
quality of a rule, or a system of rules or a process of making or interpreting rules that 
pull both the rule makers and those addressed by the rules towards voluntary 
compliance.”34 However, these do not offer a normative definition of what 
constitutes a “legitimate government”. 
Opinion with regards state practice has also been inconclusive and divided. 
For instance, the United States (US) justified its intervention in Panama by stating that 
it acted with the approval of the lawful and democratic government of Panama thus 
 
30 Malcolm N Shaw International Law (Cambridge University Press, UK, 2008) at 454. 
31 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States comment 203 (a), 204. 
See also Mary Beth West & Sean D Murphy "The Impact on U.S. litigation of Non-Recognition of Foreign 
Governments" (1990) 26 Stanford Journal of International Law at 438. 
32 Awol Kassim Allo "Counter-Intervention, Invitation, Both or Neither? An Appraisal of the 2006 
Ethiopian Military Intervention in Somalia" (2009) 3 Mizan Law Review at 216. 
33 Various attempted solutions fail to address “whom and what” constitutes a legitimate government. 
Jean D' Aspremont "Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy" (2006) 38 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics at 877-887.   
34 Thomas Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 American Journal of 
International Law at 51. 
22 
 
implying that it received an invitation from the latter.35 However, Malcolm Shaw 
contended that the US notion of “lawful and democratically elected” runs counter to 
international law’s concept of a legitimate government. He stated that in 
international legal context, a government is legitimate if it can control the majority of 
its citizens and administration effectively, regardless of whether it is democratic, 
socialist or otherwise.36  
Raymond Trevor argues and concur that “a legitimate government is a 
government in effective control of a state and ceased to be a valid government as 
soon as it loses its efficacy.”37 It follows from Trevor and Shaw’s arguments that 
recognition is granted based on a government level of efficacy.38 Therefore, the 
phrase legitimate government is used earlier in this study to connote a government 
that is recognised based on being in effective control of a state. However, as this study 
advances to Chapter Five, this definition would not suit its purpose in this study. 
Hence, a new definition will be put forward to meet the overall objective of this thesis.  
1.5.3. Democracy 
The word democracy emerged from the Greek phrase demo (people) and Kratos 
(rule), democracy, therefore, implies a form of governance based on the people’s 
rule.39 As simple as this sounds, it is one of the most elusive concepts in political 
theory because what constitutes "people" is contentious given that it may refer to 
specific and non-specific sets of people based on ethnicity, race, sex or colour.  
Furthermore, Jure Vidmar notes that the term ‘rule’ is hard to define given that 
governance is no longer a question of “who rules”, but, “how people exercise their 
rule”.40 Hence, there is no universal definition of democracy.41 Samuel Huntington 
argues that, as a form of government, “democracy can be defined in terms of sources 
 
35 Malcolm Shaw International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 1042. 
36 Malcolm Shaw International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 1042. 
37 Trevor Redmond "Power to the People-Intervention to Restore Democracy" (2004) 12 ISLR at 5 
38 See Hans Kelsen General theory of law and state (The Lawbook Exchange, 1945) at 220-221. Hans 
Kelsen believed that a legitimate government is one that is efficaciously in control of a state. He argued 
that the process through which that government comes into power is irrelevant to international law. 
39 Josiah Ober "The Original Meaning of Democracy: Capacity to do Things, not Majority rule." (2007) 
Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics Paper 090704 at 2. 
40 Jure Vidmar Democratic statehood in international law: The emergence of new states in post-cold 
war practice (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013) at 15. 
41 Obiora Chinedu Okafor "Democratic Legitimacy as a Criterion for the Recognition of Governments: 
A Response to Professor Erika de Wet" (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law at 228-232 
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of authority for government, purposes served by government and procedures for 
constituting governments.”42 However, this is ambiguous as the “source of authority” 
may originate from a democratic, undemocratic or authoritarian process.  
 To address this issue, Joseph Schumpeter’s classical theory of democracy 
argued that, as a source of authority, it should originate from the “will of the people” 
based on the “common good”. 43 According to him, this can be attainable through an 
institutional arrangement in which individuals arrive at political decisions through 
power acquired by competing for the people's vote through the electoral process.44 
In support, David Beetham claimed that democracy is attainable through popular 
control and collective decision making.45 He stated that “the core idea of democracy 
is popular vote or popular will over collective decision-making. Its starting point is the 
citizen rather than the institutions of government.”46 
 In line with recent state practices, the definition of democracy put forward by Joseph 
Schumpeter is adopted in this study to connote a government that is formed by the 
‘popular will of the people’ expressed through a process which is also agreed upon or 
acceptable by the majority of the people. Chapter Five of this study thoroughly 
discuss the justification for this adoption. 
1.5.4. Democratic Legitimacy 
Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History”47 and Samuel Huntington’s “Third Wave of 
Democracy”48 led many international law academics to believe in democracy as “the 
sine qua non to validate governance.” However, not until, Thomas Franck’s 
publication in 1992 of an “emerging right to democratic governance” did the use of 
democracy as a means of recognising governments gain traction in international 
law.49 Two events led up to these,  the August Coup in the Soviet Union that could 
 
42 Samuel Huntington The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (University of 
Oklahoma press, 1993) at 6. 
43 Joseph A Schumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge, 2013) at 250.  
44 Jure Vidmar Democratic Statehood in International Law: The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold 
War Practice (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013) at 16. 
45 David Beetham Democracy and human rights (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999) at 90-91. 
46 At 91. 
47 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" (1989) 16 The National Interest at 3-18 
48 Samuel Huntington The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (University of 
Oklahoma press, 1993) at 46. 
49 Thomas Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 American Journal of 
International Law at 46-91. 
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have led to the overthrow of President Boris Yeltsin was halt, and in Haiti President 
Jean Bertrand Aristide candidacy was restored after a successful coup.50 In both 
instances, the international community vigorously defended democracy as the only 
means of validating governance. These led to the debate on the suitability of 
democratic legitimacy as an approach for the recognition of governments in 
international law. 
  During the debate that followed, four justifications were articulated in 
support of democratic legitimacy. The first was that as a means of preventing internal 
armed conflict, democracy is increasingly being accepted by states and international 
organisations because it “addresses the exclusionary politics lying at the heart of civil 
conflicts.”51 Secondly, democracy was asserted as the key to peace and international 
security because democratic states do not wage war against one another.52 Thirdly, a 
wide range of international norms and practices not related to democracy, now rely 
on democracy or democratic processes for their implementation.53 Finally, the 
commitment to the democratic principles of choice, transparency and pluralism was 
claimed as essential to protect human rights.54 While some of these claims have 




50  Thomas Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 American Journal of 
International Law at 54. 
51 Fox, Gregory H., and Brad R. Roth, eds. Democratic governance and international law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) at 7.  
52 Michael Edward Brown, et al. Debating the Democratic Peace (MIT Press, 1996) at 58. 
53 Remarks of Gregory Fox in Karen Ann Widess "Implementing democratization: What role for 
international organizations?" (1997) American Society of International Law Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting at 360-22. 
54 Benjamin Constant The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
55 For instance, Brad Roth contends that “democratic legitimacy as an international norm is 
unpromising, and a potential source of mischief as a unilateralist initiative. According to Roth, “the 
international system is often shadowed with multiplicity of conflicting interests and conflict political 
moralities, where implementers of supposed universal values are untrusted and often untrustworthy. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis examines Roth’s claims by analyzing the basis for the recognition of the NTC 
when Muammar Gaddaffi was still in effective control of Libya. See, Brad Roth "Whither Democratic 
Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the Recognition and Non-recognition of 
Governments" at 218. While, Sean Murphy asserts that “the notions of democratic legitimacy have 
existed, to varying degrees, in the practice of recognising states and governments. Not considering this 
fact would be an unattractive conclusion. See, Sean Murphy "Democratic legitimacy and the 
recognition of states and governments." (1999) International & Comparative Law Quarterly at 581. 
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1.6. Research Gaps  
 
Every scholars study aims to contribute to knowledge by either creating research 
questions for future reviews or proposing solutions to a research problem that has 
not been addressed.56 Therefore, a research study must identify and fill the 
knowledge gaps in its field of study.57 This study’s contribution to knowledge is by 
answering whether democratic legitimacy could be a suitable replacement of current 
recognition of government approach in international law, this is a worthy 
contribution considering the on-going debate on this topic. 
  Currently, there are limited publications and materials on the recognition of 
governments in international law. Most publications on recognition to date tend to 
focus on either the recognition of states or the joint publication of recognition of 
states and governments with a limited focus on the recognition of governments in 
international law. Even when the recognition of governments is addressed by some 
of the publication, an in-depth discussion of some of the topics dealt with in this study 
are overlooked due to the murky nature of the topic. This study will, therefore, be 
useful for future research relating to the recognition of governments, effective 
control doctrine and democratic legitimacy.  
 This study analyses the causes as well as proffers solutions to problems 
surrounding the recognition of governments in international law. It examines the 
benefits of recognition and the negative impact of non-recognition. These help in the 
understanding of recognition of government, its significances, and how some 
problems emerged. Further, the study offers insight into the operational issues that 
may arise due to arbitrary decisions. State policies concerning the recognition of 
governments were examined against some benchmark. Also, the democratic 
legitimacy theory and the effective control doctrine were observed in line with similar 
approach to detect similarities, differences, and why some approaches failed. The 
study thus provides information on state practices regarding the recognition of 
governments approach. 
 
56 Judith Haber "Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Clinical Questions" (2014) Nursing Research: 
Methods and Critical Appraisal for Evidence-Based Practice at 30-35. 
57 Andrew H Van de Ven & Paul E Johnson "Knowledge for theory and practice" (2006) 31 Academy of 
Management Review at 804. 
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In conclusion, the author expects that this research will extend the debate on 
democratic legitimacy and the recognition of governments in international law. The 
significance of this choice is evident in Chapter Five of this study, where the 
researcher discusses democratic legitimacy barriers with regards to the non-
recognition of the Front for the Advancement of the Haitian People in Haiti (1992) 
and the recognition of the transitional government of Libya (2011). 
1.7. Conclusion  
 The lack of an objective approach guiding the recognition of government processes 
at the international level has caused much problems and raised questions about the 
usefulness of recognition of governments practice in international law. States have 
adopted different approaches to resolve the problems, many of, which have been 
short-lived, inadequate, unsustainable, and unsuitable. Recently, some academics 
assert that the decision to recognise a new government should be based on 
democracy rather than the ability of the government to meet the current criterion of 
effectiveness. This study assesses this claim and argues for the modification of the 
current recognition of government approach against the acclaimed democratic 
















Chapter Two: Recognition of Governments in International Law 
2.1. Introduction 
The definition of what constitutes a recognised government in international law 
remains challenging. Much of these arise as a result of different state practices and 
the lack of treaty provisions establishing what constitutes a recognised government 
in international law.58 Nevertheless, the United States of America reinstatement 
defines the recognition of government as "the formal acknowledgement of a 
particular regime as the effective government of a state and implies a commitment 
to treat that regime as the government of the state.”59 This definition implies the 
acceptance of a regime as the authority of a state and the pledge to accord its certain 
rights and privilege. 
Development in these two areas (acceptances of a regime and commitment to 
the regime) has resulted in the recent debates, which raises the question of whether 
recognition of governments performs any useful function in the international system? 
The aim of this Chapter is to answer this question. In so doing, this Chapter historically 
examines the rationale behind the recognition of governments in international law, 
discuss the essential purpose of recognition of governments and the effects of non-
recognition on a government.  
2.2. The Rationale behind the Recognition of Governments 
Historically, the need to recognise a government as the authority holder  of a state 
did not arise in international law until the Middle-Ages because of the need to affirm 
the Papal Supremacy.60 During this era, polities such as small fiefdoms and free cities 
existed under a provincial structure similar to the modern states system under the 
leadership of the Pope and Emperor who were the great powers of the era.61 For a 
 
58 Anne Schuit "Recognition of Governments in International Law and the Recent Conflict in Libya" 
(2012) 14 International Community Law Review at 382. 
59 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States comment 203 (a), 204. 
This definition can also be found in Mary Beth West & Sean D Murphy "The Impact on U.S. litigation of 
Non-Recognition of Foreign Governments" (1990) 26 Stanford Journal of International Law at 438. 
60 Prakash Menon The Law of Recognition in International Law: Basic Principles (Edwin Mellen Press, 
1994) at 1. See Also, Arthur Nussbaum A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan, 1954) at 
24, 25.  
61 However, there are different features. While the modern state system is characterised by organised 
entities, internal maturity, civilisation, defined territory and mixed populations medieval provincial 
entities were characterised by unorganised governance, underdevelopment, and a lack of internal 
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polity to become a member of the Papal States, its ruler had to be recognised.  This 
act reflected the Papacy’s acceptance of a ruler as a political leader and also upheld 
the Pope’s authority as supreme.62 
  The question of superiority did not arise between the Emperor and the Pope 
because each authority was independent and sovereign.63 However, the unification 
of the church in the Middle-Ages under the principle of unitas ecclesia resulted in all 
the Papal States and other separate polities being brought together under the same 
authority.64 It led to the enactment of conflicting laws, political strife and tussles for 
supremacy between the Pope and Emperor.65 Grewe Wilhelm observes that “where 
one power felt supreme in adjudicating problems by his office as a spiritual authority, 
the other, in contrast, felt supreme as a secular authority by political 
developments.”66 
 The conflict resulted in eighteen years of civil conflict that ended with the 
ratification of the Treaty of Venice in 1177 (also known as the Peace of Venice) which 
brought an end to the supremacy conflict by the affirmation of the Pope as sovereign 
over the Emperor in spiritual and temporal matters.67 However, this was short-lived 
because of secularism and the unifying influence of the Emperor that was back by 
increasing political and social developments.68 The rise of Protestantism, coupled 
with the development of nation-states such as France, England and Spain, led to the 
collapse of the Papal authority.”69 It gave rise to 30 years of political and religious war 
that ended with the signing of the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, commonly 
 
maturity and could thus not be regarded as states. These entities centered on specific characteristics 
such as religion, language, culture, or tribal formations.  
62 Wilhelm G. Grewe “The Epochs of International Law (Trans. Michael Bryers, Berlin, 2000) at 76. 
63 Arthur Nussbaum A Concise History of the Law of Nations (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1947) 
at 23. 
64  Arthur Nussbaum A Concise History of the Law of Nations (The Macmillan Company, New York, 
1947) at 23.  
65 Wilhelm G. Grewe “The Epochs of International Law (Trans. Michael Bryers, Berlin, 2000) at 43. 
66 At 43. 
67 Thomson Rodney M "An English Eyewitness of the Peace of Venice, 1177" (1975) 50 Speculum. at 
21.  
68 Shaw Malcolm International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 18 
69 Arthur Nussbaum A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan1954) at 52.  
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referred to as the Peace of Westphalia.70 In describing the importance of the 
Westphalia Treaty to the newly formed states, Gross asserts that: 71    
The Westphalia Treaty marked man’s abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical 
structure of society and his option for a new system characterised by the coexistence of 
a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal, and free from any 
external earthly authority.  
 
The idea of authority above the sovereign states was no longer in existence. 
Instead, what took precedence was the right of sovereigns to govern their peoples 
free of outside interference.72 The Westphalia Treaty marked an end of an epoch of 
European political entities established by the authority of the papacy and the 
beginning of one where the principle of sovereignty took precedence in state 
relations.73 To achieve political equilibrium among states and move away from the 
universal monarchical system of Papal authority, the Westphalia Treaty bestowed 
significant power on states.74 With the power to enter into legal relations in the name 
of the states, the electors were recognised as the lawful representative of the newly 
formed states.75 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr explain that: 76 
 
The end of the Thirty Years War brought with it the end of the medieval Holy Roman 
Empire. Authority for choosing the religion of the political unit was given to the prince 
of that unit and not to the Hapsburg Emperor or the Pope. No Longer could one pretend 
there was a religious or political unity in Europe. Authorities were dispersed to the 
various kings and princes, and the basis for the sovereign state was established. 
 
The Westphalia Treaty forms the Jus Foederationis and the foundation for the 
recognition of states and governments in international law.77 As the newly formed 
state system developed, questions began to arise on the usefulness of recognising 
 
70 Derek Croxton "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and The Origins of Sovereignty" (1999) 21 The 
International History Review. at 570. The Peace of Westphalia was a bilateral Peace Treaty based on 
the sovereign equality of states in contrast to the Papal structure of one sovereign authority. 
71 Leo Gross "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948" (1948) 42 The American Journal of International 
Law at 28-29.  
72 Stéphane Beaulac "The Westphalian model in defining international law: challenging the myth" 
(2004) 8 Austl. J. Legal Hist. at 183.  
73 Claire Cutler "Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and 
Organization: A crisis of Legitimacy" (2001) 27 Review of International Studies  at 134. 
74 Leo Gross "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948" (1948) 42 The American Journal of International 
Law at 28-29. 
75 JG Starke "Recognition at International Law" (1950) 22 The Australian Quarterly at 13. see also, David 
Kinsella, et al. World Politics: The Menu for Choice (Cengage Learning, 2012) at 47. 
76 Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (San Francisco, 1981) at 47. 
77 Franca-Filho Marcilio-Toscano "Westphalia: a Paradigm? A Dialogue Between Law, Art, and 
Philosophy of Science" (2007) The German Law Journal at 995. 
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the state representatives who were now called government. The following sections 
address this debate.   
2.3. The Recognition of Governments Debates 
In the previous section, it was established that the rationale behind the recognition 
of government was to affirm the supremacy of the Pope. However, this outgrew its 
purpose because of the development of the modern state system in the seventeenth 
century. From the eighteenth century until today, the question that arises at the 
international realm and in particular among academics is whether the recognition of 
governments serves any useful purpose in international law.78 These debates 
centered, on the fact that some states have abandoned the practice of recognising 
governments and the consequence of non-recognition on a government is relatively 
narrower.79 As such, the functions of a recognised government can easily be 
performed by other apparatus such as diplomats and consular mission. However, 
some circumstances make these claims less desirable. For example, not all states have 
 
78 For an overview of this debate, a detailed analysis of the problems created by the recognition of 
governments and why such recognition should be sustained, see Martha Peterson "Recognition of 
Governments Should Not Be Abolished" (1983) 77 The American Journal of International Law at 31. 
Apart from Peterson, the following academics analyse the problems relating to recognition of 
governments, their causes and their implication for the status of a government: David Ernest Hudson 
"Recognition of Foreign Governments and Its Effect on Private Rights" (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. at 312 – 
326. See also, Thomas Galloway Recognizing Foreign Governments: The Practice of the United States 
(American Enterprise Institute 1978) at 3. For example, JJ Lador-Lederer "Recognition-A Historical 
Stocktaking (Part I)" (1957) 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift Int'l Ret. at 62 questions whether the recognition of 
states and governments belongs to international law. He discusses the judicial problems surrounding 
the recognition of governments using two theories of recognition, constitutive and declaratory. Hersch 
Lauterpacht "Recognition of Governments: I" (1945) 45 Columbia Law Review at 815 to 864 identifies 
the controversial problem of distinguishing between the legal and political views of recognition of 
governments. Obed Y Asamoah "Recognition of States and Governments" (1968) 5 University of  Ghana 
Law Journal at 123 to 132 was of the view that the confusion surrounding the recognition of 
governments was the result of “different and hypocritical state practice and the attempts of textbook 
writers to construct coherent theories of recognition which are possible only through arbitrary 
selection of evidence.” Gregory H Fox & Brad R Roth Democratic Governance and International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 121 to 196. See also, Sean D Murphy "Democratic Legitimacy 
and the Recognition of States and Governments" (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly at 545 to 581, Joshua Downer "Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition" 
(2013) 46 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 581. Robert D Sloane "The Changing Face of 
Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 16 Emory International Law Review at 
112-113. See also, Pieter Kuyper, Pieter Kuyper "Recognition: Netherlands Theory and State Practise” 
in HF Van Panhuys, WP Heere, JW Josephus Jitta, Ko Swan Sik & AM Stuyt (eds.) International Law in 
the Netherlands (Vol. 1, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen an den Rijn, 1978" (1978) 30 Netherlands 
International Law Review at 371 to 403. 
79 Martha Peterson "Recognition of governments should not be abolished" (1983) 77 American Journal 
of International Law at 31-50. 
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diplomatic relations. At present, there are no diplomatic relations between the 
United States of America and Iran.80 Even if diplomatic relations exist, not all states 
maintain diplomatic missions in other states. For instance, Nigeria does not have a 
diplomatic mission in New Zealand. Instead, consular matters relating to New Zealand 
and Nigeria are addressed by Nigeria consulate in Australia.81 
 Secondly, it was argued that structurally, recognition of governments is based 
on the discretionary decisions of states as a matter of their policy and political 
expediency rather than on international law rule.82 As such, states decisions on 
recognition of government matters varies and often contains elements of 
inconsistencies that often results in the replete situation of a government been 
consider as constitutional by some states and unconstitutional by others, thereby 
creating unnecessary confusions.83 For example, in the 1992 usurpation of the 
candidacy of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Haitian opposition (FRAPH) were 
not recognised despite having the sufficient requirement for the effective control 
rule. Meanwhile, states went ahead with the recognition of Libya opposition (NTC) as 
the legitimate representative of Libyans despite the NTC, not meeting the 
requirements of the effective control rule which is the customary approach adopted 
by most states when recognising governments.84 
 
80 Afshon Ostovar, The U.S. and Iran Are Marching Toward War Can They Find a Solution Before It’s 
Too Late? Foreign Affairs <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2019-06-28/us-and-iran-are-
marching-toward-war> 
81 Consular matters relating to Nigeria are address by the Nigeria Consular in Australia 
<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/africa/nigeria/high-commission-for-the-
federal-republic-of-nigeria/> accessed on 25 August 2019.  
82 Brad Roth “Whither Democratic Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the 
Recognition and Non-recognition of Governments” 2014 108 American Journal of International Law at 
214. 
83 Failed attempts by some states and academics have led to calls for the eradication of this practice in 
international law. Among these academics was Judge Baxter, who asserts that "an institution of law 
that causes more problems than it solves must be rejected and replaced by working arrangements that 
are flexible and realistic. The partial withdrawal of law from this area of international relations will 
facilitate the maintenance of relations with states in which extra-constitutional changes of government 
are taking place, and that in itself is a good thing."  Thomas Galloway Recognizing Foreign 
Governments: The Practice of the United States (American Enterprise Institute, 1978).  
84 The United Kingdom foreign secretary, William Hague declared that: he Prime Minister and I have 
decided that the United Kingdom recognises and will deal with the National Transitional Council as the 
sole governmental authority in Libya. This decision reflects the NTC increasing legitimacy, competence, 
and success in reaching out to Libyans across the country. Through its actions, the NTC has shown its 
commitment to a more open and democratic Libya - something that it is working to achieve through 
an inclusive political process. This is in stark contrast to Gaddafi, whose brutality against the Libyan 
people has stripped him of all legitimacy. After Hague’s declaration, The United Kingdom accredited a 
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 Thirdly, some academics claimed that the political arbitrariness of many 
recognition decisions often results in problems.85 What makes this situation 
untenable is that an unrecognised government cannot sue or enforce judicial action 
on a deciding state on the basis that it refused recognition. 86 The reason being, there 
is no objective approach to determine governments' recognition. 87 Hence, each state 
enjoys a comfortable leeway when asked to recognise, i.e. each state evaluates a 
foreign governments' legitimacy based on its approach. In effect, hosts of recognition 
of government decisions are made by states without any form of accountabilities. The 
general implication of this is the use of recognition for other means than its purpose.88  
 A range of examples are evident in some state practices; for example, the 
recognition of the Huertas government in Mexico by the United States government 
was conditional. The consensus was that the regime, upon recognition, would settle 
the long-standing disagreement concerning the Chamizal boundary and equitable 
distribution of Colorado.89 Similarly, in 2012, elements of the Syrian opposition known 
as the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROR) 
were prematurely recognised by the United States of America,90 the United 
 
NTC appointed Ambassador as the Libya ambassador to the United Kingdom in London. The United 
Kingdom government then unfroze the assets of the Arabian Gulf Oil Company, a Libya oil company 
whose assets were frozen during the Libya conflict.84 This benefited the NTC in the sale of Libya crude 
oil and encouraged other states in the declaration and recognition of the NTC as the legitimate 
representative of Libya see Sam Halabi "Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention 
in Historical and Theoretical Context" (2012) 27 American University International Law Review at 321-
24. 
85 For example, the recognition of Syria oppositions by the United States of America as against Russia 
policy of non-recognition of the opposition. Another example is the United States Government 
granting of military intervention and assistance to the Contras Force in Nicaragua See Nicaragua Case 
"Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua" (1986) Judgement on 
the Merits. Another example is the pre-mature recognition of the Libya opposition group, the NTC 
while the incumbent regime Was still in effective control of Libya.  
86 Robert Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 
16 Emory International Law Review at 121. 
87 Jean D'Aspremont "Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy" (2005) 38 NYUJ Int'l. L. & 
Pol. 877 at 878-9. 
88 The use of recognition for unwilling promise is a common practice among states such as the United 
States of America. For instance, Mexico refuse its bargain of the secure oil rights for exchange of 
recognition. Martha Peterson “Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished” 1983 77(1) The 
American Journal of International Law 31 at 39. 
89 Martha Peterson "Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished" (1983) 77 The American 
Journal of International Law at 31-39 
90 Nour Malas & Jay Solomon "U.S. Formally Recognizes Syria's Main Rebel Group" The Wall Street 
Journal <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324339204578173272657834096> Also 
see, Asaad Al-Saleh & Loren White "Dissecting an Evolving Conflict: The Syrian Uprising and the 
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Kingdom,91 the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council.92 The premature 
recognition of Syrians opposition came against the background assertions of some 
states needs to effect political transitions in Syria, and the needs for unfettered and 
safe access for humanitarian agencies.93 
Fourthly, some states contend that the recognition of governments practice 
infringes on sovereignty. These arguments were tender in two ways; firstly, the denial 
of recognition to a government that has the necessary competency to be regarded as 
the lawful representative of a state would be nothing else but the violation of the 
autonomy of the state.94  Also. It could be argued as the deprivation of a state right 
to statehood since an effective government is a criterion for statehood.95  Secondly, 
the denial of recognition to a government means infringements on the political self-
determination of citizens of the state to choose their government.96 Better still, it 
 
Future of the Country" (2013) Institute for Social Policy and Understanding and the New American 
Foundation. at 192. 
91  Richard Spencer "Britain Officially Recognise New Syrian Rebel Coalition as Countries 'Legitimate 
Government’" The Telegraph 5 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9691319/Britain-officially-
recognises-new-Syrian-rebel-coalition-as-countrys-legitimate-government.html>. 
92 In 2013, the chief of Syria’s Jab hat al Nusra Front, part of the Syria opposition group known as the 
Free Syrian Army purporting to represent the self-determination of the Syrians was sighted paying 
allegiance to the al-Qaeda terrorist group, this same group were initially granted recognition as the 
representative of Syria by the United States, which has now withdrawn its recognition. See Syria: BNP 
leader Griffin says opposition dominated by 'jihadi terrorists 03 Mar. 2013 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22860844> See also, Syrian Rebels Pledge Loyalty to Al-
Qaeda 03 Mar. 2013 <http://www.freep.com/artcle/20130614/NEWS15/306140065/Syrian-rebels-
pledge-loyalty-to-al-Qaeda>,UN SC A/RES/67/262 4 June 2013, the situation in the Syrian Arab 
Republic. See also, Security Council Press Statement on Attacks against Civilians in Syria 06 Mar. 2015 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11921.doc.htm>.  
93 The United Kingdom was noted to affirm that " Britain has formally recognised the newly ‘United 
Syrian opposition’ as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian People…I have sought and 
received significant and encouraging assurances from the new National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces on agreeing on a detailed political transition plan for Syria. As 
well as showing a clear commitment to human rights and international humanitarian law, including 
the protection of religious communities and unfettered and safe access for humanitarian agencies. 
Few days later, the United States of America declared that "We’ve made a decision that the Syrian 
Opposition Coalition is now inclusive enough, is reflective and representative enough of the Syrian 
population that we consider them the legitimate representative of the Syrian people in opposition to 
the Assad regime and so we will provide them recognition and obviously, with that recognition comes 
responsibilities." 
94 Thomas Ann Van Wynen & Thomas Aaron Joshua Non-intervention: The Law and its Import in the 
Americas (Southern Methodist University Press, 1956) at 244. 
95 Ian Brownlie Brownlie Principles of public international law (Oxford University Press, 1990)  at 689. 
96 Thomas Ann Van Wynen & Thomas Aaron Joshua Non-intervention: The Law and its Import in the 
Americas (Southern Methodist University Press, 1956) at 244. This argument is based on selective 
approach of states in the recognition of government processes. See Chapter five and six discussion for 
full explanation.  
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could be affirmed as questioning the independence of the citizens of that state to 
choose their government.97 This argument is premised on the view that self-
determination rights of citizens to choose their government lies on the core end of 
the recognition of government  and implies an arena of rights that are not political 
but, legal.  
Fifthly, since the induction of the United Nations Charter, specifically Article 2 
(7) of the United Nations Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration (UN  General 
Assembly,  1970) it has become an established principle of international law that no 
states or group of states has the right to interfere for whatsoever reason in the 
internal or external affairs of other states. An enquiry into the constitutionality of a 
government in terms of how it came into power before recognition, no longer tenable 
in international law because it is considered to be a violation of sovereignty. 
Therefore, the usefulness of recognition in curbing unconstitutionality has been 
defeat since an enquiry into the process by which a government originates is no 
longer tenable in international law. For this reason, recognition of government was 
argued as better abolished. However, the abolition of recognition of governments is 
not the solution.  
2.4.  Abolition of Recognition of Governments: Not a Solution 
States are not generally concerned with the internal process that confers a 
government as the representative of a state if a change of government takes places 
per constitutional procedures.98 The needs to recognise a government arises only in 
circumstances where there is a forcible overthrow of an existing government, 
accession to power of a new government by a procedure not provided for by the 
constitution of a state,  the continuance in power of an existing government in 
violation of constitutional procedures.99 When these circumstances occur in a state, 
recognition is necessary for the following reasons: 
 
97 Pamela P. Price "The Impact of Constitutive Recognition on the Right to Self-Determination: An 
Analysis of United States Recognition Practices Utilizing the Chinese Question as a Guide" (1979) 14 
Val. UL Rev at 123.  
98 See also,  Michael E Field "Liberia v. Bickford: The Continuing Problem of Recognition of 
Governments and Civil Litigation in the United States" (1994) 18 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade at 113. Note, 
the decision or question of recognition does not arise when a government origin is constitutional.  
99 Prakash K Menon "Some Thoughts about the Law of Recognition" (1991) 3 Sri Lanka J. Int'l L. at 94. 
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2.4.1. Confirmation of a Regime Status 
Recognition confirms the status of a state and its lawful representatives in the comity 
of states.100 It is only through recognition that a government can exercise its rights as 
the legitimate ruler of a state. This does not mean that a government cannot be in 
existence or the government acting as the representative of the state does not exist 
in international law before recognition.101 Instead, recognition confirms the existence 
of the government as the legitimate representative of the state and its citizens. 
 In practice, the non-recognition of a government means that its legitimacy to 
act on behalf of the state is in doubt.102  In effect, rights and benefits that are derived 
as a result of recognition may be affected or not acknowledged.103 For instance, non-
recognition would result in the loss of financial or technical assistance such as 
development aid, military exchange/training and monetary support which a 
recognised government could ordinarily obtain. Military assistance to the recognised 
interim government of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban and Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 is a typical example.  
 The United Nations Security Council used Article 42 of the United Nations 
Charter to ensure that the recognised interim government of Afghanistan received 
the necessary assistance to eradicate terrorism.104 Sikander Ahmed Shah notes that, 
in terms of the Bonn agreements, a six-month International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) was established in Afghanistan for the sole purpose of maintaining security, 
promoting peace and nation-building to facilitate the reconstruction of the 
country.105 If the interim government of Afghanistan were not recognised, ISAF 
assistance and the benefits accorded to the government would not have taken place. 
 
100 Philip Marshall Brown "The Legal Effects of Recognition" (1950) American Journal of International 
Law at 638. 
101 Stefan Talmon "Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice" 
(1993) 63 British Yearbook of International Law at 279.  
102 Edwin D Dickinson "Recent Recognition Cases" (1925) 19 The American Journal of International Law 
at 263. 
103 Eugene F Kobey "International Law- Recognition and Non-Recognition of a Foreign Government" 
(1950) 34 Marq. L. Rev. at 282.  
104 Relying on Resolution 1386 (2001), the United Nations Security Council called upon states to assist 
the recognised interim government with personnel, equipment and resources to fulfil its mandate of 
eradicating terrorism in the state. See UN. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001), also, Grant T Harris "The 
Era of Multilateral Occupation’(2006)"  24 Berkeley Journal of International Law at 49-51. 
105 Sikander Ahmed Shah "War on Terrorism: Self defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and The 
Legality of US drone attacks in Pakistan" (2010) 9 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev.  at 113. 
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Therefore, the recognition of governments is essential to international law and states 
as it confirms the legitimacy of a government to act on behalf of a state and, in turn, 
ensures that such governments receive certain rights and benefits. 
 
2.4.2. Conferment of Legal Personality 
Recognition of government as a general concept of international law introduces and 
acknowledges the existence of a government based on certain factors such as the 
lawfulness of its origin or character. Once a regime has established itself as the lawful 
representative of the state beyond any re-establishment, states are bound to 
acknowledge the regime. The acknowledgement in fulfilment confers a legal 
personality on a regime as the sole representative of the State.106 Its denial or non-
acknowledgement automatically deprives its status.107 As such, the mere fact that a 
state is recognised does not grant an unrecognised government authority to act on 
behalf of the state.108  
 As early as the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom and United States 
Courts failed to acknowledge the existence of an unrecognised government as legally 
existing.109 It was a matter of practice for these courts to be bound by the decision of 
the executive branch of their governments, especially on matters relating to 
recognition.110 As such, the courts do not in practice grant locus standi to 
governments that are not recognised, because an enquiry into claims by such 
government may result in overlapping of constitutional powers between the 
executive and the judiciary. Likewise, the acknowledgement of an unrecognised 
government by the judiciary would easily be misconstrued as the recognition of the 
governments.111 In Stone Engineering Co v Petroleos Mexicanos, the United States 
Supreme Court affirmed its position on locus standi by stating that: 112 
 
106 Hersch Lauterpacht "Recognition of Governments: II. III. The Legal Nature of Recognition and the 
Procedure of Recognition" (1946) Columbia Law Review at 37- 38. 
107 Hersch Lauterpacht "Recognition of Governments: II. III. The Legal Nature of Recognition and the 
Procedure of Recognition" (1946) Columbia Law Review 38. 
108 Jonathan Hill & Adeline Chong International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in 
English Courts (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014) at 23. 
109 Martha Peterson "Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished" (1983) 77 The American 
Journal of International Law at 31. 
110 In re Cooper (1900) 143 U. S. 677, Percy v. Stranahan (1907) 205 U. S. 257. 
111 Louis Leventhal Jaffe Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations: In Particular of the Recognition of Foreign 
Powers (Harvard University, 1933) at 129-30. 
112 Stone Engineering co v Petroleos Mexicanos (1945) 352 Pa. 12, 16, 42 A. 2d 57, 59  
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When the Department of State makes known its determination with respect to political 
matters growing out of or incidental to our Government's relations with a friendly 
foreign state, it is the duty of the courts to abide by the status so indicated or created 
and to refrain from making independent inquiries into the merit of the State 
Department's determination or from taking any steps that prove embarrassing to the 
Government in handling of its foreign relations. 
 
According to Lauterpacht, “no judicial existences can be attributed to an 
unrecognised government and no legal consequences of its purported factual 
existence can be admitted. The correct and reasonable rule is that both the 
unrecognised government and its acts are a nullity.”113  English Courts’ decisions in 
this regard have been uniform to the point of rigidity. The Courts have declined to 
grant relief concerning contracts made with unrecognised governments as well as 
governments of unrecognised states. Furthermore, the English Courts have refused 
unrecognised governments the right to sue or claim jurisdictional immunity and have 
not acknowledged the validity of acts of organs of such governments. However, this 
does not mean that cases involving unrecognised governments never have or cannot 
be adjudicated by the English Courts.114 
Subject to some exceptions such as when justice or public policies are 
necessary, the decision of the English Courts has always been firm.115 In the Republic 
of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA 116, a cargo of rice was purchased 
by the Republic of Somalia to be shipped to its capital Mogadishu. Due to insurgent 
activities following the overthrow of President Siad Barre, and the problem of 
identifying the legal entity which should be regarded as the government of Somalia 
to claim the goods, the captain of the ship refused to enter Mogadishu.117 The cargoes 
were sold and the proceeds paid to a court in London.  
 
113 Lauterpacht "Recognition of Governments: II. III. The Legal Nature of Recognition and the Procedure 
of Recognition"at 37-42. 
114 Martha Peterson Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 1815-1995 
(Macmillan, New York, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1997) at 37. 
115 The position in English law is set out in Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., Vol. 18 (1977), p. 735, 
para. 1431: "A foreign government which has not been recognised by the United Kingdom Government 
as either de jure or de facto government has no locus standi in the English courts. Thus, it cannot 
institute an action in the courts . . . The English courts will not give effect to the acts of an unrecognised 
government.” 
116 Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA Queens Bench Division [1992] Queens 
Bench Division 609 to 623. 
117 Benedict Kingsbury "Judicial Determination of Foreign “Government” Status" (1993) 109 Law 
Quaterly Review at 377. 
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Through its solicitors, the interim government of Somalia headed by Ali Mahdi 
Muammar issued a summons to lay claim to the proceeds. On the question of 
whether the interim government was the proper representative of Somalia for the 
claim, Hobhouse J stated that presently, there is no functioning government in 
Somalia, and the political future of the country remains uncertain.118 The Court 
quoted the requirements for a recognised government and held that the interim 
government did not satisfy the approach as the Republic of Somalia had no 
acknowledged government. The Court decision concurs with the decision of the 
United States’ Supreme Court that judicially, an unrecognised government, is 
regarded as no government.119 Therefore, it is clear that whatever academics say, 
recognition of government is of importance in judicial matters for the government 
seeking judicial solutions. 
2.4.3. Promotes Political Stability 
Recognition promotes political stability in a state by eradicating the uncertainty 
surrounding the authority of a state in situations where a complicated, sudden, or 
unconstitutional change of government occurs.120 It indirectly warns illegitimate 
actors intending to capitalise on the unexpected change in governance that such acts 
will not be accepted, nor will there be any form of a political or legal relationship 
between them and the international community.  
 Another importance of recognition concerning political instability is reflected 
in circumstances where two autonomous powers are in effective control of significant 
parts of a state and assert a level of sovereign political permanence. An example here 
is the case of Ivory Coast, otherwise known as Cote d’Ivoire.121 In 2010, a democratic 
 
118 Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake &Carey (Suisse) SA (Queens Bench Division) (1992)   
119 Max Milstein "De Facto Governments--The Significance of Their Acts in Our Courts" (2014) 8 St. 
John's Law Review at 158 to 165. 
120 Prakash Menon "Some Thoughts About the Law Of Recognition" (1991) 3 Sri Lanka J. Int'l L at 102.  
Menon explains that the recognition of governments arises only “when there is a forcible overthrown 
of an existing government, accession to power of a new government by a procedure not provided for 
by the constitution of a state or the continuance in power of an existing government in violation of 
constitutional procedures. See also, Jean D’Aspremont "The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in 
International Law: A Reply to Susan Marks" (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law at 877. 
Another circumstance explained by Aspermont is when “when two warring government seeks the 
accreditation within the international organisation or when a state invites other states to carry out 
military operation in its territory.” 
121 A state in West Africa with a record population of 22, 400,835.  
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election was conducted between two presidential candidates, Mr Laurent Gbagbo of 
the Presidential Majority Party (La Majorities presidentially-LMP) and Mr Alassane 
Ouattara representing the Rally of Houphouetists for Democracy and Peace Party.122 
As a result of inconsistency in the declaration of the electoral results, Cote d’Ivoire 
found itself in a situation of two governments contesting for recognition.123  
After deliberations, the Economic Community of West Africa State (ECOWAS) 
and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) responded to the 
inconsistency by endorsing and recognising Ouattara as the recognised legitimate 
President of Cote d’Ivoire. The recognition of Ouattara was met with mixed reactions 
that later escalated into armed violence in several locations across the country with 
significant loss of life, property and human rights violations caused by some loyalists 
who proclaimed Gbagbo as the winner of the election.124  
In response to the crisis, the United Nations Security Council adopted a passive 
approach by affirming that it supported the views of ECOWAS and the AU.125  
 In contrast, the United States of America and France openly declared Ouattara 
as the winner of the election and the lawful democratic president of Cote d’Ivoire. 
Gbagbo reacted to the declarations by taking an oath of office as the legitimate 
president of Cote d’Ivoire and has been in control of the state administration, 
supported by strong regional majorities and winning the election with 46 per cent 
votes. In defence of his action and international responses to the state crisis, Gbagbo 
stated: 126 
In recent days, I have noted severe cases of interference. I am charged with defending 
our sovereignty, and I will not negotiate on that. I have never called on someone from 
outside to put me in office. 
 
See Lydia Poole, ‘Political and Humanitarian Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, 2010-2011 
<http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/political-and-humanitarian-crisis-in-cote-d’ivoire-
2010-2011-2447.html>, 
122 Cote d’Ivoire (2010-2011): Situation of Human Rights Defender 13 May. 2015 
<http://www.fidh.org/en/africa/Cote-d-Ivoire,566/COTE-D-IVOIRE-2010-2011> 
123 Yejoon Rim "Two Governments and One Legitimacy: International Responses to the Post-Election 
Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire" (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law at 683 
124 Scott Straus "‘It's Sheer Horror Here’: Patterns of Violence during the First Four Months of Côte 
d'Ivoire's Post-Electoral Crisis" (2011) 110 African Affairs at 481-89. 
125 Yejoon Rim "Two Governments and One Legitimacy: International Responses to the Post-Election 
Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire" (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law at 686.  




Within hours of Gbagbo’s swearing an oath of office, Ouattara responded by 
also swearing an oath of office because he was the declared the winner of the election 
by Cote d’Ivoire Independent Electoral Commission. Ouattara claims are authoritative 
since the election reports affirming him as the recognised winner of the election were 
acclaimed as lawful, free and fair by accredited observers, regional and international 
organisations. However, its nullity and cancellation by Cote d’Ivoire Constitutional 
Council after allegations of ballot fraud by Gbagbo’s supporters in some regions made 
his claim of legitimacy void. The political instability in Cote d’Ivoire was curbed 
through recognition of Ouattara as the democratically elected representative of Cote 
d’Ivoire. These reduced the margins of the death toll of casualties and boosted the 
economy of the depreciated state.  
2.4.4. Deters Unconstitutionality 
Recognition of government has the potential to reduce unconstitutional and 
illegitimate overthrow of governments. The non-recognition of the coup d'etat led 
regime that deposed the democratically elected president of Sierra Leone, President 
Ahmed Tejano Kabbah, and the endorsement of military action by the OAS for the 
restoration of the candidacy of the democratically deposed president of Haiti 
demonstrate this evidence.  
 Regimes intending to rule unconstitutionally have collapsed under the weight 
of non-recognition and sanctions. Between 2003 and 2013, the African Union 
suspended eight states from its membership as a result of the coups that took place 
in the states.127 Likewise, a total of thirteen sanctions are currently invoked by the 
United Nations Security Council on some regimes that have refused to uphold the 
principle of human rights, democracy and self-determination.128 Although the word 
‘democratisation’ is often not found per se in some of the resolutions, elements of 
democratisation are always in the agenda of some of the sanctions.129 The support of 
 
127 The following states were suspended: Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. See Sturman Kathryn "The Use of Sanctions by the 
African Union: Peaceful Means to Peaceful Ends?" (2009) South Africa Yearbook of International Affairs 
at 97- 98  and  Alex Vines "A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture" (2013) 89 International 
Affairs at 91. 
128 UN Sanctions Security Council Report: Special Research Report  29 Mar. 2013 
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/un-sanctions.php>. 
129 Most of the resolutions are worded in such a way that democratic factors cannot be ignored e.g. 
Resolution 1518 sanction of Iraq and Resolution 2048 of Guinea Bissau. 
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Cambodia democratic government against its opposition,130 the re-instalment of 
Sierra Leone elected government removed by unconstitutional mean131 and the 
adoption of the Santiago commitment Organisation of America States asserts these 
claims. 
Furthermore, unconstitutional, and illegitimate usurpation are no longer 
supported by states. For example, the military coup in Guinea-Bissau in 2012 brought 
about resolution 2048, for the restoration of constitutional order. As for Iraq, the 
primary objective of resolution 1518 in 2003 was the quick facilitation of democratic 
transition.132  
 
2.4.5. Protection of a State’s Sovereignty 
The need to protect the sovereignty of a state from internal or external attacks may 
arise at any time such that the need for outside help may be required. Recognition of 
governments provides the rightful holder of authority in a state the avenue to seek 
help to protect its sovereignty through intervention by invitation. Erika De Wet 
affirms “the only authority within a state entitled to extend an invitation for military 
assistance to another state, whether in the form of troops or arms, is the 
internationally recognised de jure government of a state.”133 The recognition of 
governments is a requirement of international law for this reason alone. Therefore, 
one way to answer why the recognition of governments is essential to international 
law is to say that recognition of governments protects sovereignty by providing the 
rightful holder of authority in a state the avenue to seek help to protect its 
sovereignty through intervention by invitation.134 For example, in 2012, the 
 
130 See UNSC Res. 864 (1993) (Angola), UNSC Res. 880 (1993) (Cambodia), UNSC Res. 1216 (1998) and 
UNSC Res. 1580 (2004) (Guinea-Bissau). 
131 See UNSC Res. 1156 (1998) and UNSC Res. 1181 (1998). 
132 UNSC Res. 1518 (2003). 
133 Erika de Wet “The Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation in Africa and Its Implications for 
the Prohibition of the Use of Force” (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law at 982. See further 
explanations by Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad "Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers 
Exercised by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003–June 2004" (2005) 54 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 256-7. See also, Richard A Falk "Janus Tormented: The 
International Law of Internal War" (1964) 185 International Aspects of Civil Strife at 223, François Roch 
"Antonio Cassese, International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005" (2004) 17 Rev. quebecoise 
de droit int'l. at 307. 
134 Louise Doswald-Beck "The legal validity of military intervention by invitation of the government" 
(1986) 56 British Yearbook of International Law at 189. According to Roberts Jennings and Arthur 
Watts, “an act of intervention by invitation will be lawful only, if the party extending the invitation 
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sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Mali came under armed attack. Its northern 
region was enmassed with various terrorist groups who had different aspirations for 
the state.135 On 6 April 2012, the northern parts of Mali were over-powered and 
subject to attacks by the external forces, whom unilaterally declared the territory as 
“The Independent Republic of Azawad.”136  
 While this was taking place, the Malian soldiers tasked with the duties of 
protecting the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the state staged a mutiny that 
resulted in a coup d’état.137 At the request of the head of Mali’s internationally 
recognised government, President Dioncttounda Tratore, France launched airstrikes 
to deter offensive actions of the external forces, thereby protecting the sovereignty 
of Mali.138 The intervention termed “Operation Serval” would not have been possible 
had the recognition of government not provided an avenue for the recognised 
government of Mali to call for intervention for the protection of its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity from external armed attacks.  
2.5. Effects of Non-recognition on a Government       
There are many adverse effects of non-recognition of governments, which are non-
integration into the society, inability to request mutual assistance such as military 
aids in terms of terrorism, relief and welfare aids in the aftermaths of civil war or 
natural disasters. The following section discusses these:  
2.5.1. Non-Integration into International Society  
As noted earlier, the relationship between international law and recognition of 
governments dates to the Middle Ages when the admission of polities to the Papal 
States relied heavily on the recognition of the rulers of such policies.139 In modern 
 
effectively controls the territory of the state and is a legitimate representative of the people within the 
inviting state.”  See also Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts Oppenheim’s International Law. Volume 1, 
Peace at 150, 435-438 see also, Louise Doswald-Beck “The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by 
Invitation of the Government” 1986 56(1) British Yearbook of International Law at 189. 
135 The terrorist group consisted of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is al Qaeda's North African wing, 
made up mostly of foreign fighters. the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, Tuareg group, 
and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 
136 Karine Bannelier & Theodore Christakis "Under the UN Security Council's Watchful Eyes: Military 
Intervention by Invitation in the Malian Conflict" (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law at 856. 
137 At 856. 
138  Karine Bannelier & Theodore Christakis "Under the UN Security Council's Watchful Eyes: Military 
Intervention by Invitation in the Malian Conflict" at 856-60. 
139 Grewe Wilhelm G The Epochs of International Law (Walter de Gruyter, 2000) at 13. 
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times, international acceptance of a state and its government largely depends on its 
recognition by other states; this gives a state and its representative the authority to 
participate in international conferences, multilateral conventions, bilateral relations 
and international transactions. 140 Conversely, non-recognition limits such 
participation. For example, an unrecognised government cannot participate in 
activities with international organisations.141 It also lacks the authority to assert rights 
and immunities that a recognised government would usually enjoy.142 For instance, 
states enjoy the rights and obligations enshrined in the United Nations Charter 
through representation in at least one of the United Nations’ organisations.143 The 
implementation of such rights and obligations would be difficult for a government 
that is not recognised.  
 In 1974, United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim disagreed with the 
President of the General Assembly’s decision to grant the head of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation, Yasser Arafat (who had requested to address the General 
Assembly) the right to sit on a unique chair that is customarily occupied by Heads of 
States.144 Realising that he was an unrecognised head of an unrecognised state, Arafat 
agreed to Mr Waldheim’s demand by standing in a reclining posture beside the chair 
instead of being seated.145 Waldheim’s request demonstrates the attitude of the 
international community towards an unrecognised government. 
 In effect, the abilities of such governments to participate in multilateral 
conventions and bilateral relations are limited.146 For example, an unrecognised 
 
140 Kelsen Hans The General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1949) at 
283. 
141 This is so because only recognised governments are integrated into the comity of states. The OECD 
was established as a government forum in 1961 and its current membership stands at 34 including 
states across North and South America, Europe, Asia and the Pacific. The organisation has significantly 
assisted economic and social development in developed and underdeveloped member states. See 
<http://www.oecd.org/>. 
142 Myres S McDougal & Richard M Goodman "Chinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal 
Imperatives of a Negotiated Solution" (1966) 60 The American Journal of International Law at 667. 
143 Myres S McDougal & Richard M Goodman "Chinese Participation in the United Nations: The Legal 
Imperatives of a Negotiated Solution" (1966) 60 The American Journal of International Law at 667. 
144 Costas M Constantinou & Yiannis Papadakis "The Cypriot State (s) in Situ: Cross-ethnic Contact and 
the Discourse of Recognition" (2001) 15 Global Society at 125-148. 
145 Costas M Constantinou & Yiannis Papadakis "The Cypriot State (s) in Situ: Cross-ethnic Contact and 
the Discourse of Recognition" (2001) 15 Global Society at 125-148. 




government cannot be a participant in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Forum (OECD).147 Likewise, an unrecognised government cannot 
be a part of international institutions such as the African Union, Organisation of the 
American States or the United Nations. These may result in hardship for a state since 
its ability to participate in germane meetings that might aid its socio-economic 
development would be hindered by the non-recognition of its government.148 
 However, the level of inter-relations is often minimal. For example, in 2007, the 
president of Fiji, Frank Bainimarama came into power unconstitutionally after a 
successful coup that overthrew the democratically elected prime minister, Laissenia 
Qarase. The unconstitutional regime was suspended from the Commonwealth and 
Pacific Islands Forum.149 Major states like Australia and New Zealand disassociated 
themselves from such regimes. Not until 2014 when the regime became legalised 
itself through democratic election did it become recognised.  
 
2.5.2. Inabilities to Request Mutual Assistance 
The non- recognition of a government has economic impacts and risks which would 
result in loss of financial or technical assistance such as development aid, military 
exchanges/training and monetary assistance which a recognised government would 
ordinarily have obtained. For example, in 2001, The Security Council enforcing its 
mandate under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter had ensured the recognised 
interim government of Afghanistan received the necessary assistance needed in its 
state eradication of terrorism.150  
 If the interim government had not been recognised such assistance would not 
have been accord; Benefits such as help in the re-establishment of state health 
finance; growth innovation and strategies; market developments and forum 
gatherings that ensure the interim government shares experiences would have been 
miss by Afghanistan. For this reason, the non-recognition of a government signifies 
 
147 The OECD was established as a government forum in 1961, as of today 34 states spanning across 
north and south America, Europe, Asia and Pacific are its members see 5 Aug 2013  
<http://www.oecd.org/> 
148 Sean D Murphy “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments” (1999) 
48(03) International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 157 
149 Stewart Firth "The Fiji Election of 2014: Rights, Representation and Legitimacy in Fiji Politics" (2015) 
104 The Round Table at 112. 
150 UN SC S/Res/1386 (2001) 
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its non-acceptance by states as representative of the state it claims to represent, 
which can have substantial material impacts upon the state.  
 
2.6. Conclusion  
This Chapter explored the recognition of governments in international law and 
considered some factors that render it essential. The Chapter answer parts of the 
research question as to why the recognition of governments is important to 
international law.  
 In effect, the Chapter contends that the recognition of governments has legal 
and material impacts upon states. Talk of removing it seems to ignore that it has a 
real impact, which is something of an inconvenient truth to those that wish to abolish 
the concept. The only issue seems to be whether we leave it entirely in the political 
realm (which seems unlikely considering the legal impact of non-recognition on a 
government) or recognise it as an international legal norm. Given its impacts upon 































Chapter Three: The Recognition of Government Problem 
3.1. Introduction 
In Chapter Two, some of the issues that resulted in the current recognition of 
governments debates were discussed. This Chapter now provides an in-depth analysis 
as to why the recognition of governments is controversial via three main sections. 
The first section discusses the difficulties that arises as a result of the inability to 
analytically distinguish between the recognition of governments and states. The 
second section discusses the problems that arise as a result of the inability to 
distinguish between the political and legal basis of recognition. The third section 
discusses the confusion and problems that arise as a result of the use of inappropriate 
terminology and ambiguous terms during the recognition of a government. At the 
end of this Chapter, the author concludes that the absence of an objective approach 
is the primary cause of the recognition of government controversies. 
3.2. Distinguishing Between Recognition of States and Recognition of Governments 
The inability to analytically distinguish between the recognition of state and 
government as subjects of international law have attracted critiques as to what 
approach truly circumscribe the practice of recognition in international law.151 While 
some academics of recognition are united in the treatment of recognition as a matter 
best situated to states as opposed to governments.152 Others, believe that 
recognition as a general topic of international law relates to states and governments 
combine based on the fact that a government cannot exist without a state and vice-
versa.153 The failure of academics to reach an agreement on this matter has 
contributed to the confusion surrounding the recognition of governments in 
 
151 See also, Robert D Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of 
Tibet" (2002) 16 Emory Int'l L. Rev. at 113.  
152 Martha Peterson "Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished" (1983) 77 The American 
Journal of International Law at 33. See also, Thomas Grant The Recognition of States: Law and practice 
in Debate and Evolution (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), Sean Murphy "Democratic legitimacy 
and the Recognition of States and Governments" (1999) 48 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
at 545 to 581, Hans Kelsen "Recognition in International Law" (1941) 35 American Journal of 
International Law at 605-617, Herbert Briggs "Recognition of states: some reflections on doctrine and 
practice" (1949) 43 American Journal of International Law at 113. See also, Gerhard Erasmus 
"Approach for Determining Statehood: John Dugard "Recognition and the United Nations" (1988) 4 
South African Journal on Human Rights at 207 to 220. 
153 Robert D Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" 
(2002) 16 Emory Int'l L. Rev. at 113. 
47 
 
international law.154 For instance, Ian Brownlie contends that it is impossible not to 
conflate the recognition of government and state as one, because in principle, most 
of the approach set out for the recognition of state apply equally to the recognition 
of government. According to him, "the existence of an effective government is the 
essence of statehood, and, significantly, recognition of states may take the form of 
recognition of a government.”155 Similarly, James Crawford notes that “for a state to 
exist as an entity, it must possess a government or a system of government that is in 
general control of its territory, to the exclusion of other entities.”156  
It is difficult not to agree with these academics considering firstly, that a 
government existence is part of  statehood157  and the existence of a state depends 
on the presence of an effective government.158 Secondly, the general requirement for 
the recognition of governments in international law relies on similar approach as the 
recognition of states. Indeed, a government will not be recognised as the lawful 
representative of a state if it fails among other requirements to effectively control 
substantial parts of a state population and its territories.159 Hence, the recognition of 
state and the recognition of government should be treated as the same topic with 
the same approach considering the maxim that "there is no government without a 
state, there is no state without a government".160 The importance of this is noted in 
the advisory opinion of the International Committee of Jurists in the Aaland Island 
Case when it declared that Finland was not a sovereign state from 1917 to 1918 due 
 
154 Robert Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 
Emory Int'l L. Rev. at 112-113. 
155 Ian Brownlie Principles of public international law (Oxford University Press, 1990) at 689. 
156 James R Crawford The Creation of States in International Law (OUP Oxford, 2007) at 45-46. Robert 
Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 16 Emory 
Int'l L. Rev. at 107. 
157 The Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia affirms that a “state is 
commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population, subject to an 
organised political authority.” Craven Matthew CR "The European Community Arbitration Commission 
on Yugoslavia" (1996) 66 The British Year Book of International Law at 333. 
158 Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States is clear that a state as a 
person of international law must, among other things, possess a government. See, Convention on 
Rights and Duties of a State adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American States, 26 
December 1933, 165 LNTS 19. 
159 This is discussed in more details in Chapter four. 




to its lack of a government.161 However, Brad Roth contends that the maxim that a 
state cannot be separated from a government because both are interwoven is 
false.162 Roth maintains that statehood is a normative rather than an empirical fact 
because a state does not necessarily cease if its government descends into chaos, nor 
is it reduced in size.163 It implies that the personality of a state is not affected by 
changes in governance. A state remains a state no matter the changes and 
transformation it undergoes, and its normative character remains constant while that 
of a government may cease.  
 Hence, the notion that a state cannot exist without a government, or a 
government cannot exist without a state is invalid as there have been instances in 
international law where states have existed without functioning governments. For 
the past 21 years, Somalia has been ripped apart with insurgency, Islamic extremists, 
pirate gangs and Clan militias, yet it continued to exist as a state without 
government.164 Also, despite the non-recognition of Tibet as a state, the government 
of Tibet continues to exist in exile.  Based on these examples, a state can indeed exist 
without a government and a government can exist without a state. As such, the 
recognition of a government should be treated as entirely separate from the 
recognition of a state. As far as statehood is concerned, the factual situation should 
be examined case by case because different approach applies when a change in 
government occurs, and recognition will only really be relevant where the change in 
 
161 Reports of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by Council of the League of Nations 
with the Task of giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of Aaland Islands Question, LNOJ 
spec Supp. 3(1920) (hereinafter the Aaland Island Case (1920) at 8-9. The Committee stated that for a 
considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign state did not exist. In the 
midst of revolution and anarchy, certain elements essential to the existence of a state, even some 
elements of fact, were lacking for a relatively considerable period… It is, therefore, difficult to say at 
what exact date the Finnish Republic, in the legal sense of the term, actually became a definitely 
constituted sovereign state. This certainly did not take place until a stable political organization had 
been created, and until the public authorities had become strong enough to assert themselves 
throughout the territories of the State without the assistance of foreign troops. 
162 Brad  Roth Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 
at 130. 
163 Brad  Roth Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 
at 130. 
164 Harish Venugopalan, "Somalia: A failed state?" < https://www.orfonline.org/research/somalia-a-
failed-state/> accessed on 28 August 2019.  
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government is unconstitutional. 165 As noted in Russian Government v Leigh Valley by 
the US Court of Appeal:166 
The granting or refusal of recognition of governments has nothing to do with the 
recognition of states itself. If a foreign state refuses the recognition of a change in the 
form of government of an old state, the latter does not thereby lose its recognition as 
an international person. The suit did not abate by the change in the form of government 
in Russia; the state is perpetual and survives the form of its government. 
 
In the above case, the Ambassador of the Russian provisional government 
commenced a legal suit in the name of the ‘State of Russia’ despite the dissolution of 
the country’s interim government. The Court’s decision rests on the fact that a state 
may survive without an effective government. As noted earlier, the recognition of 
Somalia as a state in the Horn of Africa is not in doubt. Neither is the lack of a 
functioning government even though different attempts to form one in the past 21 
years have had an effect on the recognition of the state as Somalia.167 While Somalia 
would miss out on some of the benefits discusses in Chapter two of this study that 
would ordinarily be accrued by a recognised government. Somalis’ right as citizens of 
Somalia (for example citizenship) will not be denied because of its lack of a recognised 
government.168  
States under the control of terrorists or embroiled in secessionist conflict will 
continue to exist as states. This is so because once a state is recognised as having 
acquired statehood, it is hard for it to lose its status, even if it no longer meets some 
of the approach for statehood. However, the case of a government is an entirely 
different situation because a government can lose its status by the withdrew of its 
recognition.169 In 2012, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Arab League and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council tactically withdrawn their recognition of Syrian 
President Bashar Assad by recognising the opposition, National Coalition of Syrian 
 
165 Shaw Malcolm International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at 377. 
166 Russian Government v Leigh Valley R.R [1919], 293 Fed.133, [1924] 265, 573. 
167 Pijovic Nikola "To be or Not to be: Rethinking the Possible Repercussions of Somaliland's 
International Statehood Recognition" (2014) 14 African Studies Quarterly at 18. 
168 Pijovic Nikola "To be or Not to be: Rethinking the Possible Repercussions of Somaliland's 
International Statehood Recognition" (2014) 14 African Studies Quarterly at 18. 
169 McCorquodale Robert "The Creation and Recognition of States" (2005) 2 Public International Law: 
an Australian Perspective at 192. 
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Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROR) as the legitimate representative of 
the Syrian People.170 
While the concept of a state is linked to the presence of a ruling apparatus, the 
absence of government does not necessarily limit its statehood.171 Once a state has 
been recognised, its legal personality continues notwithstanding internal divisions 
that may affect its governance and administration.172 Withholding recognition of a 
state on the basis that it lacks an effective government automatically violates its 
autonomy as a sovereign state. As explained by Ti Chiang Chen: 173 
In recognition of governments, there is no question of the creation of personality. For 
the personality belongs to the state and survives the change of government…the 
continued existence of the state renders it the more compelling that the recognition of 
government should not be duly delayed. The government is the sole organ through 
which a state expresses its will. The refusal to recognise and to deal with it would deprive 
the state of the means of exercising its international rights, particularly those requiring 
positive actions. 
 
 Failure to reach consensus on the separation of these two concepts, i.e. the 
recognition of states and the recognition of government, has made the recognition 
of government controversial.174 On the one hand, Chen asserts that the recognition 
of the government and the state are different concepts as the legal personality and 
continuity of a state is not affected or interrupted by changes in government. 
However, Thomas Baty disagrees by affirming that the continuity of a state survives 
in temporary situations only. When conflict escalates to an unreasonable extent, 
recognition becomes impossible. The problem, therefore, lies in determining what 
 
170 Richard Spencer "Britain Officially Recognise New Syrian Rebel Coalition as Countries 'Legitimate 
Government’ The Telegraph <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9691319/Britain-officially-
recognises-new-Syrian-rebel-coalition-as-countrys-legitimate-government.html>, The GCC comprises 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait see recognition decision on 
Gulf Cooperation Council Recognises Syrian Opposition Bloc, 13 Nov. 2012 <http://en.rian.ru>, Ian 
Black “UK: Syrian opposition 'sole legitimate representative' of the people” The Guardian  8 Aug. 
2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/20/uk-syrian-opposition-sole-legitimate 
representative-people>.  
171 Brad Roth, Reconceptualising Recognition of States and Governments in Yuri Van Hoef "Recognition 
in International Relations: Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context edited by Christopher 
Daase, Caroline Fehl, Anna Geis and Georgios Kolliarakis" (2015) 91 International Affairs 130. 
172 Ti-Chiang Chen The International Law of Recognition: with Special Reference to Practice in Great 
Britain and the United States (Praeger, 1951) at 103-104. 
173 Ti-Chiang Chen The International Law of Recognition: with Special Reference to Practice in Great 
Britain and the United States (Praeger, 1951) at 103-104. 
174 Robert Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 
16 Emory Int'l L. Rev. at 107-112. 
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constitute a prolonged situation, what approach and when should recognition be 
accord?175  
 Be that as it may, the author is of the position that a distinction between the 
recognition of states and that of governments is crucial due to the effects of non-
recognition on a government. For example, as discussed in Chapter Two of this study, 
an unrecognised government lacks the locus standi to enforce judicial actions, it will 
lose out on benefits such as military assistance and would lack the authority to assert 
rights and immunities that a recognised government would usually enjoy. While a 
state will continue to exist, enjoy the benefits of its existence with existing treaties 
remaining in force in respect of any change it undergoes under any circumstances.  
 A solution to the current problem will be to review and distinguish clearly the 
approach for recognising governments and that of state to avoid the problem of 
conflating both as the same.  
3.3. Distinguishing Between Political And Legal Basis of Recognition 
The continued insistence that the recognition of a government is a political rather 
than a judicial matter has been the subject of much debate among states and 
academics.176 Generally, It is accepted that recognition requires states to act in the 
exercise of political discretion, and there are no equivocal rule that establish a legal 
duty to recognise under any circumstances.177 The refusal of the courts to grant locus 
standi to unrecognised governments and their continued insistence that the 
recognition of a government is a political matter further added to the confusion on 
 
175 Thomas Baty "Can an Anarchy be a State" (1934) 28 Am J. Int'l L. at 445. Baty believes that foreign 
countries cannot be expected to recognise anarchy and cannot be obliged to refrain from interference 
in a region for which nobody is responsible. 
176 Hersch Lauterpacht Recognition in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 38. See, 
Joshua Downer "Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition" (2013) 46 Vand. J. 
Transnat'l L. at 581. Stefan Talmon "The Constitutive versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: 
Tertium non datur?" (2005) 75 The British Year Book of International Law at 101, Yossi Shain 
"Governments-in-Exile and International Legitimation" (1991) Governments-in-Exile in Contemporary 
World Politics at 219. See, Hans Agné "The Politics of International Recognition: Symposium 
Introduction" (2013) 5 IT at 94. See also, Leva Vezbergaite "International Recognition and Its 
Implications for the Statehood" (2015) 3 International Relations at 786-793. See Philip Brown "The 
Legal Effects of Recognition" (1950) 44 American Journal of International Law at 617 to 640. See, Jure 
Vidmar "Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition" (2012) 61 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly at 361 to 387.  
177 Robert Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 
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whether the recognition of governments is a legal or indeed a political matter with 
legal consequence.178   
 Considering that the recognition of governments, as well as its underlying 
policy, are addressed by the political departments of each state and not the Courts;179 
It seems that the recognition of government cannot be argued as a matter of law 
because there exists no legal obligation on the part of any government to accord 
recognition nor any legal right exists on the part of any government to receive 
recognition.180However, some academics challenged  this position because 
recognition manifests the legal existence of a government to act on behalf of a state 
and willingness of other states to transact with the government based on the 
existence.181 Therefore, it is believed that recognition of governments is a political act 
with legal consequences because any contract signed or reached by a politically 
recognised government is valid by law while that of an unrecognised government is 
invalid. 
  Also, only the lawful representative of a state has the full power to act on 
behalf of the state. Prior to recognition, the recognition status of a government is 
undefined.182 But, when a government is recognised, its status is defined and lawful, 
thus empowering it to act on behalf of the state and retroactively be bound by rights, 
obligations and contracts made on behalf of the state by law.183 This situation 
contrasts starkly for an unrecognised government; the legal consequences of non-
recognition are reflected by the failure of courts to grant an unrecognised 
 
178 Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938); See also Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-
20 (1978). 
179 Jose Maria Ruda, “Recognition of States and Government” in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed) 
International law: Achievements and prospects (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) at 449. Stefan 
Talmon Recognition of Governments in International Law: with Particular Reference to Governments 
in Exile (Clarendon Press, Oxford, New York, 1998).29 at vii. and the International Law Commission, 
Sixth Report on Unilateral Acts by States (2003), Documents A/CN.4/534, Paragraph 9, Hersch  
Lauterpacht Recognition in International Law (Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1947) at 817. 
180 Robert Sloane "The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 
16 Emory Int'l L. Rev. at 121. Stanley K Hornbeck "Recognition of Governments" (1950) 44 Proceedings 
of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969) at 181.   
181 Jean D' Aspremont "Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy" (2006) 38 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics at 877. 
182 Article 2(c) and 7 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also,  UN Doc.  A/ 
CONF. 39/27 1969). 
183 Stefan Talmon "Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice" 
(1993) 63 British Yearbook of International Law at 244. 
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government to judicial proceedings. Also, its acts and that of its representatives 
would be regarded as void. 184 The government will not be able to sign treaties on 
behalf of the states or officially enter legal relationships in the state name; neither 
can its actions be retroactive.185 For these reasons, to accept that the recognition of 
a government is a mere political matter at the discretion of a recognising state is to 
concede it as a mere political matter.   
Another main distinctive point that acknowledges recognition of governments 
as a political matter with legal consequences is the non-entitlement of unrecognised 
government to immunity. The judicial position is clear that an unrecognised 
government cannot claim immunity nor carry out judicial acts. The United States of 
America's position is that accreditation of an entity in the diplomatic list is the 
necessary condition for the enjoyment of diplomatic immunity. If an entity is not 
recognised, there will be no accreditation in the diplomatic list and, therefore, no 
immunity.186 Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two of this study, a state whose 
government is refused recognition or whose government recognition is withheld 
could be deprived of international legal personality, rights and duties which it would 
have ordinarily enjoyed under international law as a result of recognition. 187 
 In the author opinion, recognition of governments should be classified as an 
entirely political matter with legal consequences because firstly, recognition of 
governments is an invitation to intercourse. Secondly, decisions on recognition of 
governments usually rest within the executive branch of a state rather than the 
judiciary, however the judiciary will not grant Locus standi to an unrecognised 
government. Thirdly, no court of law will accept the failure to recognise a government 
as a breach of rights because no legal obligation or rights exist.188 Also, the practice 
 
184 Scott Davidson "Recognition of Foreign Governments in New Zealand" (1991) 40 The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 162 to 169. 
185 Most courts, including the United Kingdom and the United states holds this position. For further 
details, please refer to Guaranty Trust v. United States [1938] 308 U. S. 126, 137. 
186 Yrissari v. Clement, (1826) 2 Bing. 432; O'Neill v. Central Leather Co. (1915) 87 N. J. L.552; United 
States v. Palmer (1818) 3 Wheat. 610 Knox v. PLO, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 S.D.N.Y. (2004) Efrat Ungar 
et al. v. Palestine Liberation Org. 420 F3d 274, 282-83 (1st Cir. 2005) at 57 
187 See Chapter two. 
188 Joshua Downer "Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition" (2013) 46 Vand. J. 
Transnat'l L. at 584. Although, recent practices concerning the recognition of governments practices 
challenge this position. Evidence demonstrates that with some state shifts to democratic legitimacy, 
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of leaving recognition of governments to the political discretion of individual states 
seems to be gradually diminishing. In several recent recognition of government cases 
as Côte d’Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Mali (2012), and Gambia(2017),  the 
United Nations and Organisation of African states have called for collective non-
recognition or recognition of repressive governments.189 Based on this new trend, the 
notion that the recognition of governments is a political matter, based on the 
absolute political discretion of states is contentious. Therefore, there is a need to re-
examine the recognition of government approaches in order to avoid the 
unnecessary confusion on whether recognition is a political, legal or moral principle 
better left to the discretion of states, citizens or international organisations?  
3.4. Unclear Statements and Faulty Terminologies 
A government could be consider as recognised if it has expressly, tacitly, impliedly or 
silently been granted recognition.190 When recognition is express, it takes the form of 
a formal declaration through official writing,191 statements of notification or public 
announcement by a recognising government to another. 192  Express recognition does 
not necessarily require the word “recognise” to be in its wording. Although, an 
express recognition that consists of the word “recognise as the government” has the 
merit of clarity and the removal of confusion or doubts that may arise when 
determining whether a government is recognised or not.  
 On the other hand, implied or silent recognition is deemed to have taken place 
when a government does not expressly declare its recognition but does an act that is 
silently consistent with recognition such as the signing of treaties with a government 
or entering relations inofficiously.193  However, confusion often arises as to whether 
 
recognition of governments is becoming a legal matter because international law protects a universal 
right to democracy which in turn begets legal obligations. 
189 Example is the recognition of President Quattara in Cote d'lvoire 2011, President Hadi in Yemen 
2015 and the 2016 recognition of Government of National Accord in Libya 2016  
190 Ti-Chiang Chen The international law of recognition (Рипол Классик, 1951) at 189. 
191 The decision of the Australian Government to recognize the Royal Government of National Union 
of Cambodia was conveyed by a formal message of the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 
Foreign Minister of that Government on 17 April 1975. 
192 For example, the White House press release of I January 1949 announcing the decision to 
extend full recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea: US Department of State Bulletin, 
20 (1949) at 59-60. The declarations, “expressly states the willingness of the state to transact with the 
other government based on its status as the lawful representative of the state.  
193 Martha Peterson Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice 1815-1995 
(Springer, 1997) at 87. 
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a state through its actions or use of terminologies intends recognition to occur or 
whether its actions were for other purposes.  
 Eighteen months into the Syrian conflict, Stefan Talmon published an article 
that drew further attention to the problem of unclear recognition statements, the 
use of inappropriate terminology and the effects of this problem on a recognised 
government.194 Talmon asserts that a day after the rebranding of the Syrian 
opposition forces as the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition 
Forces (NCSROF),195 states began recognising the NCSROF as the legitimate 
representative of Syria, despite President Bashar al-Assad, the sitting president, 
retaining control of significant parts of the country. This commenced with a 
declaration from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of the National Coalition for the 
Forces of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition as the legitimate representative of 
the brotherly Syrian people.196  Some few hours later, the Arab League of States 
stated support for the NCSROF and encouraged other Syrian opposition groups to join 
it. 197    
  Mindful of its terminology, the Arab League Council urged member states and 
other organisations to recognise the NCSROF as the “legitimate representative and 
primary negotiator with the Arab League.” 198  A few days later, France announced its 
recognition of “the Syrian National Coalition as the sole legitimate representative of 
the Syrian people and thus as the future provisional government of a democratic Syria 
which paves the way to put an end to Bashar Assad’s regime.” 199 In the following 
weeks, more states issued recognition statements including the European Union 
which announced that the EU considers the National Coalition for Syrian 
 
194 Talmon shed light on the effects of this problem on a recognised government and citizens of a state. 
The article, titled “Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People” 
received a download rank of 27194 on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) and had 51 860 
results on Google in its second week of publication. See, Stefan Talmon "Recognition of Opposition 
Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People" (2013) Chinese Journal of International Law at 
253. 
195 Otherwise known as the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC). 
196 GCC recognises new Syrian opposition Bloc, Aljazeera, 03 February 2013. 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/20121112175539534504.html>. 
197 Arab League recognizes new Syrian opposition bloc, Reuters, 13 November 2012  
<http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Arab-League-recognizes-new-Syrian-opposition-bloc> 
198 See above. 




Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representatives of the 
aspirations of the Syrian people.200 
 The recognition of the NCSROF occurred just over a year after the recognition 
of the Libyan opposition groups. In both cases, confusing and unclear terminology 
was used that not only falls short of recognition but fails to show a clear intention to 
recognise.201  Most of the statements were declarations of support rather than 
recognition because they contained the words ‘acknowledge’, ‘accept’ or ‘consider’ 
rather than ‘recognise’. For instance, the United State announcement stated that:202 
We have made a decision that the Syrian Opposition Coalition is now inclusive enough, 
is reflective and representative enough of the Syrian population that we consider them 
the legitimate representative of the Syrian people in opposition to the Assad regime.  
 
This statement implies that recognition has not been granted but is still under political 
consideration. For a recognition statement to be valid, the statement must not only 
show clarity but contain statements that show an intention to grant recognition. 
 The use of clear statements when recognising a government is essential to 
avoid unnecessary confusion. Inappropriate terminology and unclear statements can 
be misleading and can lead to unjust results. What ought to be a simple statement of 
intention and confirmation of a status quo could lead to confusion such as questions 
about a government’s legal status quo. Incorrect terminology not only wastes time 
but confuses real intention. Furthermore, it portrays the recognition of government 
as a political rather than a legal act. 203  For instance, being declared as the 
representative of the aspirations of a people confers a different role, meaning and 
 
200 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Syria, Doc 16392/12, 19 
November 2012 (http://register.consilium.europa.eu). 
201 Such statements contain words such as “recognise as the sole repository of governmental authority, 
the only legitimate interlocutor on bilateral relations.” See Stefan Talmon "Recognition of Opposition 
Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People" (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law at 
216–253, Christian Schaller "Siding with Rebels: Recognition of Opposition Groups and the Provision 
of Military Assistance in Libya and Syria (2011–2014)" in  From Cold War to Cyber War (Springer Cham, 
2016) at 251 to 263. 
202 Stefan Talmon "Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People" 
(2013) 12  Chinese Journal of International Law at 223. 
203 Stefan Talmon "Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People" 
(2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law at 227. 
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intention from being declared as the representative of the people itself.  As noted by 
Talmon: 204  
For a group to be recognised as the legitimate representative of the aspiration of the 
Libyan people, it must express the ‘right’ aspirations in the eyes of the recognising states; 
although it is not always clearly spelt out what these aspirations should be. Western 
European recognising states defined the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people as 
convener of freedom, democracy and social justice. 
 
Recognising a government as the sole legitimate representative of a state carries a 
significant level of clarity and intention, rather than the ambiguous statement of 
recognising it as the legitimate representative of the brotherly Syrian people. In the 
absence of an objective approach stating the process and methods of recognising 
governments, a state may not only err in its decision by the wrong use of terminology 
but tends to violate the sovereignty of another state by its recognition declaration(for 
example pre-mature recognition). Furthermore, confusion may easily arise as to 
whether a state intends recognition to occur or not.  
3.5. Conclusion  
This Chapter examined different problems relating to the recognition of governments 
in international law. It discussed the failure to distinguish between the recognition of 
states and governments; difficulties in distinguishing between political and legal 
recognition, and the use of unclear statements and ambiguous terminology in 
recognising governments. A primary cause of the recognition of government 
controversies is the lack of an objective approach to define the process and methods 
by which a government should be recognised. 
  Until the end of the Cold war, the effective control doctrine was the dominant 
approach for the recognition of governments. However, its adverse effects, because 
of its political character and non-binding nature makes it less desirable. Furthermore, 
because the effective control approach for recognising governments is the same as 
the statehood approach for recognising states, the confusion as to whether the 
recognition of state and the recognition of government should be conflated or 
treated separately continues to arise in matters of recognition.   
 
204 Stefan Talmon "Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a People" 
(2013)  12 Chinese Journal of International Law at 253. 
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 At present, there exist no objective approach or any form of a treaty provision 
for the recognition of governments. International law continues to view the 
recognition of government as discretionary and at times, political or legal depending 
on how it suits. Therefore, recognition of government matters is replete with 
situations where a government is deemed politically legitimate by some states and 
illegitimate by others because each state continues to evaluate and recognises 
government through the approach that it chooses.   
 The author, therefore, concludes that the best solution to the recognition of 
government problems is the formation of an objective approach that would dictate 
the methods and process for recognising governments. This will solve the current 
debates on whether recognition of government is a legal or purely a political matter 
and resolve the meaning of recognition as applied to states and government. Also, an 
objective approach would put an end to the confusion that arises because of                                          


















Chapter 4: States and Academics Approaches to the Recognition of Government 
Problem. 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter Three of this study identified the lack of an objective approach as the major 
drawback of the recognition of governments. This Chapter sets out to identify the 
possible ways of improving the current situations. To this end, this Chapter reviews 
five different approaches (namely the Effective control doctrine, Thomas Jefferson 
approach, Carlos Tobar doctrine, Genaro Estrada doctrine and Democratic Legitimacy 
doctrine) that were developed from the seventeenth century until today to address 
the recognition of governments problem. The reason for selecting these approaches 
is that they have been subjects of debates both from within the states of their 
emergence and at the international level where they were adopted by states.  
 Studying the various approaches will help to get a better understanding as to 
the best possible solutions for the problems presented in the previous Chapters. Also, 
it establishes that while some of the approaches are appropriate in certain situations 
and resolves some of the recognition of government problems, they are inadequate 
in others.  As such, the recognition of government remains under the spotlight of 
further studies and investigation.  
4.2. State Solutions: The Seventeenth Century 
 A review of literature makes it clear that the Sixteenth  century Westaphalia treaty 
resulted in the formation of the modern state system and the development of the 
recognition of governments practice in the international law.205 The intention to 
which power would be consecrated in sovereign states rather than the higher 
authority of the Pope and the Emperor.206  
  With these developments, each state representative had the authority to act 
on behalf of the states, establish alliances and govern their respective states as long 
as they were in effective control of the state.207 During the Westphalia Era, this 
 
205 See Chapter Two discussion on the Rationale behind the recognition of Governments in 
International Law. 
206 Leo Gross “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” (1948) 42(1) The American Journal of International 
Law at 28 
207 Marcilio Toscano Franca Filho “Westphalia: A Paradigm-A Dialogue between Law, Art and 
Philosophy of Science” (2007) 8 German Law Journal at 955 to 975. 
60 
 
manifested itself in various situations such as when a fraction as unconstitutionally 
overthrown a government or a new fraction ascend to power in a process not 
provided for in a state constitution. The below section provides a detail overview of 
the effective control doctrine which is the most dominant recognition of government 
approach as of today.  
4.2.1. The Effective Control Doctrine: An Overview 
Post-Westphalia, a government could only be recognised as the lawful representative 
of a state if it effectively established itself within a national territory, asserted 
authority by having the habitual obedience of its people, showed ability and 
willingness to fulfil obligations and in case of revolutions showed evidence of control 
with reasonable permanency.208 This doctrine, known as the effective control 
doctrine was the dominant traditional approach for recognising governments and 
benefitted  from widespread support from states until the end of the Cold War.209 
  Academically, it first originated from the works of Hugo Grotius in the 
sixteenth century. However, it was rarely used by states until the seventeenth century 
when Emmerich de Vattel advanced the principle with more clarity. He explained that 
states lack the powers to interfere or pass judgment on the constitutionality of a 
national government irrespective of the origin or exercise, except they wish to declare 
war or enmity with the state.210 The reason for Vattel's claim is that according to 
international law, a government brought into permanent power by a revolution or 
coup d’état is the legitimate government of the state whose identity is not affected 
by its origin. Further developed by Hans Kelsen under the grundnorm theory,211 and 
re enshrine in 1820 Alliances Declaration of Principles.212 
 
208 Hersch Lauterpacht "Recognition of Governments: II. III. The Legal Nature of Recognition and the 
Procedure of Recognition" (1946) Columbia Law Review at 91, 92 
209 Joshua Downer "Towards a Declaratory School of Government Recognition" (2013) 46 Vand. J. 
Transnat'l L. at 590.  
210 According to Vattel, foreigners have no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a State, they are 
not obliged to examine or pass upon the justice or injustice of its conduct in the management of them; 
they may if they think fit, presume that the sovereign in procession is the lawful one.  When a Nation 
has driven out its sovereign, other powers which do not wish to declare war with it or arouse its enmity, 
consider it henceforth as a free and sovereign State, without taking it upon themselves to judge 
whether it has acted justly in throwing off the sovereignty of its former prince. Vattel, Work Les Droit 
d Gen. IV, ch. V, sec. at 68 
211 General Theory of Law and State, Harvard ed., 1945 (hereinafter cited as " G.T.L.S.") at 118, 
212 The principle states that Any state forming part of the European Alliance which may change its form 
of interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become a menace to other 
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 A review of literature and state practices around the world shows that 
concerns associated with the emergence of power (origin of a government) and the 
test of effectiveness has factors that makes the effective control doctrine unsuitable. 
Below section explores a number of weaknesses associated with the effective control 
doctrine. 
4.2.2. Critique of the Effective Control Doctrine  
The advantages of the effective control doctrine are often overlooked by 
commentators who call for the abolishment of the approach.213 The author of this 
thesis, however, identifies some significant advantage of the effective control 
doctrine that distinguishes it from other recognition of government approaches.  
 Realistically, the effective control doctrine has some advantages that make it 
more useful and better than the other recognition of government approach. For 
instance, a review of state practises shows the effective control doctrine as a 
substantive recognition of government approach that resolves the debates that 
recognition of government practices infringes on state sovereignty. It is so because 
the approach do not permit interference or an enquiry into the process by which a 
government comes into power before recognition is granted.214 According to the 
principle of international law, today and universally accepted by states, under the 
effective control doctrine the capacity of a government to represent the state in its 
international relations does not depend in any degree on the constitutionality or 
origin of a government. The fact is that a usurper who in fact, holds power with the 
 
states, will automatically cease to form a part of the Alliance, and will remain excluded from its councils 
until its situation gives every guarantee of order and stability. The Allied Powers not only formally 
declare the above to be their unalterable policy, but faithful to the principles which they have 
proclaimed concerning the authority of legitimate governments, they further agree to refuse to 
recognize any changes brought about by other than legal means. In the case of states where such 
changes have already taken place and such action has thereby given cause for apprehension to 
neighbouring states (it lies within the ability of the powers to take such useful and beneficent action) 
they will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance. 
Friendly negotiations will be the first means resorted to, and if this fails, coercion will be employed, 
should this be necessary.  
213 For instance, Christopher Le mon believed that the effective control doctrine Leaves little room for 
flexibility nor consideration to determine the would-be governments policies or principles. Christopher 
Le Mon,’ Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in Civil War: The Effective Control Test Tested’ (2003) 35 
International Law and Politics 741 at 745. 
214 Brad Roth "Secessions, Coups and the International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of the 
Effective Control Doctrine" (2010)  11 Melbourne Journal of International Law at 2; Doswald-Beck "The 
Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government" (1985) 56 British Yearbook of 
International Law BYIL at 194. 
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express or tacit consent of the nation, acts validly in the name of the state under the 
effective control doctrine. 
 To date, the effective control doctrine is the only recognition of government 
approach that finds expressions in various areas of international law principles such 
as the recognition of state and military intervention by invitation.215 During civil strife, 
the effective control doctrine remains the only non-contested landmark decisive test 
for determining the faction best placed to speak on behalf of the state.216 Although 
the effective control doctrine is not enshrined in any international instruments, it is 
recognised under customary international law and a general and consistent practice 
of states. Furthermore, the effective control doctrine is the only favoured recognition 
of government approach that has provided a clear basis for the conduct of 
international relations by ensuring that only the government that is in effective 
control is recognised.217  
 The most significant disadvantage of the effective control doctrine is the 
antithetical nature of the principle to the “self-determination notion of the people's 
will” by overtly relying on the concept of "control" rather than popular acceptance as 
it means test.  Also, neither is there a benchmark at the time of recognition under the 
doctrine in determining whether a putative government would effectively administer 
state functions despite been in control of the state conflict.218 Non is there any 
consideration for an enquiry into the process by which the government gains control. 
In effect, a government that comes into power through coup d’état or any other 
unconstitutional means could be recognised as long as it is in control of the state.219 
The process by which a government gains control and conducts itself under the 
 
215 The effective control doctrine is factual test for determining statehood and invitation for military 
assistances. See Colin Warbrick "Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition" (1981) 30 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly at 473-82, Roland Rich "Recognition of states: The collapse of Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union" (1993) 4 Eur. J. Int'l L. at 36. Erika De Wet "The modern practice of intervention 
by invitation in Africa and its implications for the prohibition of the use of force" (2015) 26 European 
Journal of International Law at 998.  
216 Awol Kassim Allo "Counter-intervention, Invitation, Both or Neither: An Appraisal of the 2006 
Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia" (2009) 3 Mizan Law Review at 220.  
217 Christopher Le Mon,’ Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in Civil War: The Effective Control Test 
Tested’ (2003) 35 International Law and Politics 741 at 748. 
218 Christopher J Le Mon "Unilateral intervention by invitation in civil wars: the effective control test 
tested" (2002) 35 NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. at 745.   
219 Christopher Le’Mon, ‘Unilateral Intervention by Invitation In civil War: The Effective Control Test 
Tested’ (2003) 35 International Law and Politics 741 at 745 
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doctrine is irrelevant.220 The key question is whether it has attained control. Despite 
these, little has been done to give a concrete definition of what constitutes control. 
 Although, some academics argued on effectiveness as the actual test rather 
than control for the effective control doctrine.221 However, contentious questions 
arise as to whether effectiveness should be equated to the success of the 
government's ability to carry out functions and what duration of time should be 
judged before a regime is considered effectively successful to be recognised. While 
the court in State v Dosso222 had decided that twenty-one days seems to be sufficient 
enough to make such determinations, the decision of the Privy Council in 
Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke223 that two years and eight months was insufficient 
to determine whether a regime will be effective caused more confusion than 
solutions. The reason been that waiting for such long periods before recognition is 
granted may affect the state in terms of some advantages discussed in Chapter Two. 
  Additionally, "assert authority by the habitual obedience of the people" 
constitute command rather than consent under the doctrine. Also, the lack of 
consideration for constitutionality that may arise as a result of maintaining control 
questions the continued use of the effective control doctrine from a moral angle.224 
As expressed by the High Court of Lesotho in Mokotso and Others v. H.M.King 
 
220 See comment of Justice Taft C.J. in the Tinoco Concession Case herein Great Britain v Costa Rica 1 
RIAA 369(1923) at 381-2. 
221 Benedict Kingsbury “Judicial Determination of Foreign “Government” Status” (1993) 109 Law 
Quarterly Review at 377 to 382.  
222 The State v. Dosso [1958] P.L.D. 533a. 
223 Madiimbamulo v. Lardner-Burke [ 1968] 3 All ER 561. 
224 Since the question of constitutionality is irrelevant in the effective control doctrine, if a government 
can satisfy the granting state that it is in de facto control of the state.  Martha Peterson "Recognition 
of governments should not be abolished." (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law at 37. See 
also, Per Professor Charles Hyde “No difficulty presents itself as normal when a change happens by 
abnormal processes, and such change is regarded as a mere incident in the life and growth of the state 
concerned. The situation is obscure, for the fact, that when a contest for governmental control is 
waged by force of arms, or by other processes not contemplated by national laws of the state involved, 
the completeness of the success of such contestant may be relatively open to doubt for a protracted 
period. See Stanley K Hornbeck "Recognition of Governments" (1950) 44 Proceedings of the American 
Society of International Law at 182, Danny Auron "The Derecognition Approach: Government Illegality, 
Recognition, and Non-Violent Regime Change" (2013) 45 George Washington International Law 
Review at 468. 
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Moshoeshoe II and Others, “Legality should be achieved if and only if the bulk of the 
people accept and approve, for in them lies political sovereignty.”225  
 In recent times, additional factors such as absences of violence,226 abilities to 
fulfil legal obligation have been added by states.227 However, the addition of these 
factors in the practical sense does not address the problems associated with the 
effective control doctrine considering recognition of governments is necessary under 
unconstitutional circumstances.228 Instead, it creates the problem of variances in 
approach and inconsistencies in decisions, which were discussed in Chapter Two of 
this study as part of the reasons for the suggestions that recognition of governments 
should be abandoned in international law.229 
4.3. State Solutions: The eighteenth Century  
The French Revolution had a significant effect on the creation of the next recognition 
of government approach that became internationally recognised. The Revolution had 
begun as a result of systematic societal conflict between the bourgeoisie (lower class) 
and the nobilities (higher class) in the French territories.230 The conflict, which lasted 
for ten years resulted in the overthrow of King Louis Capet XVI and the eventual 
 
225 Mokotso and Others v. H.M. King Moshoeshoe II and Others [1989] Law Reports of the 
Commonwealth (Constitutional and Administrative Law Reports) at 24-169. 
226 British, Dutch, French, Italian, and United States non-recognition of the Karageorgevich Dynasty in 
Serbia, which was brought to power in 1903 by a coup resulting in the deaths of the former King and 
Queen, several of her relatives, and several ministers of the Government. See, Maria Aristodemou 
"Choice and Evasion in Judicial Recognition of Government: Lessons from Somalia" (1994) 5 Eur. J. Int'l 
L. at 534.  
227 Doswald-Beck "The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government" (1985) 
56 British Yearbook of International Law at 193. 
228 For instance, the US claimed that control that is likely to be continuous and sustained is a sufficient 
prerequisite for determining effective control, while the United Kingdom requires permanent control 
as affirmed by its declaration that “We shall continue to decide the nature of our dealings with regimes 
which come to power unconstitutionally in the light of our assessment of whether they are able of 
themselves to exercise effective control in the territory of the state concerned, and seem likely to 
continue to do so”. However, a major difficulty that may arise in relation to the US assertion is the use 
of the words “continuous control”. Armed conflict is at times prolonged and backed with extreme 
violence that may have grievous consequence for the economy of a state. See Robert Sloane "The 
Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet" (2002) 16 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 
at 125. 
229 Chapter Five discusses further on the effective control doctrine. 
230 Gail Bossenga "Origins of the French Revolution." (2007) 5 History Compass at 1295. See also 
Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution, trans. Robert R. Palmer (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1947); Albert Soboul, The French Revolution, 1787–1799, trans. Alan 
Forrest and Colin Jones (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1975). See, also, The Feudal Structure of the 




establishment of a new government declaring itself as the constitutional 
representative of the French territories.231 
 The government, republican in characteristics was welcomed by the people 
due to one essential factor- the origin of the newly formed government was derived 
from the will of the people as opposed to the monarchism that was imposed 
governance.232 However, at the international level, there were discrepancies as to  
whom to accord recognition considering the foreignness of the Revolution and the 
newly developed French government. 233  
 While the effective control doctrine should have applied considering it was 
the only known approach for recognising government at the time, it was abandoned 
due to the failure of the French government to effectively fit into the monarchy 
system of governance it had overthrown.234  
 The French Revolution and the subsequent defeats of Napoleon changed the 
face of the effective control doctrine as a new approach that will suit the current 
recognition problem emerged.235 This new approach, as discussed below, became 
known as the Thomas Jefferson approach, and was adopted by most states until the 
twentieth century.  
4.3.1. The Thomas Jefferson Approach: An Overview 
The Thomas Jefferson approach emerged in 1793 from the United States and is 
named after the US Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson who claimed that “to 
acknowledge any government to be rightful, it must be formed by the will of the 
nation, substantially declared.”236 This approach also known as the popular 
 
231 Lynn Hunt, ‘The Family Romance of the French Revolution (1992, University of California press, 
California) at 3 
232 At 232. 
233 Thomas Jefferson assertions " It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be 
rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared. The late government was of 
this kind and was accordingly acknowledge by all the branches of ours; so, any alteration of it shall be 
made by the will of the nation, substantially declared, will doubtless be acknowledged in like manner. 
With such a government every kind of business may be done." See Amos Hershey, "Recognition of 
New Governments" (1921) 15 The America Journal of International Law at 59. 
234 Gregory Weeks "Almost Jeffersonian: US Recognition Policy toward Latin America" (2001) 31 
Presidential Studies Quarterly at 492.  
235 Gregory Weeks "Almost Jeffersonian: US Recognition Policy toward Latin America" (2001) 31 
Presidential Studies Quarterly at 492. 
236 Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Morris, Minister to France, November 7, 1792. MS 
Institution, Ministers at 215. See also, Amos S Hershey "Recognition of New Governments" (1921) 15 
The American Journal of International Law at 59. 
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sovereignty was succinctly expressed, repeated, reworded and applied literally by 
different states for half a century as a solution to some of the recognition of 
government problems.237 For instance, in terms of the debates that recognition of 
government practices infringes on sovereignty and the right of citizens to choose their 
government rather than foreign nations, Jefferson's approach serves as a perfect 
solution to eradicate this problem. Also, with the adoption of Jefferson's approach by 
states the issues of states making recognition of government decisions on their 
political expediency are solved. It is simple, the will of the governed shall be the basis 
of recognition. 
4.3.2. Critique of Thomas Jefferson's Approach  
The decisive test of the Jefferson approach is "consent of the people".  This means 
that recognition must be granted to any government, irrespective of its origin and 
method of the ascendency of a state, provided it is the will of the people.238 It appears 
to be relatively simple and workable on a moral dimension compared to the effective 
control doctrine where effectiveness and unconstitutionality were significant 
setbacks. However, Jefferson’s approach is problematic and cannot be considered as 
a solution to the recognition of government problems. Instead, it creates and 
advances the recognition of government terminology problems because the decisive 
test of determining what constitutes “formed by the will of the nation substantially 
declared,” i.e. consent in unconstitutional circumstances where recognition is needed 
is difficult to ascertain.  
 
237 Green H Hackworth, et al. "The Policy of the United States in Recognizing New Governments during 
the Past Twenty-Five Years" (1931) 25 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its 
Annual Meeting (1921-1969) at 121. 
238 In 1856, President Pierce applied the principle to Nicaragua, stating that, “It is the established policy 
of the United States to recognize all governments without question of their source or their 
organization, or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there be a 
government de facto accepted by the people of the country, and with reserve only of the time as to 
the recognition of revolutionary governments arising out of the subdivision of parent states with which 
we are in relation of amity. We do not go behind the fact of a foreign government exercising actual 
power to investigate questions of legitimacy; we do not inquire into the causes which may have led to 
a change of government. To us it is indifferent whether a successful revolution has been aided by 
foreign intervention or not; whether insurrection has overthrown existing government, and another 
has been established in its place according to pre-existing forms or in a manner adopted for the 
occasion by those whom we may find in the actual possession of power. All these matters we leave to 
the people and public authorities of the country to determine; and their determination, whether it is 
by positive action or by ascertained acquiescence, is to us a sufficient warranty of the legitimacy of the 
new government”. See Charles Cheney Hyde "Concerning the Recognition of New Governments by the 
United States" (1919) 13 The American Journal of International Law at 110. 
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 Although, the approach resolved the debates that arose as a result of 
variances in state practice due to recognition of government been discretionary and 
based on the political expediency of states, it does shift focus to citizens consent.  
However, the problem with this approach is that the need to recognise a government 
arises only when there is a forcible overthrow of an existing government; accession 
to power of a new government by a procedure not provided for by the constitution 
of a state; or the continuance in power of an existing government in violation of 
constitutional procedures. The application of citizens' consent in all of these 
circumstances is impractical and unattainable.239  
 Also, in Jefferson's approach, there is suggestion of a contract between the 
people and the government. The contract, which clings to the exchange of power by 
the people for governance to secure certain obligations and inalienable rights puts 
constitutional accountability on governments. Of course, this is a good thing 
considering that government will be refrain from abusing their power since consent 
can easily be withdrawn when a government fails to fulfil its duties and obligations 
thus giving power to the citizens. An example is Egypt 2011, when Egyptians withdrew 
their consent and called for a  democratic regime change against their autocratic 
leader, President Hosni Mubarak.240  
 Jefferson's approach is remarkable when considering the need to uphold 
accountability. However, the demerit that may occur is the encouragement of 
rebellion at the slightest provocation. Also, in some circumstances, foreign 
governments have to recognise insurgents against constitutionally elected 
governments whenever citizens withdraw consent or when a revolution is the will of 
the people against an incumbent government.  
 Also, Jefferson’s approach consists of factors that internally place obligations 
on states relating to the respect of the people to make choices free from any foreign 
interference, thus promoting the self-determination rights of the people. However, 
Jefferson’s failure to address what constitutes consent and how consent should be 
 
239 All of these circumstances demonstrate situations where the constitution of a state would have 
collapse, as such, attaining consent through these procedures could be impractical and unattainable. 
For instance, obtaining citizen consent during the forcible overthrow of an existing government (coup 
situations) is unachievable. 
240 Ozan O Varol "The Democratic Coup d’etat" (2012) 53 Harvard International Law Journal at 292. 
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obtain further contributed to some of the shortcomings of the principle.  Even when 
consent is gained, Jefferson’s policy fails to address how it would be secure in 
circumstances where more than two governments are vying for authority.  
 Furthermore, Jefferson assumed that governments established by popular 
consent would be democratic in their dealings and would observe international law 
principles and treaties. However, this assumption is wrong as international law has 
over time witnessed cases of consented governments becoming authoritarian or 
undemocratic without any respect for the rule of law.  
 Except, there is a structure, or a defined form of rules determining consent, 
Jefferson’s policy would continuously be problematic and not a solution per se to 
recognition of government problems.  Against this background, in the foreseeable 
future, the use of Jefferson's approach as a measure to resolve the challenges of the 
recognition of governments is unlikely. Perhaps, had Jefferson projected a link 
between involuntary consent and constitutional legitimacy, Jefferson's approach of 
recognising a government base on the will of the governed substantially declared 
might have survived as the most compelling approach for the recognition of 
governments in international law.  
4.4. State Solutions: The Nineteenth Century 
While the newly formed Westphalia state system continued to spread to other 
continents, Central America hopes of integration with the modern system was 
repeatedly destroy by internal strife. The conflicts between Manuel Estrada Cabrera 
of Guatemala and Jose Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua further threatened the Peace of 
Isthmus Treaty that had been signed by the Central America States.241 By 1906 it had 
become clear that all five republics (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) that made up the Central America states were on the verge of War. In July 
1906, onboard U.S.S Marble a truce was established between the  five republics by 
Mexico and the United States. 242 
 
241 Charles L Stansifer "Application of the Tobar Doctrine to Central America" (1967) 23 the Americas 
at 251. 




 In 1907,  the Republics met with Mexico and the United States met at a 
conference in Washington DC and adopted numerous agreements, among which was 
not to recognise new governments that come to power as a result of Coup d'etat or 
revolution against the recognised government.243 This new agreement was 
incorporated  into the General Treaty of Peace and Amity of 1907  initiated a new 
policy of recognition for Central America and was credited to the recognition 
suggestion of Dr Carlos Tobar, the foreign Minister of Ecuador and became known as 
the Carlos Tobar Doctrine.244  
4.4.1. The Carlos Tobar Doctrine: An Overview  
The Carlos Tobar Doctrine originated in 1907 from the suggestion of the then Foreign 
Minister of Ecuador as a solution to end usurpation of constitutional governments 
through non-recognition of governments that comes into power by unconstitutional 
means such as Coups or Revolution.245 Unlike the effective control doctrine246 and 
Jefferson's approach247, the Carlos Tobar doctrine was clear that unconstitutionality 
is an original recipe for disaster, the obstruction of peace and the promotion of 
instabilities. Peace and political stability will be attained in society by collective force 
and non-recognition of regimes that come into power by unconstitutional means 
against constitutional order.248 
  The Carlos Tobar doctrine operated for twenty-three years and was not 
generally accepted by states. For instance, Mexican Foreign Minister, Genaro Estrada, 
considered Tobar’s doctrine “as nothing less than an intervention in the affairs of 
 
243 Donald Marquand Dozer "Recognition in Contemporary Inter-American Relations" (1966) 8 Journal 
of Inter-American Studies at 321.  
244 Charles L Cochran "The Development of an Inter-American Policy for the Recognition of de facto 
Governments" (1968) 62 American Journal of International Law at 27. Though the United States was 
not a signatory to the treaty, the attendance of US representatives and joint agreement by the 
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245 Charles Stansifer, ‘Application of the Tobar Doctrine to Central America’ 23 (1967) The Americas at 
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247 Supports revolution as long as it is the will of the people. 
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recognition to de facto governments springing from revolution against constitutional order. see 




another state,”249 while, US Secretary of State Henry Stimson, “qualified the doctrine 
as contrary to international law.”250 Furthermore, two of the five states that signed 
the treaty later rescinded their decision.251 The recommendation adopted by the  
Commission of Jurists at the Sixth International Conference of American States  that 
“No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of other states” saw to the 
demise of the doctrine.252 
4.4.2. Critique of the Carlos Tobar Doctrine  
It is unclear whether Tobar intended other states apart from the five American 
Republics to adopt the principle of state collective action in agreeing to the non-
recognition of unconstitutional regimes. It remains clear that he intended the 
American states to act as a joint force. However, Tobar did not consider the origin 
and structure of recognition of government as a discretionary prerogative act which 
itself does not permit collective state action. He failed to consider evidence of state 
practices that the decision to recognise a government is a matter of a state political 
expedience as it carries with it a prerogative duty on the part of the state granting 
recognition. He further failed to consider the recognition of government as a 
unilateral act which indicates the willingness of a state to accord the government of 
another rights and amenities of intercourse between equal nations.253 For these 
reasons, Tobar's doctrine is distinctly unsuitable because it creates more recognition 
problems rather than a solution.  Supportive ground for adopting Tobar’s 
doctrine include the approach protecting state sovereignty and serving as the best 
ground for achieving constitutional stability. It is so because the doctrine deters 
ambitious revolutionary from revolt due to the fear and consequences of non-
recognition.254 However, the doctrine is  unsuitable because it departs from the 
fundamental principle of international law relating to non-intervention and counters 
 
249 David Rai Statehood and the law of self-determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002) at 115. 
250 At 249.  
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252 International Commission of Jurists, Public International Law Project No. II, reprinted in American 
Journal of International Law, XXII, Spec. Suppl. (1928) at 240. 
253 Philip Marshall Brown "The Recognition of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic" (1933) 11, American Journal of International Law at 290.  
254 Donald Marquand Dozer "Recognition in Contemporary Inter-American Relations" (1966) 8 Journal 
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the political right of a citizen to democratic revolution.255 Also, the doctrine exposes 
government seeking recognition to coercion by granting states the power to 
disapprove of its form, political tenets and composition. In effect, this supports the 
abolition theories that recognition of government questions the autonomy of states.  
 Concerning countering the political right of citizens to revolution, the Tobar 
doctrine interferes with the rights of the people to change their government, alter 
their constitutional system, and choose whomever they like to exercise political 
authority over their state. This promotes the abolition of recognition theory that the 
recognition of government questions the autonomy rights of citizens.256 Also, non-
recognition under Carlos Tobar doctrine meant the passing of judgment on 
constitutional and legal intricacies of a state which the Judiciary was not prepared to 
deal with, and It also mean that behind every inquiry into the constitutionality of a 
government looms the use of force.  
 In the end, Tobar's solution to the recognition of government proved to be 
most unsuitable. Further, its risks being a contributing factor to unauthorised 
intervention and economic disaster.257 For example, Costa Rica was faced with 
economic disability due to its non-recognition and the Huerta regime in Mexico was 
able to legitimise itself and carry out its mundane duties despite its non-recognition. 
In effect, this shows the demerits of the Carlos Tobar Doctrine and its unsuitability as 
recognition of government approach.  
4.5. State Solution: The twentieth Century   
The next major recognition of government approach that emerged and was adopted 
by states as a solution to the recognition of government problem was the Estrada 
Doctrine. This doctrine, which deals with the abolishment of the recognition of 
government practices was not a spur of the moment decision, but a doctrine that 
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emanated from Mexico's experience of foreign interference in its domestic affairs as 
a result of recognition.258  The overthrow, and murder of President Francisco Madero 
in 1913 by the revolutionary coup regime of Jose Victoriano Huerta. Also, the US 
denial of recognition to Huerta, followed by deadly indecisive armed conflicts 
between the revolutionary troops of Venustiano Carranza, Francisco Villa, and 
Emiliano Zapata in 1914 were part of Mexico decisions to abolish recognition of 
governments. Mexico assumed the position that recognition of government violates 
the autonomy of a national government, by subjecting it to the mercy of foreign 
governments who have the prerogative to grant recognition. He also felt that an 
enquiry into the constitutionality of a government constitutes interferences in the 
political affairs a state.259  
4.5.1. The Genaro Estrada Doctrine: An Overview  
The Estrada Doctrine is named after the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, 
Senor Don Genaro Estrada whose recognition of governments approach centres on 
the abolition of the recognition practices.260 The Estrada Doctrine begins with stating 
Mexico's experiences on the effects of recognition and its new position that foreign 
government passing judgment on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a government 
subordinates national authority to international opinion.261 He further reinstated 
Mexico position of withdrawing from the recognition of government practices and its 
new position of recognising diplomatic representatives instead of governments.  
 
258 Philip C Jessup "The Estrada Doctrine" (1931) 25 The American Journal of International Law at 719 
-20. 
259 Estrada stated "After a very careful study of the subject, the government of Mexico has transmitted 
instructions to its minister of Charges d’ Affaires in the countries affected by the recent political crises, 
informing them that the Mexican Government is issuing no declarations in the sense of grants of 
recognition. Since our nation consider that such a course is an insulting practice that offends the 
sovereignty of other nations and one which implies that judgement of some sort may be passed upon 
the internal affairs of those nations by other governments, inasmuch as the latter assume.  In effect, 
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260 Philip C Jessup "The Estrada Doctrine" (1931) 25 The American Journal of International Law at 719 
261 Charles L Cochran "The Development of an Inter-American Policy for the Recognition of de facto 
Governments" (1968) 62 American Journal of International Law at 28 
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4.5.2. Critique of Genaro Estrada Doctrine 
Theoretically, many arguments favour the Estrada Doctrine of abolishment of the 
recognition of government practices. These include the recognition of government 
problems discussed in Chapter Two and Three of this study that the recognition of 
governments opens the way to abuse of power, infringements on state sovereignty 
and diplomatic/legal confusion and promotes hostility against other governments.262 
Furthermore, some states have abandoned the practice of recognising 
governments263 and the consequences of non-recognition have diminished.264  Also, 
the functions of a recognised government could easily be performed by state 
representatives such as diplomats and consular missions.265 
 However, as discussed in Chapter Two, there are also reasons to reject the 
Estrada’s Doctrine.266 Recognition of governments plays a vital role in the socio-
economic and political life of a state.267 For example, it ensures that only a regime 
that deserves recognition is accepted as the government. It also informs government 
agencies and nationals of recognising states that a regime is the legitimate 
government of a state.268 A lack of recognition would not only affect state relations 
and international co-operation in the fields of scientific research, military assistance, 
health and international trade but would create a significant vacuum.269  
 
262 Pieter Kuyper “Recognition: Netherlands Theory and State Practise” in C Flinterman "H. Van 
Panhuys, WP Heere, JW Josephus Jitta, Ko Swan Sik and AM Stuyt,(eds.), International Law in the 
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263 For example, Mexico believed that the rules that determine the recognition of a government within 
the international sphere conflict with some enshrined principles of international law and described the 
recognition of governments as an insulting practice. 
264 The United Kingdom and Mexico for example, declared that it was not their policy to recognise 
governments. However, in 2011, the United Kingdom openly recognised the Libyan opposition. 
265 However, some circumstances make this impossible. For example, not all states have diplomatic 
relationships. At present, North Korea has no diplomatic relations with the US and South Korea. 
Furthermore, not all states maintain diplomatic missions in other states. For instances, Nigeria does 
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267 For a detailed discussion, see Chapter two. 
268 Martha Peterson "Recognition of governments should not be abolished" (1983) 31 American 
Journal of International Law at 31. 
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Estrada is arguably correct in his theoretical assertion that the recognition of 
governments in international law is an insulting and degrading act that passes a 
favourable or unfavourable opinion on the legality of a national government.270 This 
contrasts with the advantageous nature and meaning of the recognition of 
governments in international law because once recognition has been granted, an 
invisible stamp of approval denotes an informal contract between the granting and 
the seeking state.271 For instance, state A can ask for economic, financial and military 
assistance from state B (the grantor of recognition). Should state B’s sovereignty be 
violated, it can call on the government of state A for military aid and protection of its 
sovereignty.272 Such arrangements promote peace, and friendly multilateral relations 
among states, which is unmistakably the purpose of international law.273 
However, Estrada did not consider three main pertinent issues in his 
distinction that the role of a recognised government could easily be substituted for 
Diplomats when calling for the abolition of recognition. 274  Firstly, not all states have 
diplomatic missions. Some states do not engage in diplomatic relations, while some 
states have broken diplomatic ties with other states as a means of displaying 
disapproval or imposing sanctions. Secondly, diplomats in foreign missions lack the 
clarity and consistency in political and legal matters that ordinarily could be 
addressed by a government. Finally, as discussed in Chapter Two, not all states have 
diplomatic missions or the financial capacity to establish them in all the recognised 
states in the world. Undeniably, the doctrine embraces unfettered sovereignty and 
rejects interferences. However, abolishing the recognition of governments is not the 
most logical solution to the recognition of governments problem as discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
 
270 Chandler P Anderson "Our Policy of Non-Recognition in Central America" (1931) 25 The American 
Journal of International Law at 299. 
271 See the discussion on confers legal personality 
272 An example cited in Chapter two was the military assistance rendered to Mali during the violation 
of the state sovereignty. 
273 S.S Lotus Case [1927] PCIJ (Ser.A) 10 at para. 18 “International law governs relations between 
independent States. The rules of law binding upon States, therefore, emanate from their free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usage accepted as expressing principles of law and established to 
regulate the relations between co-existing independent communities or to (or “intending to”) the 
achievements of common aims.” 
274 Charles L Cochran "The Development of an Inter-American Policy for the Recognition of de facto 
Governments" (1968) 62 American Journal of International Law at 29 
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4.6. Recent Practice:  Scholar Solutions  
 In recent times, some scholars have argued that the best way to address the 
problems surrounding the recognition of governments is to recognise governments 
that adhere strictly to a norm of democratic legitimacy.275 They believe that the use 
of democratic legitimacy, a system of governance that relies on democracy as the 
only means of deciding the rightful authority holder in a state will end the ongoing 
debates surrounding the recognition of governments.276  
 Following the restoration of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti (1992) 
and President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone (1997), as well as the failure of 
the August Coup in the Soviet Union (1991);  one of the most prominent academics 
of  the democratic legitimacy debate, Thomas Franck published a path-breaking 
article that postulated that a new era had emerged with the recognition of 
governments practice.277 Franck stated that the world is moving toward a norm of 
democratic entitlements that would guarantee global peace, stability, and 
transformation in the socio-economic and political development of states. Referring 
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Fukuyama "The End of History?" (1989) The National Interest at 3-18, Sean D. Murphy "Democratic 
Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments" (1999) 48 The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly at 545-581, Samuel P Huntington The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
late twentieth century (University of Oklahoma press, 1993) at 31. For a general view of the debate 
see Steven Wheatley "The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq" (2006) 
17 European Journal of International Law at 531-551,  Jean d’Aspremont "The rise and fall of 
democracy governance in international law: A reply to Susan Marks." (2011) 22 European Journal of 
International Law  at 549-570. Of recent, Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The 
Unpredictable Road of Democratic Legitimacy in Governmental Recognition" (2014) 108 American 
Journal of International Law at 201-207 and Obiora Chinedu Okafor "Democratic Legitimacy as a 
Criterion for the Recognition of Governments: A Response to Professor Erika de Wet" (2017) 108 AJIL 
Unbound at 228-232. 
276 Steven Wheatley defined democratic legitimacy as a system of governance that depends upon the 
will of the people to be governed by those in power in Steven Wheatley "Democracy in International 
Law: A European Perspective" (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 236. Anthony 
Laden asserts that democratic legitimacy refers to the process of governance based on the consent of 
the governor. The Bucharest Declaration, adopted by states at the Third International Conference of 
the New or Restored Democracies, asserts: “[there exists] an almost universal recognition that a 
democratic system of government is the best model to ensure a framework of liberties for lasting 
solutions to the political, economic and social problems that our societies face" See: UN Doc A/52/33. 
Academics like Thomas Franck "The emerging right to democratic governance" (1992) 86 American 
Journal of International Law at 46-91, assert that democratic legitimacy is the best type of governance 
to ensure citizens’ democratic entitlement.  
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to the pro-democratic intervention of non-state actors in restoring democracy in Haiti 
(1992), and the failed coup in the Soviet Union, he asserted that:278 
We are witnessing a sea change in international law, as a result of which the legitimacy 
of each government someday will be measured definitively by international rules and 
processes. We are not quite there, but we can see the outlines of this new world in which 
the citizens of each state will look to international law and organisations to guarantee 
their democratic entitlements. For some states, that process will merely embellish rights 
already protected by their existing domestic constitutional order. For others, it would be 
the realisation of a cherished dream. 
 
According to Franck, it is clear that the international community is no longer 
indifferent to the constitutionality of regimes seeking recognition; it expects 
governments to be democratic.279 As such, democracy as a approach for recognising 
governments has emerged in international law. Frank and other legal academics cite 
general acceptance of democracy among states, and in states where democracy was 
rarely applied as evidence for these claims.280                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4.6.1. Democratic Legitimacy Debate: An Overview 
Before the Haiti intervention, democracy was seldom used in recognition of 
governments practice because most states subscribed to the 1987 American Law 
Institutes Restatement, which states that “International law does not address 
constitutional issues, such as how a national government is formed.”281 Furthermore, 
the assertion of a right to democracy would have proposed a approach for the 
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constitutionality of states, which would have been at odds with other prevailing 
recognition practices.282  
 However, given states reaction to Haiti, democratic legitimacy academics such 
as Susan Marks believe that “recognition of a government is no longer an issue left 
for the domestic constitution of states. The legitimisation of regimes has shifted 
dramatically such that international law has begun to embrace a norm of democratic 
governance.”283 Roland Axtmann concurs "It is no longer the case that, as long as 
there is a sufficiently high degree of effective control, a state’s border is protected 
from scrutiny by the principle of state sovereignty. Rather, for a state to be 
considered legitimate, it has become necessary to demonstrate that it rules with the 
consent of the governed."284 
 Other academics contend that democratic legitimacy has begun to acquire the 
status of a norm within customary international law with regards a government 
recognition. For example, in a 20-year review of democratic legitimacy as an approach 
for the recognition of governments in Africa, Erika De Wet claimed that democratic 
legitimacy “was becoming an additional or even alternative replacement  approach 
to the effective control doctrine.”285 Justifying her argument from state and 
institutional practice, Erika De Wet affirms that the international community’s 
rejection of the internal overthrow of democratic governments, and states’ refusal to 
recognise usurpers provides strong evidence of the acceptance of democratic 
legitimacy.286 Gregory Fox and Brad Roth agree by affirming that:287 
It is now clear that international law and international organizations are no longer 
indifferent to the internal character of regimes exercising effective control within 
sovereign states.  In region after region, political change has swept through the former 
 
282 For example, the effective control doctrine is recognised as the most sufficient approach for 
recognising governments during armed conflicts. 
283 Susan Marks "The End of History-Reflections on Some International Legal Theses." (1997) 8 Eur. J. 
Int'l L. at 460. 
284 Given this transformation, regimes that exhibit democracy find themselves at ease with 
governance, while undemocratic regimes find themselves moving towards people’s democracy to 
validate their governance. See Roland Axtmann Democracy: Problems and Perspectives: Problems and 
Perspectives (Edinburgh University Press, 2007).  
285 Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic Legitimacy 
in Governmental Recognition." (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 203 
286 Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic Legitimacy 
in Governmental Recognition." (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 203. 
287 Gregory H Fox & Brad R Roth "Democracy and international law" (2001) 27 Review of International 
Studies at 328. 
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bastions of authoritarian and dictatorial rule, offering the promise, if not always the 
reality, of democratization, and this development has been reflected in international 
institutions. 
 
The UN Secretary-General’s assertion of an established norm dissuading “military 
coups against democratically elected governments by self-appointed juntas”288 and 
the UN Security Council imposition of sanctions against the military junta that 
overthrew the constitutional government of Sierra Leona align with these claims.289 
Academics also observe that the maintenance of quality democracy in some 
European and Pacific nations, coupled with the introduction of a broad range of 
democratic mechanisms, prove that democratic legitimacy is here to stay.290 
  The 2016 Global Democracy rankings, which show a remarkable increase in 
the movement towards democracy in the Middle-East and Africa, where democracies 
were rarely accepted, buttress these arguments.291 This is despite Steven Wheatley’s 
warning that, while “it might not yet be possible to identify a general obligation on 
states to introduce democratic government, the recognition that a democratic system 
of government may not legitimately be replaced by an authoritarian one and that an 
unconstitutional government won't be recognised indicates a progressive acceptance 
of democratic legitimacy.”292 
4.6.2. Critique of Democratic Legitimacy 
As stated in Chapter One, there is a lack of conceptual clarity on the definition of 
democracy, what it entails, and the basis upon which any action may be taken in the 
name of democracy.293 The UN Charter and the League of Nations did not mention or 
make reference to the word democracy.294 International law has also not affirmed a 
single definition of democracy. As a result, large numbers of states proclaim support 
 
288 See SC Res. 940 (1994) (authorizing armed intervention in Haiti); UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/5 (Security 
Council Presidential Statement welcoming the removal of the Sierra Leonean junta); S.C. Res. 1162 
(1998) (commending ECOWAS after the fact for its role in the Sierra Leonean transition). 
289 Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/52/1 (1997), 
para. 37. 
290 Roland Rich "Bringing democracy into international law" (2001) 12 Journal of Democracy at 20-34. 
291 Progress in World’s Democratic Quality: Democracy Ranking (2016) 03 May. 2017 
<http://democracyranking.org/ > 
292 Steven Wheatley "Democracy in international law: a European perspective" (2002) 51 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly at 234.          
293 For a detailed argument on this issue, see Richard Bruchill in Richard Burchill "The Developing 
International Law of Democracy" (2001) 64 The Modern Law Review at 124. 
294 Larry Diamond "Is the third wave over?" (1996) 7 Journal of democracy at 22. 
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for democracy and its associated values, without any real agreement on the meaning 
of democracy or the means by which it should be given effect.295  
 Academics define democracy in different ways.296 A universal definition is 
ambiguous because democratic practices differ, and democracy as a concept was 
originally a process- and action-orientated as an ideology for struggle and freedom.297 
As such, it appears to be everything and nothing.298 Few studies tend to be satisfied 
with the use of procedural or substantive definitions of democracy,299 the essential 
distinction between purely procedural models and more substantive visions of 
democracy is a challenge. Considering the ambiguity that revolves around whether 
democracy involves or entails certain outcomes, certain right and just outcomes, or 
whether democracy is purely procedural or whether the views of the majority 
prevail.300 
 However, several academics have criticised reliance on both substantive and 
procedural approaches to the definition of democracy. For instance, Martti 
Koskenniemi argues that “both procedural and substantive theories of democracy 
leave aside powerful aspirations that are neither about procedural correctness nor 
about political participation.”301 Also, considering that substantive definitions of 
democracy are under inclusive in that they often tend to presuppose a consensus on 
what constitutes just or fair outcomes and to impose particular substantive visions 
 
295 David Wippman "Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention" (1996) 19 Hous. J. Int'l L. at 
664. 
296 Niels Petersen "The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law" (2008) 34 Brook. J. Int'l 
L. at 33.  
297 Marks, Susan "The End of History-Reflections on Some International Legal Theses" (1997) 8 Eur. J. 
Int'l L. at 430. 
298 Susan Marks noted that in some cases, modifying adjectives were used in conceptualising 
democracy (one-party democracy, people’s democracy, etc.); in other cases, the appropriation was 
unmodified. Either way, observers found normative inferences challenging to draw, for democracy 
appeared to mean everything and therefore nothing. Susan Marks "The End of History-Reflections on 
Some International Legal Theses." (1997) 8 Eur. J. Int'l L. at 430. 
299 Joseph A Schumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge, 2013) at See also,  Joseph 
A. Schumpeter "Capitalism, Socialism, And Democracy" (2010) 16 International Journal of Cultural 
Policy at 20. 
300 James Allan "Liberalism, Democracy, and Hong Kong" (1998) 28 Hong Kong LJ at 156.  
301 Martti Koskenniemi "Whose Intolerance, Which Democracy?" (2000) Democratic governance and 
international law at 436. 
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where they are neither appropriate nor useful.302 It creates more problem than 
solution as an approach for recognising governments.  
The definition of democracy put forward by Joseph Schumpeter relates to an 
electoral process in the sense that the democratic method is an institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote remains the most 
influential definition today.303 However, this definition relies on an electoral process 
that is attainable through the people’s vote and an institutional arrangement that is 
not achievable when the needs to recognise a government arises in international 
law.304  
This is not to say that democracy does not elucidate the rule of law and bridges 
the gap between the people and the government in the sense that the government 
competes for the people's vote and the people express their individual right to 
governance through elections. However, elections which are free, and fair can only 
be achieved in a stable state. Election cannot happen during armed conflicts nor coup. 
Therefore, the assertion that democracy would be a suitable replacement of the 
effective control doctrine is controversial. 
 In slight contrast to Schumpeter’s definition, David Beetham offers a broader 
definition that comprises popular participation.305 However, this definition remains 
problematic because of its contradiction of the principle of state sovereignty and 
autonomy.”306 The usefulness of democracy as a approach for the recognition of  
 
302 Molly Beutz "Functional democracy: Responding to failures of accountability" (2003) 44 Harv. Int'l 
LJ at 401 
303 Joseph A Sehumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Hamper Brother, New York, 1942) at 
269. 
304 Joseph A Sehumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Hamper Brother, New York, 1942) at 
269. 
305 David Beetham Democracy and human rights (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999) at 90 to 91. According 
to Beetham, the core idea of democracy is that of popular vote or popular control over collective 
decision-making. Its starting point is with the citizen rather than with the institutions of government. 
Its defining principles are that all citizens are entitled to a say in public affairs, both through 
participation in government and that this entitlement should be available in terms of equality to all. 
Control by citizens over their collective affairs and equality between citizens in the exercise of that 
control are the basic democratic principles. 
306 UN GA Res 45/150 (18 December 1990). Acknowledging this problem, the UN General Assembly 
reiterates that “the efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the 
principle of periodic and genuine elections should not call into question each State’s sovereign right 
freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic, and cultural systems, whether or not they 
conform to the preferences of other states. 
81 
 
governments is therefore questionable, especially in instances where the constitution 
of a state has collapsed, and an electoral structure cannot be formulated. 
4.7. Conclusion  
Discussion on the recognition of government controversies have occurred over a 
number of decades. To date, such discussion has not resulted in effective measures. 
This is because most of the recognition of government approaches has remained 
controversial, thus leaving states and academics at variances on how best to address 
the problems affecting this area of international law. 
 Some academics advocated for the continuous use of the effective control 
doctrine which has been in substantial existence for decades. However, it has been 
criticised for several reasons. Compared to other recognition of government 
approach such as the Carlos Tobar doctrine, the effective control doctrine is  
antonymic to the self-determination of the people. In fact, to date, the doctrine relies 
on the level of effectiveness and control of a faction rather than self-determination 
of the governed as basis of recognition. Furthermore, the doctrine promotes 
unconstitutional regime changes, these among others are part of the reasons why 
some states are reluctant on the continuous use of the doctrine.  
 Jefferson's approach introduced by the US Secretary of State, Thomas 
Jefferson, was another possible approach for the recognition of government. 
However, the problem of determining the “will of the nation” in an unconstitutional 
circumstance such as armed conflicts or coups makes Thomas Jefferson approach an 
impractical solution in reality. 
 The continuous armed conflicts that affected the Central American states in 
the nineteenth century demonstrate great possibility in the eradication of some but 
not all of the recognition of government controversies with the Carlos Tobar doctrine. 
Considering that basically, the doctrine calls for collective action and the non-
recognition of governments that are unconstitutional, which is a more realistic. 
However, unlike the other recognition of government approach, the problem with 
Carlos Tobar doctrine is not the nature of the approach itself in terms of definition, 




Some state and studies have indeed called for the abolishment of recognition 
of governments with claims that the role of a recognised government can be 
substituted by diplomats and the consequences of non-recognition has diminished in 
international law. However, the review of several situations in this study shows that 
the nonrecognition of governments is undesirable and carry more weighty 
repercussions than the recognition of government. For instance, states would not be 
able to determine the legitimate authority in a state, thereby prolonging conflicts. 
Refusal to recognise a government would also serve as a means of indicating severe 
disapproval and sanctions, particularly in a world where the benefits of recognition 
such as military assistance and aid, are of great importance.  
 States and some academics have recently devoted their attention to the 
recent norm of democratic legitimacy; they are so focused on recent pro-democratic 
intervention that they have overlook that the implementation of this proposal is 
beset with difficulties. They have claimed that the doctrine is the best solution to the 
recognition of government approach, and it would replace the effective control 
practice. The lack of a conceptual definition of democracy and the basis by which 
action should be taken in the name of democracy has been ignored by these scholars. 
Hence, the next Chapter reassesses the claims in favour of democratic legitimacy as 
a recognition of government solution and a sustainable replacement of the effective 














Chapter Five: Comparative Analysis of the Effective Control Doctrine and 
Democratic Legitimacy 
5.1.  Introduction  
Chapter four of this study examined Five approaches put forward by some states and 
academics for the improvement and elimination of the recognition of government 
problems. The author concluded that most of these approaches are either unsuitable 
or unsustainable. This Chapter aims to establish whether democratic legitimacy will 
be a suitable solution and a sustainable replacement of the dominant recognition of 
government approach (the effective control doctrine) as put forward by some 
academics. To this end, this Chapter consists of four main sections.  
 The first section establishes the effective control doctrine and democratic 
legitimacy norm are sufficiently comparable, in so doing, the Chapter explains the 
reasons for adopting a comparative analysis by studying the similarities and 
disparities between the two principles. The second section provides an overview of 
democratic legitimacy, the discussion in this section centres on outlining the most 
significant feature of democratic legitimacy based on the result of the comparative 
analysis. The third section of this Chapter practically illuminates the main barriers of 
democratic legitimacy as an approach for the recognition of governments in 
international law using Haiti and Libya as case studies. The fourth section of this study 
concludes the presented analysis. 
 A comparative analysis of both the effective control doctrine and democratic 
legitimacy is a new and interesting discourse that will throw light on whether the 
acclaimed norm of democratic legitimacy will be a suitable solution and a sustainable 
replacement of the effective control doctrine. Also, a comparison of the similarities 
and the differences between the two approach will reflect their variables which 
would help construct validity on the best of the two approaches and help identify that 
the current effective control is better modified than abandon by states.  
5.2.  The Effective Control Doctrine and Democratic Legitimacy: What Suitability? 
The effective control doctrine shows attractive characteristics having been in 
existence for decades and succeeded in other areas of international law such as 
intervention by invitation. However, when considering the author's observations on 
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the unsuitability of the effective control doctrine in Chapter four of this study, the 
effectiveness of the doctrine in its current form when practically applied is unclear in 
terms of resolving all the recognition of government concerns. Furthermore, it is vital 
to investigate that, if states agree to a uniform approach in the future for the 
recognition of governments in international law, would democratic legitimacy or the 
current effective control doctrine serve as the most suitable approach for use? 
Particularly, will it address the concerns of states and academics with regard the 
recognition problems? It is against this background that a comparative analysis of the 
effective control doctrine and democratic legitimacy will be carried out in the next 
section to identify the differences and similarities between the two approaches and 
establish their most compelling features as discuss below:  
5.2.1.  Similarities between the Effective Control Doctrine and Democratic 
Legitimacy 
5.2.1.1. Connection to Customary International Law Principle 
Although the nature and structure of the effective control doctrine and democratic 
legitimacy approach are not identical, by comparing both approaches, one finds some 
clear similarities. For example, in all the recognition of government approaches 
examined in this study, both the effective control doctrine and democratic legitimacy 
are the only recognition of government approach that are connected to a broader 
established principle that is evident in customary international law. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, the effective control doctrine finds expressions in various areas of 
international law principle, such as the recognition of state and military intervention 
by invitation.307 During civil strife, the effective control doctrine remains the only non-
contested recognition test for determining the faction best placed to speak on behalf 
of the state.308 Similarly, democratic legitimacy is enshrined in international law 
 
307 The effective control doctrine is factual test for determining statehood and invitation for military 
assistances. See Colin Warbrick "Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition" (1981) 30 International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly at 473-82, Roland Rich "Recognition of states: the collapse of Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union" (1993) 4 Eur. J. Int'l L. at 36. Doswald-Beck "The legal validity of military 
intervention by invitation of the government" at 189 to 252. Erika De Wet "The modern practice of 
intervention by invitation in Africa and its implications for the prohibition of the use of force" (2015) 
26 European Journal of International Law at 998.  
308 A detail explanation is of the effective control as the only applicable recognition test during conflict 
or coup is discussed in Chapter 7 in relation to Libya ongoing conflict. See Awol Kassim Allo "Counter-
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principles such as democracy, political and self-determination rights. Likewise, after 
revolution and at times civil strife, democratic legitimacy remains the only non-
contested recognition test for determining the faction best placed to speak on behalf 
of the state through electoral processes.  
5.2.1.2.  Enshrined in International Law Instruments  
 Another fundamental similarity between the two approaches is that both the 
effective control doctrine and democratic legitimacy are the only recognition of 
governments approach that is enshrined in International law instruments. 
Democratic legitimacy is embodied in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights309 and Article 25 of the ICCPR.310 Similarly, the effective control 
doctrine guiding principle is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 
and Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land; 205 CTS 277).311  
5.2.1.3. Tested and Undergone Different State Practices  
Also, despite the differences in the components of the effective control doctrine and 
democratic legitimacy, both approaches are tested and could be considered a norm 
of customary international law having undergone different state practices. In Libya 
(2011), oppositions were recognised by states based on democratic legitimacy. 
Similarly, Zimbabwe (2017) coup usurpers were recognised against the incumbent 
government of President Robert Mugabe based on the effective control doctrine.   
 
intervention, Invitation, Both or Neither: An Appraisal of the 2006 Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia" 
(2009) 3 Mizan Law Review at 220.  
309 Article 21(3) of the UDHR specifically requires that the will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government. This will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections, which shall be 
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures 
310 The ICCPR came into force 21 years after the UDHR laid the foundation for the right to the 
democratic legitimacy component of internal self-determination, stresses that states must respect and 
promote the principle of self-determination, and citizens’ right to determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. It states that All peoples have the right 
of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The state parties to the present Covenant, 
including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realisation of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, 
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.   
311 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 
October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910) annex (Regulations respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land’) S3. 
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 Thus, it can be concluded from this brief discussion on the similarities 
between the effective control doctrine and democratic legitimacy that both 
approaches have a pedigree, determinacy and coherence in established international 
law norms, state practices and international instruments.312 Therefore, it makes 
sense to draw a comparison from both approaches (than other recognition of 
government approach) because they have both commonly observed actual 
compliance, addressed by a rule of law and rulemaking institutions. Importantly, both 
approaches have operated under accepted principles of international law (other than 
recognition of government) to warrant an investigation into their suitability and 
sustainability as recognition of governments approach.  
5.2.2.  Differences between the Effective Control Doctrine and Democratic 
Legitimacy Approach  
Having identified that the effective control doctrine and democratic legitimacy have 
similar connections relating to an established international law norm, state practices 
and international instruments, it is the aim of this section to examine the disparity 
between approaches to identify their disadvantages and also, to construct a 
conceptual map to answer the research question. To achieve this the following 
criterion  
5.2.2.1. Constitutionality Promotion     
Democratic legitimacy is said to promote constitutionality because it is the key to 
political stability, conflict resolution,  global peace and is increasingly regarded as a 
means of preventing internal armed conflict and promotion of human rights.313 
Academics cite the cooperative foundation of democratic states, maintenance of 
liberal peace and statistics on the war between democratic and non-democratic 
 
312 By pedigree, determinacy and coherence the author refers to (a) the depth a rule in historical 
process (b) The rule's internal consistency and lateral connectedness to the principles underlying other 
rule; (C) The rule's ability to communicate content. 
313 M W Doyle "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs" (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
205, 206-32; Norton Moore "Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle" (2004) 44 
Virginia Journal of International Law 341, John  Owen  Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics 
and International Security (Cornell University Press, New York, 1997), Erich Weede “Some simple 
calculations on democracy and war involvement” (1992) 29(4) Journal of Peace Research at 377.   
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states over the past 200 years.314 It was noted that democracies do not wage war 
against each other 315 and that democratisation addresses the exclusionary politics at 
the heart of civil conflicts by ensuring legitimacy stems from the interest of the 
governed.316 Global events that resonate with state and institutional practices from 
the nineteenth century to date support this claims and are bolstered by former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement that democratisation gives people a stake 
in society and is indeed the key to lasting peace.317  
 In contrast, the effective control doctrine is said to promote political                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
instability, unconstitutional regime changes and human rights violations as a result of 
the violence that is often accompanied by the need to maintain control and efficacy  
under the doctrine.318 As explained in Chapter four, recognition under the effective 
control doctrine mainly stems from effectiveness and level of control. Thus, a regime 
engaging in human rights violation by definition does not forfeit its entitlement to be 
recognised under the doctrine.319 It may request external intervention as the ubiquity 
of armed conflicts permits provided it is in control. The general acceptances is that 
successful revolution or coup begets its legality.320 Consequently, a government 
 
314 Michael Doyle "Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs" (1983) Philosophy & Public Affairs at 217, 
Kenneth Schultz "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional 
Perspectives on Democracy and War" (1999) 53 International Organizations 233, Anne Slaughter 
"International Law in a World of Liberal States" (1995) 6 European Journal of International Law 503. 
This has been severely criticized. See for example, Brad Roth Governmental illegitimacy in international 
law (Oxford University Press, 2000) at 424  
315 Erich Weede “Some simple calculations on democracy and war involvement” (1992)  29(4) Journal 
of Peace Research at 377. Weede argues that “the apparent absence of war among the liberal states, 
whether adjacent or not, for almost two hundred years has some significance. Politically more 
significant, perhaps, is that when states are forced to decide, by the pressure of an impinging world 
war, on which side of a world contest they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side.” 
316 Gregory Fox and Brad Roth, eds. Democratic governance and international law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) at 103. 
317 1998 statement quoted in Mac Ginty ed. Routledge handbook of peacebuilding (Routledge, 2013) 
at 113. 
318 Brad Roth "Secessions, coups and the international rule of law: Assessing the decline of the effective 
control doctrine." (2010) Melb. J. Int'l L. 11 at 394. 
319 Brad Roth, Governmental illegitimacy in International Law (Oxford University Press, 1999), at 163. 
320 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedberg trans, Russell & Russell, 
1961) 118. Kelsen elaborated as that "Under what circumstances does a national legal order begin or 
cease to be valid? The answer, given by international law, is that a national legal order begins to be 
valid as soon as it has become - on the whole - efficacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses 
it efficacy. The government brought into permanent power by a revolution or coup d'9tat is, according 
to international law, the legitimate government of the State, whose identity is not affected by these 
events. Hence, according to international law, victorious revolutions or successful coups d'etat are to 
be interpreted as procedures by which a national legal order can be changed. Both events are, viewed 
in the light of international law, law-creating facts. 
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brought to power by a revolution or coup is regarded by international law as the 
legitimate government of the state "as soon as it has become on the whole 
efficacious, and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses that efficacy"321 thus, it is 
irrelevant whether the regime change is constitutional or whether it expresses the 
interest or will of the governed. As noted by Justice Taft in Tinoco Concession Case is 
that: 322  
Legitimacy is not about a new government assuming power or conducting its 
administration under constitutional limitation established by its people during the 
incumbency of the government it has overthrown. The question is, has it established 
itself in such a way that all within its influence recognise its control and that there is no 
opposing force assuming to be a government in its place. 
 
Indeed, moral ambiguity, political instability and unconstitutionality surround the 
effective control rule seeming because its favours effectiveness and control. 
5.2.2.2. Consolidation by State  
The second identified differences between the effective control doctrine and 
democratic legitimacy is consolidation. The effective control doctrine has been in 
existence since the sixteenth century and has been the only substantial landmark 
recognition approach that best determines whom to recognise during armed conflict. 
323 Yet, it has never been consolidated by the United Nations, states or regional 
organisations. In contrast, democratic legitimacy is being consolidated by some 
states. In 1988, the United Nations organised the first International Conference on 
New and Restored Democracies in Manila, with 13 countries in full attendance for the 
consolidation of democracy.324 
 By 1989, more than sixty states, equivalents to nearly one-third of the UN 
organisation members were in attendance and support of democratisation.325 Also, 
 
321 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, Wedberg trans., 1961), at 
220-1. 
322 Trevor Redmond "Power to the People-Intervention to Restore Democracy" (2004) 12 ISLR at 5. 
323 Awol Kassim Allo "Counter-intervention, Invitation, Both or Neither: An Appraisal of the 2006 
Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia" (2009) 3 Mizan Law Review at 220.  
324 UN GA Doc/A/Res/A/50/133 and Corr.1 20 December 1995. 
325 Apart from this, in 1994, the number of states that attended the restored democracy summit in 
Managua increased to 75, thereby indicating states’ interest in democratic processes. Following the 
summit, the United Nations General Assembly through resolution A/RES/49/30 requested the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali, to study and give comprehensive reports on 
the methods and mechanisms that the United Nations could use in the consolidation and promotion 
of democracy. On the 7th of August 1995, the UN Secretary-General submitted his report titled ‘Support 
by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or 
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In 1994, the numbers of states that attended the restored democracy summit in 
Managua increased to seventy-five, thereby indicating states interest in democratic 
processes. Following the summit, the United Nations General Assembly by resolution 
A/RES/49/30 requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-
Ghali326 to study and give comprehensive reports on the methods and mechanisms 
the United Nations can use in the consolidation and promotion of democracy. 327 A 
second report of the Secretary-General showed evidence of states' interest in the 
democratisation of the United Nations itself which was addressed at the fiftieth 
anniversary of the United Nations with representatives of one hundred and twenty-
eight states in attendances.328 The increase in numbers indicates the rapid spread and 
acceptance of democracy. International conferences on human rights such as the 
“United Nations World Conference on Human Rights” where self-determination was 
affirmed as an element of democracy assert these facts.329  
 
Restored Democracies.’ n the report, the Secretary-General made references to indissoluble links 
between human rights, democracy and development, which he believed to be interchangeable and 
interdependent. Furthermore, he asserted that democracy is an expression of the free will of the 
people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural system inclusive of their 
participation in all aspects of their lives. Justifying the advantage of a democratic legitimacy, the UN 
Secretary-General stated: Because democratic Governments are freely chosen by their citizens and 
held accountable through periodic and genuine elections and other mechanisms, they are . . . less likely 
to abuse their power against the peoples of their own State territories. Democracy within States thus 
fosters the evolution of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built.” By contrast, “Lacking 
the legitimacy or real support offered by free elections, authoritarian Governments all too often have 
recourse to intimidation and violence in order to suppress internal dissent.” A second report of the UN 
Secretary-General showed evidence of states’ interest in the democratisation of the United Nations 
itself. This was addressed at the 50th anniversary of the United Nations with representatives of 128 
states in attendance. The increase in the number of states indicates the rapid spread and acceptance 
of democracy within the United Nation. International conferences on human rights, such as the ‘United 
Nations World Conference on Human Rights’, where self-determination was affirmed as an element 
of democracy, assert these facts.325 Statistical shifts in states’ policies, commitments and paradigm 
towards democratic legitimacy further affirm that democracy was settled within the United Nations. 
Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman observed that “the number of states legally committed to open 
multi-party, secret-ballot elections with universal franchise grew from one-third in the mid-1980’s to 
as many as two-thirds in 1991. With the collapse of authoritarian governments and the failing of 
socialist regimes, democratic legitimacy experienced an increase, clearly indicating governments’ 
acceptance of the principle as the most objective approach for the recognition of government. As 
noted in the Budapest Declaration there exists an almost universal recognition that a democratic 
system of government is the best model to ensure a framework of liberties for lasting solutions to the 
political, economic and social problems societies faces. 
326 The Sixth Secretary General of the United Nations from January 1992 to December 1996. 
327 UN GA Doc/A/Res/49/30 22 December 1994. 
328 Boutros Boutros-Ghali An Agenda for Democratization (United Nations, New York, 1996) at 6. 
329 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 32 
I.L.M. 1661, 1665 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. The World Conference on Human Rights 
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 Statistical shifts in states policies, commitments and paradigm towards 
democratic legitimacy further affirmed that democracy was settled and consolidated 
among states.330 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman observed that “the number 
of states legally committed to open multi-party, secret-ballot elections with universal 
franchise grew from one-third in the mid-1980 to as many as two-thirds in 1991.”331 
With the collapse of authoritarian governments and failing of socialist regimes in the 
twentieth century, especially during the Arab Spring known as the fourth wave of 
democracy,332 democratic legitimacy experienced a high increase clearly indicating a 
surge in its consolidation.  
5.2.2.3. Self-determination Promotion    
The third difference between the two approaches is respect for self-determination. 
Self-determination is said to be the oldest driving force of democracy and is one of 
the most important elements of international human rights that originated as far back 
as 1000BC.333 During the Versailles peace settlement, self-determination was a 
touchstone for universal entitlement and peace.334 Self-determination is 
internationally recognised as a symbol of political freedom.335 It is a prerequisite for 
the attainment of individual rights, which are often referred to as subjective rights.336 
 
was assembled in Vienna by the United Nations on June 14-25, 1993. Representatives of 171 states 
attended. The Vienna Declaration was adopted by acclamation on June 25, 1993. Id. at 1661. 
330 US department of states Country reports on human rights practice for 1990 mentioned 110  
democratic states see Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman “You, the People : Pro-Democratic 
Intervention in International Law” 2000 Democratic Governance and International Law at 259.  
331 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman “You, the People: Pro-Democratic Intervention in 
International Law” (2000) Democratic Governance and International Law 259-92. 
332 Michael McFaul "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in 
The Post-Communist World" (2002) 54.2 World Politics at 212-244. Also, Cristian Popescu "Is there a 
fourth wave of democracy or not? An evaluation of the latest theories." The USV Annals of Economics 
and Public Administration 12.1 (15) (2013): 32-38. 
333 Thomas Franck "The emerging right to democratic governance." (1992) 86 American Journal of 
International Law at 52. 
334 Hurst Hannum Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011) at 20-31, Thomas M Franck “Legitimacy in the 
International System” 1988 82(4) The American Journal of International Law at 743-748. 
335 Kristina Roepstorff The Politics of Self-determination: Beyond the Decolonisation Process 
(Routledge, 2012) at 26. 
336 Dominic McGoldrick The Human Rights Committee: Its role in the Development of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford University Press, USA, 1991) at 14.  
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As such, denial of the right to self-determination may signify the loss of rights such as 
freedom of expression, political participation and equality.337  
 Self-determination as a right allows people to pursue their socio-political and 
economic lives, as well as choose their form of government without interference.338 
As such, governments that are unconstitutional in origin because of a coup or lack 
popular supports infringe on their citizen's internal self-determination.339 In most 
cases, these types of governments are faced with non-recognition and regime 
changes. An example is Haiti (1992), Libya (2011) and Gambia (2017). Self-
determination is interrelated with democracy and is classified as a right in human 
rights instruments such as the UDHR and ICCPR; it works hand-in-hand with 
democratic legitimacy which relies on democracy.340 In contrast, the effective control 
is antithetical to the notion of self-determination because it overtly relies on the 
notion of "Might make right " as opposed to "Right make Might".341 
 Conclusively from this section, it can be adduced that the effective control 
doctrine is antithetical to the notion of self-determination of the people, non- 
consolidated by states, and antithetical to the promotion of regime constitutionality 
compared to democratic legitimacy. In answering part of the research question, from 
the provide evidence, the effective control doctrine therefore ceases to be a more 
suitable solution to the recognition of governments problems than democratic 
legitimacy. As such, it won't warrant further investigation in this Chapter for the 
following reasons. Firstly, despite the similarities, the result from the disparity 
between both approaches espouse democratic legitimacy as a better and more 
suitable solution than the effective control doctrine. Also, some of the identified 
 
337 Jordan J Paust “International Law, Dignity, Democracy, and the Arab Spring” 2013 46 Cornell Int'l 
LJ at 5 
338 Christine Griffioen "Self-Determination as a Human Right: The Emergency Exit of Remedial 
Secession" (2010) Economic Public Law at 15. 
339 Steven Wheatley  The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Hart Pub, Oxford, 2010) at 229. 
340 The government of West Germany argued in 1988 that “the exercise of the right to self-
determination required the democratic process.” GAOR, A/C.3/43/SR.7, 13 October 1988, at 16 at 
para 76. The government of India argued in 1996: “The internal aspects of self-determination 
includes the right of people to choose their own form of government and the right to democracy and 
they do not and cannot include the right of a fraction of the people to secede.” CCPR/C/76/Add.6, 17 
July 1995, at para 32. 
341 Brad Roth "Secessions, coups and the international rule of law: Assessing the decline of the effective 
control doctrine." (2010) Melb. J. Int'l L. 11 at 394. 
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disparities are part of the debate pushing for the replacement of the effective control 
doctrine in the first place. In addition, the aim of this Chapter was to identify the best 
of the two approach which has now been achieved.  
 Secondly, in Chapter four of this study, the author discussed Carlos Tobar 
claims that unconstitutionality obstructs peace and political stability. The author's 
concluded that despite the disadvantages of Tobar's Doctrine, having a recognition of 
government approach that promotes constitutionalism protects sovereignty, deters 
ambitious revolutions and regime changes are much desirable. The author position 
has not changed in this respect, having considered the disadvantages and impact of 
having an effective control approach for the recognition of governments with regards 
to the ongoing South Sudan and Libya conflicts.  
 Thirdly, the US Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson identifies the importance 
of self-determination of the people.342 A review of Jefferson's approach to 
recognition of governments demonstrates that an approach based on the self-
determination of the people resolves the debates on the confusion that arises as a 
result of variances in state practices by shifting focus to citizens will. In addition, 
Jefferson's approach demonstrates that having recognition of government approach 
that promotes self-determination of the people secures inalienable rights and 
importantly, constitutional accountability of government.  
 Fourthly, when a rule is consolidated, its ensures compliance which indeed is 
the measure of a principle legitimacy and acceptances. Further, it ensures the 
sustainability of a practice. As noted in Chapter Four, the consolidation of Carlos 
Tobar doctrine among the Central American states and its enshrinement in the Treaty 
of Peace and Amity of 1907 secured its sustainability for twenty-three years. 
Considering the aim of this study is seek a solution with fewer encumbrances to the 
recognition of government controversies, the author maintains democratic 
legitimacy as a better suitable solution to the recognition of governments problems 
than the effective control doctrine. As a result, this study will now focus on 
democratic legitimacy.  
 




5.3. Comparative Analysis Discussion 
5.3.1. Democratic Legitimacy as a Solution and Sustainable Practice: The Demerits 
 The investigation into the similarities and differences between the effective 
control doctrine and democratic legitimacy helped identify democratic legitimacy as 
a more suitable approach than the current effective control doctrine. Six identified 
variables in the comparative analysis in the previous section between democratic 
legitimacy and the effective control doctrine helped this conclusion.  
 In this section, the author will conduct an in-depth examination of the 
variables. By variables, the author refers to the quality that makes democratic 
legitimacy distinct. In so doing, the author is able to lay foundation for further 
discussion in the next section as well as answer the second part of the research 
question, i.e. whether democratic legitimacy would be a sustainable replacement of 
the effective control doctrine or whether an alternative solution needs to be derived 
for the recognition of governments in international law? 
 Secondly, in relation to connection with established international law norm, 
both democracy and human rights evolved in tandem and pursued the common goal 
of combatting oppression. This claim is evidenced-based considering the United 
Nations Secretary-General's Report titled "Support by the United Nations System of 
the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored 
Democracies."343 In the report, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali344 
referred to the indissoluble links between human rights and democracy  which he 
claims to be interchangeable and interdependent.345 This is not to say that all 
recognised governments that came into power on the basis of democracy observe 
human rights. Neither does this study refute Tony Evans' observation that we must 
treat the claim that human rights and democracy share a symbiotic relationship with 
 
343 UN GA Doc/A/Res/A/50/133and Corr.1 20 December 1995. 
344 Secretary-General of the United Nations (1992–1996) 
345 UNGA Doc/A/Res/A/50/133and Corr.1 20 December 1995. Justifying the relationship, the UN 
Secretary-General democratic Governments are freely chosen by their citizens and held accountable 
through periodic and genuine elections and other mechanisms, they are less likely to abuse their power 
against the peoples of their own State territories. Democracy within States thus fosters the evolution 
of the social contract upon which lasting peace can be built. Lacking the legitimacy or real support 
offered by free elections, authoritarian Governments all too often have recourse to intimidation and 
violence in order to suppress internal dissent. 
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great caution. 346 Given that human rights abuses in democratic states are not hard 
to be identified. However, because freedom of expression347, self-determination, and 
political participation are defining elements of democracy with which human rights 
flourishes, democratic legitimacy continues to work in tandem with human rights and 
remains distinguish compared to the effective control doctrine that lacks 
consideration for human rights. 
 Thirdly, with regards to the promotion of constitutionality and evidence of 
state practice, the past few decades in international law have witnessed more 
international engagement of states in the promotion of constitutionality through pro-
democratic intervention than ever before.348 On different occasions before, during 
and after the Arab Spring, the international community vigorously defended 
democracy. This was done not only through pro-democratic interventions, but the 
recognition of opposition against some authoritarian governments or coup plotters. 
In 1996, the UN, ECOWAS, OAU, EU and Commonwealth not only condemned the 
coup by the Armed Revolutionary Council (AFRC) against the elected President of 
Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah349 but ensured the unconditional restoration of 
his candidacy.350 In Libya (2011), the international community endorsed the use of 
external force to promote democracy and human rights against the authoritarian 
government of President Mohammed Qaddafi. States later went ahead to recognise 
the government’s opposition.  In Gambia (2017), the African Union endorsed and 
recognised the newly elected government of President Adama Barrow against long-
term president Yahya Jammeh, who refused to accept the results of the december 
2016 democratic elections.351 
 
346 Tony Evans "If democracy, then human rights? (2001) 22 Third world quarterly at 623-642.  
347 Today, freedom of expression is enshrined in some states constitutions as a fundamental human 
right and it is regarded as an essential determinant of democracy.  
348 Gregory Fox and Brad Roth, eds. Democratic governance and international law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) at 329. 
349 It should be noted that Ahmad Tejan Kabbah served twice as the 3rd President of Sierra Leone, from 
1996 to 1997 and again from 1998 to 2007. However, the discuss situation refers to his first reign as 
the president in 1996. 
350 Gregory Fox and Brad Roth, eds. Democratic governance and international law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) at 305 to 307.  
351 This was also demonstrated in the failed August coup against the Soviet Union in August 1991, the 
year of the Haiti coup. This coup, also known as the August Putsch, was plotted by the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to oust the president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. 
However, it was defeated after just three days as a result of the efforts of Russian president, Boris 
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 Fourthly, democratic legitimacy is enshrined in international instruments and 
soft law. The most apparent evidence of this relationship is found in human rights 
instruments such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms,352 the American Convention on Human Rights,353 and the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.354 All of these assert that human rights 
are best protected by a democratically formed government.355 For instance, Article 
1(1) of the ICCPR, which reflects Article 1 of the ICESCR states, that, “all people have 
the right to self-determination. By that right, they unreservedly determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”356 
Also, Article 20(1) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (the Banjul 
Charter) affirms the peoples’ indisputable and inalienable right to internal self-
determination.357 Democratic legitimacy components can also be found in soft laws 
such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and  
Peoples358, Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations,359 Declaration of the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples,360 the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the 1990 Paris Charter. It 
is also enshrined in the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution on Promotion of 
the Right to Democracy,361 and Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All. 362 
 
Yeltsin, citizens of the Soviet Union, and state leaders who came out in defence of democracy. Thomas 
Franck describes the tremendous support for the incumbent regime and the actions of state and non-
state actors as pointing to the “inestimable human, political and historical import that demonstrates 
for those sensitive to trends that democracy is beginning to be seen as the sine qua non351 for validating 
governance." Another example of the value placed on democracy is the failed Peru palace coup (1992), 
where President Alberto Fujimori, in conjunction with the state military, announced a self-coup called 
‘Plan, Verde’ for the sole purpose of limiting democracy in the country. The restoration of democracy 
in Guatemala after the suspension of constitutional rule by the dictatorship headed by President 
Serrano. 
352 Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 
353 Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
354 June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 58 (1982). 
355  Andrew Moravcsik “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe” 2000 54(2) International Organization at 295  
356 Article 1(1) of the ICCPR AND ICCESR. 
357 Article 20(1) the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Banjul Charter). 
358 UN GA Res.1514 (XV) 1960. 
359 UN GA Res.2625 (XXV) 1970. 
360 UN GA Res.61/295 2007. 
361 Communique on Human Rights, Promotion of the Right to Democracy, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/1999/57 (Apr. 27, 1999). 
362 Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 
UN Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 
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 Fifthly, democratic legitimacy allows people to pursue their socio-political and 
economic lives, as well as choose their form of government without interference.363 
As such, governments that are unconstitutional in origin because of a coup, lack 
popular support or fail to respect citizens’ self-determination not only infringe on 
their right to internal self-determination but violate international law principles.364 In 
most cases, these types of governments are faced with non-recognition and regime 
changes because the current disposition of states has low tolerance toward 
governments that fails to consider and respect their citizens’ right to self-
determination. This is evident in the UN Security Council’s interventions in securing 
the self-determination rights of citizens in states such as East Timor, Nicaragua, Haiti, 
and, recently, Tunisia.365  
 Sixthly, in the last ten years, democratic legitimacy has been a conditionality 
for state relations. Commonwealth suspension of aids programme to 
unconstitutional regimes, the European Union suspension of activity with 
undemocratic government based on Article 11(1) of the 1992 EU treaty and the 20-
year Cotonou Agreement between the African, Caribbean, Pacific states and the 
European Union demonstrate this evidence. For instance, after 1999 military Coup in 
Cote d'Ivoire, the European Union launched a bilateral discussion with the state on  
breach of Article 5 of Lomé V and the need for restoration of democracy or suspension 
of aids.366 Likewise in response to Coup d'état and human rights violation in Fiji (2000 
and 2007), Zimbabwe (2002), the Central African Republic (2003), Togo (2004),  
Madagascar (2010), (Guinea-Bissau (2004 and 2011) and Burundi (2015) the EU 
invoked Article 96 Cotonou Agreement as sanctions that include suspension of aids 
and cooperation programme. 
 
2005). 
363 UN Doc. CCPR/C/TTO/99/3 Paragraph 20-1. 
364 Steven Wheatley The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Hart Pub, Oxford, 2010) at 229. 
365 Marc Weller “Settling Self-determination Conflicts: Recent Developments” 2009 20(1) European 
Journal of International Law 111 at 111-65. There are currently more than 20 on-going armed conflicts 
related to the abuse of self-determination. While some stem from the violation of human rights, others 
represent protests against undemocratic governance. Self-determination enables citizens to 
collectively and individually resist the violation of this right, as witnessed in Kurdish, Quebecois, 
Basques, Nigerian Igbo and Palestinians’ revolts. 
366 Rich Roland "Bringing democracy into international law" (2001) 12 Journal of Democracy at 29-30. 
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 Finally, democratic legitimacy, unlike other recognition of government 
approaches is being consolidated and carries with it a moralistic obligation which can 
easily be conceptualised in different ways. For instance, some academics espoused a 
human rights-based obligatory conceptualisation by the defence of a right to political 
participation, democratic governance and a right to free and fair elections.367 Others 
contend democratic legitimacy through the lens of internal self-determination 
originating from the existence of a customary international obligation to be 
democratic.368  Whichever way it is viewed, indeed it is quite evident that a customary 
obligation to promote democratic origin of government exists in international law.369 
Although, the obligation is argued as an erga omnes obligation rather than a Jus 
Cogen obligation.370 It undeniably exists and can easily be adduced globally in state 
practices, including the African continents where democratic governments are been 
challenged. An example of state practices relating to this obligation is demonstrated 
in Gambia (2017). President Yahya Jammeh, who had been in power for 22 years as 
the president of Gambia, shockingly lost his state democratic election to the 
presidential candidate of Coalition 2016, Adama Barrow.371 Upon realisation of the 
implication of his defeat, President Jammeh declared a 90-day state of emergency,  
citing election irregularities with the presidential released result.372 In an obligatory  
move to uphold democracy in Gambia, the Security Council of the African Union (AU) 
in its 647th   communique declared that Jammeh ceases to be recognised as the 
legitimate president of Gambia from the 19, January 2017.373  
 
367Jean Aspermont "The rise and fall of democracy governance in international law: A reply to Susan 
Marks" (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law at 556 
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NewsWeek> Accessed 8 April 2017. 
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<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38662000> accessed on the 18 January 2018. 
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 More importantly, it stressed the AU's determination "to take all necessary 
measures, in line with the relevant AU Instruments” to ensure full compliance with 
the outcome of the presidential elections. Similarly, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) issued an ultimatum to President Yahya Jammeh to 
step down and vacate office by midnight 19 January 2017 or be ousted  from office.374 
In its published communique, "ECOWAS expressly agreed to uphold the result of the 
Gambian elections; request the endorsement of the AU and the UN on the matter 
and take all necessary measures to enforce the results of the 1st December 2016 
elections." The declarations made by the AU and ECOWAS followed Jammeh's failure 
to concede power after a promise of a peaceful transition to democratic elected 
President Adama Barrow. On the 19th January 2017, Barrow was sworn into office 
while in exile at the Gambia Embassy in Dakar based on the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 2337 (2017). Three days later, ECOWAS troops arrived in Gambia 
and seized the state capital. This marked the end of Yahya Jammeh’s authoritarian 
reign as he flew on exile to Equatorial Guinea and the promotion of democratic rule 
in Gambia.375 
5.3.2.  Democratic Legitimacy as a Solution and Sustainable Practice: The Demerits  
Having discussed the features of democratic legitimacy that makes it a more suitable 
approach than the current effective control doctrine, the aim of this section is to 
discuss the disadvantages of democratic legitimacy as a solution.  
  As earlier stated, Haiti was selected as a case study because it is the first state 
where the effective control rule was collectively abandoned by the majority of the 
American states granting recognition. In the international realm, it was the first south 
America state were collective roles where jointly played by both state and non-state 
actors in the restoration of democracy. Till today, Haiti stands out as a reference for 
the end of an era in the traditional practices of the effective control doctrine and a 
tested study into the emergence and development of democratic legitimacy. Further, 
 
374 Paul Obi and Alex Emunah, ‘Gambia: Jammeh Gets Ecowas Deadline - Step Down Midnight 
Tomorrow or Face Forceful Ejection’ Thisday Newspaper 
<https://allafrica.com/stories/201701170545.html> accessed on  17 January 2017. 
375 The Gambia's former leader Yahya Jammeh goes into exile in Equatorial Guinea amid rising 
tensions The News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-01-22/gambias-former-leader-jammeh-flies-
into-exile/8201628> accessed on the 2nd of February 2015 . 
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Libya was selected as a case study because Libya stands out as a state where states 
pre-maturely recognised oppositions. Also, it is the only tested state where 
oppositions were democratic and recently became repressive thereby questioning 
the usefulness of democratic legitimacy as an approach to the recognition of 
governments.  
 Also, there are obvious similarities and differences in Haiti and Libyan 
interventions to warrant their use as case study.  A similarity is the collective 
intervention by both states and non-state actors occurred in both state conflicts. Also, 
Haiti regime change occurred during the third wave of democracy when usurpations 
in constitutional order as a result of coups were a considerable threat to international 
security and peace.376 In contrast,  Libya regime change occurred during the fourth 
wave of democracy known as the Arab Spring when democratic revolutions were 
blessing for the restoration of popular will and the removal of autocratic, tyranny and 
unconstitutional regimes.377  
 Given the aim of this Chapter is to investigate whether democratic legitimacy 
can be a sustainable approach for the recognition of government, Libya and Haiti 
stand out as the central cases to consider.  
5.3.3. Case Study: Haiti (1991) 
Haiti, the first Black republic in the world and the poorest country in the western 
hemisphere,378 elected its first democratic president by a two-thirds majority of votes 
under the close watch of the United Nations (UN) election monitoring committee on 
16th December 1990.379 The election brought political hope to Haitians, who had been 
oppressed by the autocratic regime of former President Jean-Claude Duvalier. 
However, seven months after the election, these hopes were dashed.380 The Front for 
the Advancement of Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), comprising Haitian military, police and 
security forces enforced unconstitutional regime change through a coup d’état381 that 
 
376 Samuel Huntington "Democracy's third wave" (1991) 2 Journal of democracy at 12-34. 
377 Ibrahim Abushouk "The Arab Spring: a fourth wave of democratization?" (2016) 25 Digest of Middle 
East Studies at 52-69. Olimat Muhamad "The fourth wave: Revolution and democratization in the Arab 
Middle East." (2011) 12 Journal of International Women's Studies at 1-6. 
378 Audrey M Wade “A Dream Deferred: The United States-Haitian Interdiction Policy” (1993) 2 How. 
Scroll: Soc. Just. Rev. at 55.  
379 At 55. 
380 President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was on a state visit to the UN headquarters in New York.  
381 Also referred to as Front Revolutionnaries pour l’Avancment et le Progress en Haiti. 
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overthrew the democratic government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and 
established the FRAPH as a military government headed by Joseph Raoul Cedars.382  
 From the standpoint of Haiti’s long entrenched but suddenly vulnerable elites, 
the coup brought salvation from an ochlocracy that failed to respect the rule of law 
and human rights. On the other hand, from the standpoint of Haiti’s long-
disenfranchised poor majority, the coup was a reactionary and bloody usurpation of 
popular will.383 Aristide’s constitutional and extra-constitutional reforms mainly 
targeted military and para-military personnel who had committed human rights 
atrocities during the reign of his predecessor, Jean-Claude Duvalier.384 This resulted 
in the formation of opposition groups within and outside of his government, 
particularly among some elites who had strongly opposed his presidency.385   
 In maintaining effective control of Haiti, the FRAPH committed gross human 
rights atrocities that led to a massive exit of citizens to the United States and other 
neighbouring states.386 Haiti became unsafe for Aristide’s supporters, including 
Aristide himself, who went into political exile in Venezuela. In response to the 
unconstitutional regime change, the UN, the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
and other regional organisations denounced the coup d’état and issued a repudiation 
condemning persistent human rights violations in the country.387 They demanded the 
return of the democratic government of Aristide and remained steadfast in their 
recognition of his government as the sole democratic representative of Haitians.388  
 States neither recognised the FRAPH government nor engaged in diplomatic 
relations with its representatives. Instead, recognition was accorded to the exiled 
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government of Aristide.389 While in exile, Aristide vehemently denounced the coup 
government and pushed for his return, arguing that the coup d’état should not be 
permitted to deter democracy.390  
 Acting under Chapter VII of its mandate, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 940 that ordered the use of economic sanctions and all necessary means 
to oust the unconstitutional government of the FRAPH.391 It also ordered the 
restoration of Aristide's government as the only recognised and legitimate 
democratic representative of Haiti.392 Alongside the UN Forces, in a collective military 
intervention termed ‘Operation Uphold Democracy’, the United States reinstated 
Aristide as the lawful representative of Haiti.393  In total,  15 resolutions were issued 
by the Security Council in response to the Haiti coup.394 The first, which relied on 
Article 41 of the UN Charter, provided that, if a solution was not found within seven 
days the Security Council would ban all international relations and trade with the 
FRAPH, including the supply of military equipment.395 Paragraph 16 expressed the 
Security Council’s readiness to review these measures if, in good faith, the FRAPH 
agreed to reinstate Aristide.396  
 The 14 remaining resolutions and general statements issued by the Security 
Council focused on the  mandatory restoration of democracy in Haiti by means of the 
reinstatement of Aristide and the full respect for human rights.397 As observed by 
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Elizabeth Gibbons, "this unique resolution set a precedent for  the collective 
enforcement of the democratic entitlement”.398 The reason being that the Security 
Council and other regional organisations’ reaction to coup regimes had always been 
sanctioned that take the form diplomatic relations termination, rather than, the 
restoration of democracy.399 The only logical explanation for the Security Council’s 
response to the Haiti coup by the restored of democracy was the consolidation of 
democratic legitimacy by the Organisation of America States. 
  Four months before the Haiti coup, on 5th June 1991, 34 democratically 
elected representatives of Latin American states met in Santiago, Chile under the 
aegis of the OAS for an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly.400 The 
purpose of the meeting was to sign a document termed the Santiago Commitment to 
Democracy and The Renewal of the Inter-American System. It consisted of various 
agreements affirming democracy as a state priority and the only statutory instrument 
for the manifestation of the people’s will.401  The mandate of the Santiago document, 
as enshrined in resolution 1080 of the agreement, was: 402 
To instruct the Secretary-General on the immediate convocation of a meeting of the 
Permanent Council in the events of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular 
interruption of the democratic political, institutional process of the legitimate exercise 
of power by the democratically elected government in any organisation’s member 
states. Within the framework of the charter, to examine the situation, decide on and 
convene an ad-hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs or a special session of the 
General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period.  
 
removal of the de facto regime of the FRAPH and the restoration of Aristide. The wording of the 
resolution shows that the Chapter VII mandate the Security Council relied upon was solely for the 
restoration of democracy. The Security Council’s resolutions did not demonstrate that the human 
rights violations in Haiti were a threat to international peace and security and that the coup was so 
overwhelming that it was left with no other choice but to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs. 
The Council’s intervention in Haiti was thus unjustified. The application of Article 2(7) and Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter would have been justifiable on the grounds of protecting Haitian lives, property and 
human rights. 
398 Elizabeth D Gibbons Sanctions in Haiti: Human rights and democracy under assault (Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 1999) at 7. 
399 The basis for the Security Council’s authorisation and states’ response that led to unambiguous 
repudiation of the legality of the de facto regime of the FRAPH was not clear at the time of the Haiti 
coup. While states and international organisations did not support the bloody violence and continuous 
violation of human rights perpetrated by the FRAPH, this could not have been a legitimate reason for 
not recognising it as the origins of a regime, whether democratic or not, are irrelevant to its legitimacy. 
400 Roland I Perusse Haitian Democracy Restored, 1991-1995 (University Press of America, 1995) at 21. 
401 Gregory Fox and Brad Roth Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 374. 
402 AG/Res.1080 (XX1-0/91) (5TH Plenary Session, June 5, 1991). Emphasis added. 
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In line with the Santiago agreement, three days after the Haiti coup, the OAS Council 
met and invoked resolution 1080 of the document and resolution CP/RES.567 
(870/91), denouncing the Haiti coup and demanding strict adherence to the Haiti 
Constitution, as well as respect for the democratically elected administration of 
Aristide.403 Importantly, the resolution reads, “to adopt, in accordance with the OAS 
Charter and international law, any additional measures that may be necessary and 
appropriate to ensure the immediate reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide to the exercise of his legitimate authority.”404  
 The fact that it denies any recognition of the FRAPH and demands the 
reinstatement of Aristide is evidence of democracy consolidation by states. 405 
Another example of the value placed on democracy is the failed Peru palace coup 
(1992), where President Alberto Fujimori, in conjunction with the state military, 
announced a self-coup called ‘Plan, Verde’ for the sole purpose of limiting democracy 
in the country.406 The restoration of democracy in Guatemala after the suspension of 
constitutional rule by the dictatorship headed by President Serrano also affirms the 
consolidation of democracy.407 This was confirmed by Luigi Einaudi, US Permanent 
Representative to the OAS, who stated that: 408 
A great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle, as we all know, 
is the revolutionary idea that the people, not governments, are sovereign. Democracy 
 
403 It resolved to recognise the representative of the Government of President Jean- Bertrand Aristide 
as the only legitimate representative of the Government of Haiti. To recommend, with due respect to 
the policy of each member state on the recognition of states and governments, action to bring about 
the diplomatic isolation of those who hold power illegally in Haiti. To recommend to all states that they 
suspend their economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and technical 
cooperation except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes. 
404 AG/Res.1080 (XX1-0/91) (5TH Plenary Session, June 5, 1991) 
405 Thomas M Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 The American Journal 
of International Law at 46-91. It was clear that fundamental changes were occurring in the global 
system in relation to validating governments. This is evident in the history of recognition of 
governments in international law and states’ responses to unconstitutional regimes. 
406 A self-coup, otherwise known as auto-coup, is a form of coup d’état where a legitimate state 
representative incapacitates citizens, and other arms of government and unlawfully assumes 
extraordinary powers not granted under the constitution. Such powers include dissolving the 
constitution and the executive and judicial arms of government. See Seung-Ok Ryu “Effectiveness of 
Joint International Organization Operations in Latin America: Case Studies of Peru, Guatemala, and 
Haiti” (2011) Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses at 18. 
407 David Malone “Haiti and the International Community: A case study” 1997 39(2) Survival at 136. 
408 Bureau of Pub. Aff., U.S. Dep’t Of State, Current Pol’y No. 1240, Panama: A Just Cause 2 (1990) 
(Statement Of Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative To The Oas), quoted in David Wippman 
"Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention" (1996) 19  Hous. J. Int'l L. at 659. 
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today is synonymous with legitimacy the world over; it is, in short, the universal value of 
our time.  
5.3.4. Case Study: Libya (2011 to 2019)  
The Arab Spring started with pro-democratic protests that spread from Tunisia in 
2010 to some states in North Africa and the Middle East.409 The protests led to the 
overthrow of established, elected, and unelected governments in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Syria410 and Morocco.411 While they could be termed symbolic as they echoed 
the American Revolution and its Declaration of Independence, unsuccessful attempts 
to suppress these protests by some North African and Arab leaders drew the world’s 
attention.412 Indeed, these events sent clear signals around the world that for the first 
time in the 21st century, pro-democratic regime change was occurring to a significant 
extent in some North African and Arab states.  
 Tunisian vegetable salesperson, Muammar Bouazizi’s death, after he set 
himself ablaze to protest against government oppression, led to widespread protests 
across the country and resulted in the ousting of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.413  
In a nationwide broadcast, an ally of the ousted president, Libyan President 
Muammar Gaddafi condemned the Tunisian uprising and advised Tunisians to adopt 
the Libyan model of governance which according to Gaddafi, “marks the final 
destination of the people’s quest for democracy.”414  
 Little did Gaddafi know that, a few months after this speech, Libya would be 
the next port of call with his regime coming to an end. What began as a street protest 
against the arrest of a human rights campaigner in Benghazi415 soon turned to calls 
 
409 Hannah Woolaver “Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa and the Arab Spring” (2014) 22 Afr. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. at 161. 
410 At 161. 
411 Amax Afaisheer, Will Morocco Be the Arab Spring's Next Greatest Success-or Great Failure?, The 
Atlantic <http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2011/07/will-morocco-be-the-arab-
springs-greatsuccess-or-great-failure/241286>.  
412 Christian Henderson “ International Measures for the Protection of Civilians in Libya and Côte 
d'ivoire” 2011 60(03) International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 768. 
413 Hannah Woolaver “Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa and the Arab Spring” 2014 22 Afr. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. at 161. 
414 Matthew Weaver, “Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisian uprising The Guardian 03 Jan. 2016 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising>. 
See also, Muammar Gaddafi Condemns Tunisia Uprising The Guardian 03 Jan. 2016 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/muammargaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising>. 
415 Geir Ulfstein and Hege Føsund Christiansen “The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya” (2013)  
62(01) International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 159. 
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for his resignation and the institution of a democratic government in Libya.416 
Gaddafi, who had never before experienced this level of democratic outcry in his 41-
year rule, responded with force.417 The use of the military instead of the Libyan police 
was combative and aggressive with the intention of suppressing the rebellion.418 
Vigorous resistance led to the deaths of thousands of civilians,419 as well as the 
defection of some of Gaddafi loyal personnel and state structures.420 Gaddafi did not 
help matters as he interpreted the rebellion as a minor security breakdown that could 
be stopped with the arbitrary arrests and intimidation that were commonplace under 
his rule.421 He threatened: 422 
There are handfuls of people trying to imitate what’s happened in Tunisia and Egypt. 
These are “cockroaches.” Officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that 
they can purify all decisions of these “cockroaches.” Any Libyan who takes arms against 
Libya will be executed. 
 True to his words, the International Criminal Court reported that: 423 
 
Civilians were attacked in their homes; demonstrations were repressed using live 
ammunition. Heavy artillery was used against participants in funeral processions, and 
snipers placed to kill those leaving the mosques after the prayers. 
 
Gaddafi justified his actions with claims that the protests were armed rebellions that 
must be dealt with under Libyan criminal law.424 To some extent, this was an 
 
416 Hannah Woolaver “Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa and the Arab Spring” (2014) 22 Afr. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. at 172. 
417 Marie-Joe Domestici-Met “Protecting in Libya on Behalf of The International Community” (2011) 3 
Goettingen J. Int'l L. 861 at 866. 
418 Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams “The New politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and The 
Responsibility to Protect” (2011) 87(4) International Affairs 825 at 838  
419 Hannah Woolaver “Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa and the Arab Spring” (2014) 22 Afr. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. at 172. 
420 Sam Foster Halabi “Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in Historical and 
Theoretical Context” (2011) 27 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. at 375. As the conflict intensified, the Transitional 
National Council (NTC) became less relentless in their mission as they fought vigorously for the 
formation of a democratic society. Their mandate was clear - the overthrow of the Gaddafi government 
and assumption of office by the interim government of Libya pending a referendum to establish a new 
democratic constitution and government. 
421 Hannah Woolaver “Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa and the Arab Spring” (2014) 22 Afr. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L.  at 172-74. 
422 Alex J Bellamy “Libya and The Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and The Norm” (2011)  25(03) 
Ethics & International Affairs at 265.  
423 ICC Prosecutor: Gaddafi used his absolute authority to commit crimes in Libya' International 
Criminal Court <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/1365E3B7-8152-4456-942C-A5CD5A51E829.htm>  
accessed on 23 January 2016 
424 Gaddafi defiant as State Teeters, Aljazeera, 




acceptable defence as the country’s criminal law strictly prohibits rebellion against a 
ruling government. However, as the protests escalated beyond the control of the 
state machinery, Libya automatically became subject to the minimum standard of 
international law that calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of persons 
within and outside armed conflict zones.425 
 Although international law is premised on respect for sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and states’ political independence,426 the use of extreme violence by a 
government against the citizens it purports to represent calls for international 
responses based on the need to protect human rights. As such, when the death toll 
of civilians and gross violations of human rights committed by the regime advanced 
beyond mere numbers and were relentlessly increasing, the reactions of the 
international community in rejecting Gaddafi claim that the rebels were “mere 
cockroaches” to be treated under Libya criminal law became justifiable.427 Also, it 
demonstrates that most international organisations and states were not in support 
of human right abuses and undemocratic acts committed by the Gaddafi's regime.428 
For instance, the Human Rights Council in its special session on the “Situation of 
human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” urged the Libyan government to respect 
 
425 Hannah Woolaver “Pro-Democratic Intervention in Africa and the Arab Spring” (2014) 22 Afr. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. at 173. The UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and other regional treaties and obligations 
contain various provisions on human rights. Libya is a consenting party to these instruments whose 
enactments supersede state laws and are regarded as fundamental jus cogens norms. They cannot be 
undermined or dissuaded by any state, including Libya, as a justification for the application of its 
internal laws. In principle, violation of any of the provisions of the enactments in treaties or customary 
obligations can lead to state action, and the application of Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter, 
especially when the nature of the violence or suppression exhibited by a state is inhuman 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.368 (1967). 
426 Principles of the UN Charter.  
427 The Security Council condemned attacks on the civilian population and warned the regime against 
committing crimes against humanity. The resolution further demanded that the regime cease 
exercising violence against the civilian population. See Sam Foster Halabi “Traditions of Belligerent 
Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in Historical and Theoretical Context” (2011) 27 Am. U. Int'l L. 
Rev. at 375. It should also be noted that the use of military aircraft, heavy weapons, and counter 
attacks by the rebels shows that the protest had escalated beyond Libya’s control.  
428 The UN Secretary General made a call to Gaddafi, demanding respect for international law principles 
and Security Council resolution 1970 of February 26, 2011. 
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the popular will, aspirations and demands of its people. 429 Further, it urged the 
government to make the utmost effort to prevent further deterioration of the crisis. 
 Under Chapter VII of its mandate in relation to ensuring international peace 
and security, the UN Security Council echoed the Human Rights Council’s concerns by 
unanimously adopting Resolution 1970.430 This Resolution, among others, urged an 
end to the Libyan conflict and fulfilment of the democratic legitimate demands of the 
people.431 These calls were refuted by Gaddafi, who continuously undermined 
international instructions, including those of the Security Council and the AU.432 
Acting under Chapter VII of its mandate, the UN Security Council enforced measures 
such as an arms embargo, freezing Gaddafi’s assets and a no-fly zone in Libya’s 
airspace.433 Most significantly, the Security Council authorised regional organisations 
and states to enforce Resolution 1970 by using all necessary means to restore peace, 
having accepted that Libya was in a civil war.434 Resolution 1973 states:435 
The Security Council authorises member States to take all necessary measures, 
notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians, and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack in the Libya Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, 
while excluding a foreign  occupation force of any form on any part of Libya territory. 
In a separate communiqué, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon436 asserted that:437 
 
429 Human Rights Council Res. S-15/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 15th Spec. Sess. (Feb. 25, 
2011) condemning the gross and systematic human rights violations committed by the Gaddafi regime. 
430 S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 25, 2011).  
431 S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 25, 2011), paragraph No. 1 
432 Sam Foster Halabi “Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in Historical and 
Theoretical Context” (2011) 27 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. at 374. 
433 Determined to put an end to the continuous violence and threat to international security and peace, 
and notwithstanding its earlier Resolution 1970, in Resolution 1973, the Security Council reiterated its 
concern for the plight of refugees and foreign workers that had fled Libya. UN Security Council, Security 
Council Resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, 6491st meeting S/RES/1970 (2011),  
434 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Fiddling While Libya Burns New York Times. 23 Jan. 2016 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/opinion/14slaughter.html>.See also, Philippe Sands, U.N.'s 
Libya Resolution 1973 is Better Late than Never The Guardian  03 Jan. 
2016<http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetailgetNewsByld.action;jsessionid=6E29AOC962CED36
CA72BO47C63E46D3C?newsld=239496. >. Noting problems with Security Council Resolution 1973 
but nevertheless endorsing its legitimacy based on protecting civilians. See also, Gaddafi, Moral 
Interventionism Libya, and the Arab Revolutionary Movement:  How to Save a Revolution Todays 
Zaman <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7703> .  
435 Un SC S/RES/1973 (2011) 17 March 2011. 
436 The eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 2007 to December 2016 
437 UN Doc. SG/SM/13454, Statement by the United Nations Secretary General, 17 March 2011. 
Despite the Security Council reiterating that Resolution 1973 aimed to promote order, international 
peace and security in Libya. The use of the words “all necessary means” authorises individual or 
collective force. The use of such force seemed not to be about civilians but the forcible overthrow of 
Gaddafi, including regime change in Libya. The Secretary-General’s statement affirms this assertion by 
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Resolution 1973 affirms clearly and unequivocally, the international community's 
determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated 
upon them by their own government.  
The AU’s reaction to Security Council Resolution 1973 showed elements of 
disapproval. This was evident in its reports on some African states’ rejection of the all 
“necessary means approach and mandates” in Libya.438 The AU emphasised the 
importance of legitimacy and the self-determination of the Libyan people to choose 
their government, undergo political reform, and achieve social justice and economic 
development.439 Two days after the UN Security Council resolution, it was confirmed 
that the United States and the United Kingdom had launched more than 110 missiles 
into Libya.   
 In addition to the missile attacks, both states sent forces to train the 
Transitional National Council of Libya (NTC).440 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) imposed a No-fly Zone in Libya, and forcibly prevented pro-Gaddafi troops 
from advancing towards opposition-controlled areas through targeted airstrikes. This 
led to the death of pro-Gaddafi protesters, members of Gaddafi's family and the loss 
of some territory controlled by the regime.441  
 
its systematic use of responsibility to protect (R2P) as a justification for the use of force against the 
Gaddafi regime.  
438 African Union Peace and Security Council 261st Meeting Communiqué of February 
23, 2011, (PSC/PR/COMM (CCLXI) See also, African Union Peace and Security Council 265th Meeting 
Communiqué of March 10, 2011, (PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV). See also, Response to the Situation in 
Libya ASIL Insight 30 Jan. 2016.  <http://www.asil.org/insights110725.cfm> 
439 However, it expressed serious concerns about the efforts of foreign actors i.e. the Security Council 
and the Western states, undermining Africa efforts to achieve international peace and security by 
applying non-African solutions to African problems. The AU urged states to refrain from military action 
in Libya, arguing that it would compound the situation in the territory. It called on the Africa 
Commission on International Law (ACIL) to consider the legal implications of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Citing the need to approach the Libyan conflict with caution and road 
maps, the AU created high-level ad-hoc committees on Libya that were tasked with engaging with all 
parties to the conflict on the facilitation of peace and appropriate reform. Discrepancies also emerged 
among some states on the scope and limits of the mandates, particularly on the use of all necessary 
means in Libya. China and Russia expressed regret and condemned the aerial attacks on Libya. Briefed 
on the military strikes in the country and support for rebels carried out by NATO, Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sergi Lavrov stated that, “If this is confirmed, it is a crude violation of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1970.” See Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Peace and Security Council 
on the state of Peace and Security in Africa of April 26, 2011 (PSC/MIN/BR.1 (CCLXXV).  
440 Alan Cowell & Ravi Somaiya, France and Italy Will Also Send Advisers to Libya Rebels NewYork Times 
3 Jan. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/world/africa/21libya>  
441 Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Libya North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization <www.nato.int, press release, March 27, 2011, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71808.htm > accessed on 26 January 2017 
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 In response to the Libyan conflict, France recognised the NTC as the lawful 
representative government of the country. President Nicolas Sarkozy argued for the 
need to prevent Libya from becoming a failed state and to promote democracy for 
all.442 France’s decision was met with scepticism by some states who viewed the move 
as irrational.443 For instance, Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte was quoted to have 
said, “I find it a crazy move by France, to jump ahead and say I will recognise a 
transitional government in the face of any diplomatic practice. It is not the solution 
for Libya.”444 Nevertheless, Qatar, Italy, the USA and the United Kingdom joined 
France in recognising the NTC as the legitimate representative of Libyans.445 
 The United Kingdom accredited an NTC appointed Ambassador as the Libyan 
ambassador in London. The government also unfroze the assets of the Arabian Gulf 
Oil Company, a Libyan company whose assets were frozen during the conflict.446 
Interestingly, the United Kingdom’s actions contradicted its 1980 policy on the 
recognition of governments.447  This illustrates the states shift from the traditional 
recognition of governments based on the effective control approach to one based on 
respect for democratic legitimacy. 
 However, some states rejected this position. For instance, Venezuela stated 
that it would only recognise the representatives of a constitutionally established 
government that was the will of the Libyan people.448 Bolivia’s representative also 
 
442 Raf Casert and Don Melvin EU slams France’s crazy move on Libya: Seeks One Voice Daily News 30 
Jan. 2016 <http://www.arabnews.com/node/370720> 
443 Raf Casert and Don Melvin EU slams France’s crazy move on Libya: Seeks One Voice Daily News 30 
Jan. 2016 <http://www.arabnews.com/node/370720> 
444 Nicholas Watts Nicolas Sarkozy calls for air strikes on Libya if Gaddafi attacks civilians The Guardian 
30 Jan. 2016 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/nicolas-sarkozy-libya-air-strikes> 
445 British Foreign Secretary, William Hague declared that “the Prime Minister and I have decided 
that the United Kingdom recognises and will deal with the National Transitional Council as the sole 
governmental authority in Libya. This decision reflects the NTC increasing legitimacy, competence 
and success in reaching out to Libyans across the country. Through its actions, the NTC has shown its 
commitment to a more open and democratic Libya - something that it is working to achieve through 
an inclusive political process. This is in stark contrast to Gaddafi, whose brutality against the Libyan 
people has stripped him of all legitimacy.” Foreign & Commonwealth Office and The Rt Hon William 
Hague MP: Working for peace and long-term stability in the Middle East and North Africa, National 
security, Defence and Armed Forces, Foreign Affairs others 
<Http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latestnews/?view=News&id=635937682> accessed on 30 Jan. 
2016 
446 Patrick Capps “British Policy on the Recognition of Goverments” 2014(2) Public law, at 229 
447 At 229. 
448 Venezuela’s representative stated that the Assembly was being asked to recognise a group working 
under the guidance of the United States Government and NATO, which had no legal or moral authority 
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rejected recognition of the NTC, describing it as a violation of Libyans’ self-
determination.449 The Nicaraguan representative expressed his displeasure by stating  
“Let me be clear, a unity government has not been formed, and the National 
Transitional Council had committed itself to do so and crafting a new constitution and 
a free Libya.” 
 Regardless of different states’ positions on recognising the NTC, it was clear 
that Gaddafi was in effective control of substantial parts of Libya, including Tripoli, 
the state capital,450 and doubt was cast on the unity of the NTC. Nonetheless, the 
General Assembly recognised the NTC as Libya’s representative for its sixty-sixth 
session. Such premature recognition was a clear breach of Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter. As discuss earlier, the effective control test should have come into effect as 
soon as the Security Council accepted and declared that Libya was in a state of civil 
war.451 The Gaddafi regime thus remained the lawful government of Libya pending 
the loss of its efficacy.452 Any assistance to or recognition of an opposition group 
would violate the effective control doctrine. The only logical explanation for states 
and the General Assembly’s recognition of the NTC is undemocratic practice by the 
Gaddafi's regime. 
Article 25 of the ICCPR and Article 21 of the UDHR entitled Libyans to certain 
obligations under the Gaddafi regime, namely, non-discrimination in the exercise of 
self-determination and the political right to participate in elections. Undue 
restrictions because of discrimination on the grounds of class, sex, and age, denial of 
 
to decide who should govern a nation. NATO’s belligerent conduct violated the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State.  It also represented an act of 
aggression, which negated any humanitarian purpose. The perpetrators of those crimes must be 
brought to the International Criminal Court.  The Assembly’s recognition of the National Transitional 
Council as Libya’s Government represented an “abominable precedent” that violated the most 
elementary principles of international law. See UN GA 11137 16 September 2011. Also “After Much 
Wrangling, General Assembly Seats National Transitional Council of Libya as Country’s Representative 
for Sixty-Sixth Session” <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11137.doc.htm> 
449 Bolivia’s representatives discussed the implications of Libyans’ on-going suffering and the violation 
of their sovereignty as a result of their inability to express their opinions or establish the government 
of their choice. UN GA 11137 16 September 2011 
450 Patrick Capps “British Policy on the Recognition of Governments” (2014) 2 Public law at 229. 
451 Patrick Capps “British Policy on the Recognition of Governments” (2014) 2 Public law at 230. 
452As explained by Hans Kelsen, “Under international law, a legal order is valid as it becomes efficacious 
and it immediately losses its validity as soon as its losses its efficacy.”  
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suffrage to minors, professional training, and political ideology, mental illness, etc. 
are explicitly prohibited under this provision. 
  However, during Gaddafi’s rule, unreasonable restrictions were placed on 
membership of the Arab Socialist Union, which was the only political party in Libya.453 
Not only was membership of the party restricted to specific categories, Libyans right 
to participate in the political structure and development of their society 
systematically controlled.454 
  Parliamentary participation and representation were dependent on 
government selected revolutionary committees (RCs) whose decisions were subject 
to implementation by Gaddafi himself.455 Participation thus centred on 
representatives rather than the people. Libyans literally lacked political freedom to 
express their will and participate fully in matters relating to the sovereignty of the 
country. 456 After the fall of the regime and the death of Gaddafi in 2011, an 
independent investigation by Human Rights Watch documented a large number of 
renditions, torture and inhuman activities committed by the government against 
Libyans aboard, although at times with the complicity of Western intelligence 
agencies.457 
 
453 Article 25 of the ICCPR and Article 21 of the UDHR assert citizen right to directly or indirectly 
participate in the conduct of the affairs of states through their chosen representatives without 
unreasonable restrictions. Article 25 of the ICCPR which gives specific expression to Article 21 of the 
UDHR provides that Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections; this shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. (c) To have access, on general 
terms of equality, to public service in his country. See, Kimberly L Sullivan Muammar Al-Gaddafi's Libya 
(Twenty-First Century Books, 2008) at 32. 
454 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Libya: A Country Study. Washington: GPO Library of Congress 03 Mar. 2016 
< http://countrystudies.us/libya/>  
455 Kimberly L Sullivan Muammar Al-Gaddafi's Libya (Twenty-First Century Books, 2008) at 32. 
456 Unchecked by the rules of governance and with all vestiges of civil society destroyed and vast oil 
wealth at his disposal, Gaddafi was able to build an anti-imperialist economy fuelled by dictatorship 
and terrorist activities. Training camps primed guerrillas for a supposed world revolution; free training, 
infrastructure and pay were offered depending on the success of their operations. M Cherif Bassiouni 
Libya: From Repression to Revolution: A Record of Armed Conflict and International Law Violations, 
2011-2013 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at 67. M Cherif Bassiouni Libya: From Repression to 
Revolution: A Record of Armed Conflict and International Law Violations, 2011-2013 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2013) at 67. Brian Lee Davis Qaddafi, Terrorism, and The Origins of the US Attack on Libya 
(ABC-CLIO, 1990) at 6. 
457 Delivered into Enemy Hands: US Led Abuse and Rendition of opponents of Gaddafi’s Libya Human 
Right Watch  2016 < http://www.hrw.org/fr/node/109782>  accessed on 15 November 2019 
112 
 
 In July 2012, after Libya National elections, the democratically elected 
government of the General National Council (GNC) took over governance of Libya 
from the NTC.458 However, by 2013, Libyan political situations had deteriorated 
mainly because a consensus could not be reached on the roles of majority and 
minority stakeholders of the conflict.459 The political turmoil intensifies with 
increasing number of armed attacks challenging the GNC government. Soon after, a 
Coup led to the ousting of Libyan acting Prime Minister, Minister Ali Zeidan through 
Operation Dignity, also known as Operation Karama in Libya.460 
 The GNC was challenged, and re-election was demanded. In response, a 
democratic election was held on the 26 August 2014 in Libya. However, the election 
was marred with irregularities. Questions arose as to the voting of representatives 
and the constitutionality of the election due to the voters voting based on religion 
and tribal affiliations. 461 
 Following an internal armed conflict, the Dawn coalition emerged. The 
Internationally recognised and democratically elected House of Representatives 
(HoR) was declared illegal and unconstitutional by Libya Supreme Court. The decision 
left Libya without a recognised government, widening the fight for power and 
international recognition.462 Consequentially Libyan was divided between two rival 
governments of the GNC and the House of Representative (HoR) that emerged from 
the democratic election.  
 In December 2015, after the Libyan Political Agreement was signed, the 
Government of National Accord (GNA) came into power as the legitimate and 
 
458 Zineb Abdessadok  Libya Today: From Arab Spring to failed state War and Conflict Libya Today: From 
Arab Spring to failed state <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/happening-libya-
today-170418083223563.html>. 
459 Elif Ersen Post-Gadhafi Libya: Crippled By Continuous Clashes, Political Instability Daily Bach: 
Africa <https://www.dailysabah.com/africa/2019/06/22/post-gadhafi-libya-crippled-by-continuous-
clashes-political-instability> accessed on 6 November 2019. 
460 The aim was to target groups such as the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries in Benghazi (of 
which Ansar al-Sharia and other armed Islamists were part), which largely rejected the formal political 
process at the time (the Islamists were at the time influential and in control of parts of Tripoli).  
461 Libyan National Army Reaches Tripoli's Outskirt (Map)" South Front <https://southfront.org/libyan-
national-army-reaches-tripolis-outskirt-map/> 6 April 2019. 
462 Mohamed Eljarh, 'The Supreme Court Decision That’s Ripping Libya Apart' Foreign Policy News  
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-supreme-court-decision-thats-ripping-libya-apart/> 
accessed on 10 November 2019.  
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internationally recognised government of Libya.463 Despite its international 
recognition, the GNA was not nationally recognised by the HoR due to non-agreement 
on some issues. On 4 April 2019, ten days to Libya National Conference for the 
planning of Libya Presidential and Parliamentary election, "Operation Flood of 
Dignity" which is another form of conflict was launched.464 As at the time of 
completing this study, Libya is in armed conflict with ongoing human rights 
violations.465 
5.4. Comparative Analysis Discussion: Democratic Legitimacy Barriers 
Contrary to claims that democratic legitimacy would be a suitable replacement of the 
effective control doctrine, it is clear from this chapter that democratic legitimacy is 
not fully accepted by states as the sole approach to recognition of governments. One 
of the main reasons for this assertion as noticed in Haiti and Libya case studies is that 
there was high level of inconsistency in state practices. The inconsistencies were 
demonstrated at one point by some states, such as France and the United Kingdom, 
recognition of the NTC on the basis of democracy and the condemnation of such 
recognition by some other states. For example, the Dutch Prime Minister considered 
it a crazy move by France; similarly, Bolivia rejected the recognition and found it a 
violation of Libyan's self-determination and Sovereignty.466 Another example was the 
conflicting reaction of International Organisations such as the United Nations, NATO 
and in particular, the African Union to Libya conflict.467 While the UN Human Rights 
 
463  United Nations, "UN welcomes ‘historic’ signing of Libyan Political Agreement" Peace and Security 
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/12/518412-un-welcomes-historic-signing-libyan-political-
agreement#.VyJoBKMrLKI>.  
464 UN chief issues stark Libya warning as fighting rages south of Tripoli 
<https://www.arabnews.com/node/1478066/middle-east> Arab News accessed on 6 April 2019. 
"Libyan National Army declares no-fly zone in the west of the country" TASS 
https://tass.com/world/1052444> accessed on 5 November 2019. 
465 Haftar’s forces lauch attack on closed Mitiga Airport in Libya’s capital Libyan Express 
<https://www.libyanexpress.com/haftars-forces-lauch-attack-on-closed-mitiga-airport-in-libyas-
capital/>  accessed on 1 October 2019.  Haftar’s Forces Launch Attack On Closed Mitiga Airport In 
Libya’s Capital Libyan Express <https://www.libyanexpress.com/haftars-forces-lauch-attack-on-
closed-mitiga-airport-in-libyas-capital/> accessed on 2 November 2019. 
466 Bolivia’s representatives discussed the implications of Libyans’ on-going suffering and the violation 
of their sovereignty as a result of their inability to express their opinions or establish the government 
of their choice. See Patrick Capps “British Policy on the Recognition of Governments” (2014) 2 Public 
law at 229. 
467 The African Union expressed serious concerns about the efforts of foreign actors i.e. the Security 
Council and the Western states, undermining Africa efforts to achieve international peace and security 
by applying non-African solutions to African problems. The AU urged states to refrain from military 
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Council urged the Gaddafi regime to respect the popular will, demand and aspiration 
of the people with the UN Security Council using its Chapter IV mandate, the African 
Union reaction was the opposite.468 The African Union emphasised the importance of 
the effective control doctrine and condemned the UN and NATO reaction to Libya 
conflict by releasing a communique emphasising that "African problems demand 
African solutions." 469 
 The Libya conflicts is not the only justification for this conclusion. Another 
example that demonstrates inconsistency in states practices supporting a notion of 
democratic legitimacy is the continued tolerance of coups regimes and regimes that 
are popular rebellions against authoritarian governments despite such regime's 
undemocratic origins. These inconsistencies were obvious during the Arab spring in 
particular with Libya (2011), Egypt (2013), Mali (2012) and of recent Zimbabwe 
(2018). In Egypt (2013), the African Union had outrightly condemned the overthrow 
of the democratically elected President Mubarak Morsi by calling for the restoration 
of democracy in Egypt. However, inconsistency plagued the United States, the 
European Union and some other states who did not condemn the Egypt coup and 
demand the reinstatement of President Morsi.470 Similarly, while the African Union 
 
action in Libya, arguing that it would compound the situation in the territory. It called on the Africa 
Commission on International Law (ACIL) to consider the legal implications of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Citing the need to approach the Libyan conflict with caution and road 
maps, the AU created high-level ad-hoc committees on Libya that were tasked with engaging with all 
parties to the conflict on the facilitation of peace and appropriate reform. Discrepancies also emerged 
among some states on the scope and limits of the mandates, particularly on the use of all necessary 
means in Libya. China and Russia expressed regret and condemned the aerial attacks on Libya. Briefed 
on the military strikes in the country and support for rebels carried out by NATO, Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sergi Lavrov stated that, “If this is confirmed, it is a crude violation of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1970.” See Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Peace and Security Council 
on the state of Peace and Security in Africa of April 26, 2011.  
467 Alan Cowell & Ravi Somaiya, France and Italy Will Also Send Advisers to Libya Rebels New York 
Times 3 Jan. 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/world/africa/21libya>  
467 Statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on Libya North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71808.htm > accessed on the 25 
November 2019.  
468 Human Rights Council Res. S-15/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 15th Spec. Sess. (Feb. 25, 
2011) condemning the gross and systematic human rights violations committed by the Gaddafi regime. 
S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 25, 2011), paragraph No. 1 
469 African Union Peace and Security Council 261st Meeting Communiqué of February 
23, 2011, (PSC/PR/COMM (CCLXI) See also, African Union Peace and Security Council 265th Meeting 
Communiqué of March 10, 2011, (PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV). See also, Response to the Situation in 
Libya ASIL Insight 30 Jan. 2016.  <http://www.asil.org/insights110725.cfm 
470 See Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic 
Legitimacy in Governmental Recognition." (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 205. Peace and Security Council 
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(AU) outrightly condemned and suspended the government that came into effective 
control of Guinea Bissau by Coup, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) worked with the same coup government on the shadow of intending to 
restore democracy.471 Therefore, evidence of acceptance and uniformity in 
international practice for democratic legitimacy is absence. Thus, democratic 
legitimacy is not yet fully accepted as a measure for the recognition of governments 
and a sustainable replacement of the effective control doctrine.  
 Secondly, the lack of a consolidated accepted global-level international rule 
against the recognition of undemocratically installed governments (similar to the OAS 
approach discuss in Haiti Case study) makes the prediction of democratic legitimacy 
as a sustainable replacement of the effective control doctrine less realistic.472 As at 
the time of completing this study, evidence from state practices in  response to the 
Egypt, Ukraine, Syria and South Sudan conflicts shows that states are more  interested 
in installing friendly regimes than in the democratic nature of such governments. 
Perhaps, Lessons seems to have been learned from Libya intervention and its 
aftermath. Although, there are treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) that obligates states with democratic rights of citizens, 
these treaties simply do not deal with the situation of non-recognition of 
undemocratic governments. Also, this treaty provisions, as stated earlier, are not Jus 
Cogen obligations, i.e. peremptory norms of international law that permits no 
derogations. Where the treaty provisions conflict with the national security or public 
policy of a state, customary international law has shown evidence of derogation as 
evidence in current Syria and the ISIL situation. Given this, democratic legitimacy 
clearly not the perfect solution.  
 
of the African Union (AU), Communiqué of the 318th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 
PSC/PR/COMM(CCCXVIII) (Apr. 17, 2012). Security Council, Situation in Guinea-Bissau Marked by 
Insecurity, Impunity, Despite Recent Political Progress towards Development of Transitional Road 
Map, Security Council Told, SC/10907 (Feb. 5, 2013). 
471 ECOWAS, Extraordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government: Final 
Communiqué (Nov. 11, 2012) 
472 This finding has led some authors to contend that there exist “double standards” in that regard. 
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 Thirdly, without any doubts, the twentieth century has been replete with 
examples of the use of democratic legitimacy as an approach for recognising 
governments and indeed with Haiti, democratic legitimacy in relation to the 
recognition of governments could arguably be claimed to have entered another 
epoch. However, the question is whether states are ready for an era where 
democracy will be practise to its absolute core, i.e. democracy will be the only 
approach for validating governance in both armed and non-armed conflicts 
situations. Since the claims of democratic legitimacy as a solution to the recognition 
of governments controversies and a sustainable replacement of the effective control 
doctrine, there have been fewer cases like Haiti or derecognition of a government or 
the sanction of a government based on it emerging as an undemocratic 
government.473 The United States' effort to place sanctions on the Cuban government 
which came into power undemocratically through the 1996 Helms-Burton Act was 
met with vigorous condemnation by states such as the UK, Canada, Mexico and even 
the European Union who consider it an attack on international law and the 
sovereignty of Cuba.474 As at the time of completing this study, the US is facing 
ongoing legal battles relating to the Helms-Burton Act.475 This confirms that some 
states will continue to transact with undemocratic regimes and the effective control 
doctrine has not been totally eradicated from international law.  
 Fourthly, international organisations such that the United Nations, African 
Union and European Unions since the high-water mark of Libya (which is ongoing) 
remain indifferent to the effective control doctrine. Undeniably, democratic 
legitimacy projects some advantages (as discussed in previous sections) that cannot 
easily be replicated by the effective control doctrine. However, due to some 
democracy deficits such as what it entails, its meaning and the process to attain an 
 
473 Jean Aspermont "The Pipe Dream of Constraining Recognition Through Democracy: International 
Lawyers’ Regulatory Project Continued" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 220.  
474 The European Union enforce EU Council regulation 2271/96 sanctioning US companies 
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<"The Extraterritorial US Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of Trading 
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absolute democracy as noted in the ongoing Libya conflict,476 democratic legitimacy 
ceases to be a suitable replacement of the effective control doctrine. While some 
states will continue to apply democratic legitimacy as part of their recognition policies 
when recognising governments, it is obvious that the effective control doctrine has 
not been totally replaced. Rather, in the absence of a global level declaration or an 
international treaty provision on democratic legitimacy, both recognition of 
governments approaches will continue to be used depending on individual states 
policies and case by case situations. Supporting evidence to this claim is the recent 
military-like coup against democratically elected President Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe.477 While Zambia and some African states expressed concerns as to the 
illegality of the Coup, and the African Union stated that it would never accept the 
coup,478 no sanction or non-recognition was placed on the coup regime.  
 Fifthly, while there is a strong move to consolidate democracy globally such 
as that similar to the Organisation of America States in Haiti, different constitutional 
frameworks and system of governance make such move hard, challenging and 
unstainable.479 For example, Libya constitutional framework before the fall of Gaddafi 
shows a different form of democracy to those practised in other Arabian Regions. As 
explained earlier, Libyan parliamentary participation and representation were 
dependent on government selected revolutionary committees (RCs) whose decisions 
were subject to implementation by Gaddafi himself.480 Participation thus centred on 
RCs representatives rather than Libyans. Until the conceptual definition problem of 
what is democracy is resolved, democratic legitimacy ceases to be the perfect 
solution and a suitable replacement of the effective control doctrine.  
 Sixthly, the key elements of democratic legitimacy in relation to the 
recognition of governments has always been argued as electoral processes. However, 
a serious threat to it is political intolerance. Many of the democratic oppositions that 
 
476 This is obvious and is one of the major roots of Libya ongoing armed conflict in relation to voting 
based on tribal and religious affiliations. 
477 Zimbabwe takeover seems like a coup, African Union says BBC News 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42004816> accessed on 18 November 2019. 
478 William Saunderson-Meyer Reuters  <Https://Www.Reuters.Com/Article/Us-Saunderson-
Zimbabwe-Commentary/Commentary-Africas-Deft-Handling-Of-Zimbabwes-Coup-Iduskbn1dl2rp>  
479 Stepan Alfred and Cindy Skach "Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: 
Parliamentarianism versus presidentialism" (1993) 46 World politics at 1. 
480 Kimberly L Sullivan Muammar Al-Gaddafi's Libya (Twenty-First Century Books, 2008) at 32. 
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performed well during the Arab Spring, especially in Libya are not in the true sense 
committed to democracy and had their own political agenda. The general assumption 
is always that whoever was democratically recognised would carry a form of moral 
legitimacy. Yet, Libya GNC and Egypt Brotherhood failed after each state regime 
changes to attain such legitimacy. The elections in these two states at the time of 
writings have neither produced political stability nor any form of  legitimacy.481 
Therefore, an extensive restructuring of democratic legitimacy through existing 
international, regional and national mechanisms is essential before it can be assumed 
as a sustainable and perfect solution to the recognition of government problems. In 
the absence, democratic legitimacy ceases to be the perfect solution and a suitable 
replacement of the effective control doctrine. 
  Seventhly, democratic legitimacy as a suitable replacement of the effective 
control doctrine and the solution to the recognition of government controversies is 
an unattractive conclusion. Analysis in this study demonstrates evidence of striking 
similarity between Thomas Jefferson approach and democratic legitimacy.482 
Democratic legitimacy is indisputably a remodel of the content, purpose and scope of 
Thomas Jefferson approach. This similarity is easily identified in the decisive test of 
both approach and the problems faced by both approaches. As explained in Chapter 
Four, the decisive test for Thomas Jefferson approach is "the will of the people shall 
be the basis of governance", this in a reform term is what democracy entails and the 
requirement of recognition under the democratic legitimacy approach.  
 Finally, as discussed in Chapter four, evidence demonstrated that rather than 
states resorting to a clear-cut framework of recognition, states instead weight various 
amorphous policy to quantify democracy as a result of lack of definition for 
democracy. There have been different forms of democracy such ad new democracy, 
procedural democracy, normative democracy, substantive democracy etc, despite 
these numerous democracies, understanding what democracy entails remains a 
problem. Given this, in the absence of a workable substantive definition of democracy 
 
481 Alfadhel Khalifa A "Toward an Instrumental Right to Democracy." (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound 112 at 
87.  
482 The will of the people substantially declared" as a as the basis of recognising any government. is 
parallel striking with democratic legitimacy component of democracy which is consider as 
"government formed by the will of the people." 
119 
 
for international law purposes, democratic legitimacy is not the perfect solution 
because there are at present no consensus about democracy and its underlying 
purpose.483 
5.5. Conclusion  
In conclusion, the author returns to the main research question: can democratic 
legitimacy be a solution to the recognition of government problems, and can it be a 
sustainable replacement of the effective control doctrine? The author's answer is in 
the negative. Is it worth celebrating compared to other recognition of government 
approaches? The author's answer here is affirmative but qualified in terms of the 
significant features it has compared to other recognition of government approach. 


















483 Brad Roth "Whither Democratic Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the 
Recognition and Non-recognition of Governments" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 213-218. 
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Chapter Six: Towards an Effective Solution: A Modified Effective Control Doctrine  
6.1. Introduction  
The previous Chapters of this study examine the recognition of government 
controversies. A variety of possible solutions put forward by some states and 
academics were examined in Chapter Four of this study, and it was established that 
none of the solutions could indisputably solve the recognition of government 
controversies or could be classified as a suitable and sustainable approach.  
 Chapter Five of this study examined the claims of some academics that the 
most recent emerged approach to recognition of governments (democratic 
legitimacy) has arrived in international law as a solution and a sustainable 
replacement of the current dominant approach the effective control doctrine.484  
 Relying on a comparative analysis of the effective control doctrine and 
democratic legitimacy, the author was able to conclude that though democratic 
legitimacy is a better solution than the effective control doctrine, some barriers 
hinder it from being a sustainable solution. 
  Accordingly, the objective of this Chapter is to recommend an effective 
solution that is capable of overcoming and eliminating all, or at least most, of the 
drawbacks affecting the recognition of governments in international law. In so doing, 
this Chapter suggests a better and more sustainable approach by building upon the 
solutions of some states and academics discussed in Chapter Four of this study.  
 This Chapter consists of eight sections. The next section considers whether 
the current recognition of government approach (the effective control doctrine) 
needs to be replaced or modified. The third section of this Chapter reviews the 
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recognition of government controversies discussed in Chapters Two and Three to 
identify the claims against the effective control doctrine. Using comparative analysis, 
the fourth section of this Chapter examines whether there are additional factors 
other than the drawbacks identified against the effective control doctrine in the 
previous section. The fifth sections discuss the result of the comparative analysis, 
recommends a solution to the drawbacks of the effective control doctrine and 
explains the justification for the recommendation. The sixth section of this study 
explains how the recommendation could be applied in recognition of government 
instances, and the seventh section, by revisiting Libya conflict explains how the 
recommended solution would create better outcomes than the present. The eighth 
section concludes.  
6.2. Should the Effective Control Doctrine be Modified or Replaced? 
 From the sixteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, 
recognition of government did not concern itself with democratic forms of 
government as it is doing in the twentieth century. The traditional approach that most 
states applied when the need to recognise a government arose was the effective 
control doctrine. However, since the 1992 pro-democratic intervention in Haiti, and 
the consolidation of democracy by the OAS, changes are being asserted as to how 
governments should be recognised, and indeed a new approach has emerged.  
  This new approach, democratic legitimacy, although it addresses some 
recognition of governments problems, it also raises some concerns such as 
questioning the origins of governments, the relationship between who governs and 
the governed. It is unlike the effective control doctrine that respects the autonomy 
of states by not tolerating any form of enquiry into how a government is formed or 
its underlying policies. For these reasons and others discussed in this section, the 
author proposes that effective control should be maintained but modified to meet 
the current demands of the recognition of governments in international law.  
 One of the main reasons is that inconsistency continues to affect the 
recognition of government practices with states switching from one approach to 
another over the last few decades. However, evidence demonstrates that the 
effective control doctrine is the only approach that has not fallen prey to consistent 
changes in the name of a solution to the recognition of government controversies. 
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The effective control doctrine has been in existence since the sixteenth century. It 
witnessed the demise of the Jefferson, Tobar and Estrada recognition of government 
practices. It has consistently stood the test of time despite inconsistent state practice 
and most likely will surpass the current hype of democratic legitimacy. This is because 
the democratic legitimacy approach, as evidenced in Chapter Four and discussed in 
Chapter Five is a modern remodel of the Thomas Jefferson approach. Having an 
approach that has been in line with the principle of sovereignty since the Westphalia 
paradigm, duly established doctrine in other areas of international law, tested over 
time and has served as a solution to other international law matters is far more 
suitable.  
 Secondly, democratic legitimacy ceases to serve as a straitjacket replacement 
of the effective control doctrine when considering that democratic legitimacy as an 
approach for the recognition of governments is no longer an emerging norm, it has 
been in existence since the twentieth century. Yet, it has still not fully established 
itself as the dominant recognition of government approach. One primary reason is 
that democracy cannot fill the internal voids that occur after the decentralisation of 
a constitutional order and impromptu regime changes.485 The one recognition of 
government approach that remains the crucial yardstick to determine the better-
placed government in such circumstance is the effective control doctrine. As of today, 
international law has not provided any other viable options to fill the void for such 
circumstance should the effective control doctrine be removed. For instance, in 2014 
General Prayat Chan o Cha, the commander of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) was able to 
maintain political stability and operate as the Prime Minister of Thailand after six 
months of political crisis in the state due to the effective control doctrine.486 Five 
years later, he is still the Prime Minister of Thailand and continues to maintain peace 
in the state. No other recognition of government approach could have filled 
 
485 Brad Roth "Secessions, Coups and The International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of The 
Effective Control Doctrine" (2010) 11 Melb. J. Int'l L. 11 At 395 
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<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/05/20/thailands-army-says-this-
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Thailand's governmental void during the impromptu military coup than the effective 
control doctrine.  
 Thirdly, as noted in the context of the post-Gaddafi regime change, 
democratic legitimacy does not appear to be more orderly, consensual, or stable than 
the effective control doctrine. Continuous disagreement on new rules, constitutions 
and institutions continues to affect democratic processes and causes insecurity. On 
the other hand, the effective control doctrine projects stability as soon as a period of 
conflict is over. A typical example is Zimbabwe where the effective control doctrine 
was applied as a result of a coup d'etat against President Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe 
is now more politically stable than Libya, whose mode of recognition during its regime 
change was democratic legitimacy. As at the time of writing, the Libya war remains 
extremely messy, and attempts to create a unified democratic government have been 
unsuccessful due to rivalry contest of power between the HoR, the GNA and General 
Khalifa Hafar, the leader of the Libyan National Army.487 The democratic rights of 
Libyans are at stake with high death tolls and human rights abuses. Besides, the 
United Nations Secretary-General was unable to finalise a democratic peace deal,488 
and the war has reached a stage where Libya's sovereignty is under armed attack by 
Islamist fundamentalists.489 
 Fourthly, the international system and those calling for the replacement of 
the effective control doctrine have not explained how the vacuum that will be created 
by its removal will be filled during certain recognition circumstances, should it be 
replaced. For example, how would the status of the rightful holder of authority be 
determined in these three circumstances: (a) when there is a forcible overthrow of 
an existing government during coup instances, (b) accession to power of a new 
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government by a procedure not provided for by the constitution of a state, or (c) 
when a state invites other states to carry out military operation in its territory. An 
alternative solution to these highlighted circumstances other than the effective 
control doctrine is not only elusive because of realpolitik but could mean the 
establishment of new principles that may destabilise other generally established 
international law principles that are linked to the effective control doctrine and 
recognition. An example of such established principle is the recognition of state, 
military intervention by invitation and humanitarian intervention by request of a 
government that is in effective control of an armed conflict.  
 Fifthly, a departure from the effective control doctrine would also open an 
enquiry into the legality of the three listed recognition circumstances discussed in the 
previous paragraph thus resulting in external interference that the international 
system in the first place had good reasons to which to object. It would also contravene 
some United Nations Charter provisions and would result in the kind of unconstrained 
external intervention in the internal affairs of other states which in the first place is 
what those calling for the abolition of the recognition of governments in international 
law seeks to preclude. As explained in Chapter Four, the effective control doctrine 
protects the autonomy and sovereignty of states by ensuring such practices are not 
permitted. Furthermore, the effective control doctrine effectuates Article 2(7) of the 
United Nations Charter by ensuring no interference in the domestic affairs of other 
states.490 Besides, there have been pro-democratic interventions that violate state 
sovereignty. For example, in Haiti, Aristide issued no invitation. Therefore, a 
modification in its current practice is the answer rather than abolition. 
 Sixthly, two possible justifications explain the continued existence of the 
effective control doctrine and why efficacy and control are the primary determinants 
of the effective control doctrine's legitimacy. The first reason as suggested by 
Redmond is that the effective control doctrine serves the wider goal of inhibiting 
intervention by promoting autonomy and peace between nations by allowing 
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legitimacy to turn on a single fact that may be easily verified.491 The second reason as 
postulated by Farer is that the effective control doctrine is pragmatically a form of 
legitimism rather than the misconstrued "might against right" that is often 
antagonistically used against the doctrine.492 The reason for this is simple if the 
people follow the will of the government by allowing the government to control them 
effectively, then it can be assumed that despite the unconstitutional origin of the 
government, the population is in accord with the government.  
 Seventhly, as explained in the overview of the effective control doctrine in 
Chapter Four, the principle has been in existence since the sixteenth century. The 
drafters of the effective control doctrine could not have foreseen nor envisaged the 
occurrence of the modern-day democratic revolutions as at the time of drafting the 
doctrine. The effective control doctrine was developed after the signing of the 
Westphalia Peace Treaty to meet the recognition of governments problem of the 
time, which was common with putsches. The author position's is not to say that 
because it has been the oldest operated recognition of government approach it 
should be maintained. Rather, because the approach was developed to solve a 
problem of the sixteenth century, a modified approach of the doctrine to meet the 
twentieth-century recognition of government needs is essential.  
 Eighthly, democratic legitimacy cannot be sustained as a recognition of 
government approach without a constitutional ethos, because not all governments 
are democratic and inimical to democracy.493 At present, international law relating to 
democratisation is surrounded by conflicting interests, and conflicting political 
moralities where implementers of supposed universal values are untrusted. As 
observed by Roth: 494 
 A thorough-going democratic legitimism is unpromising as an international norm, and a 
potential source of mischief as a unilateralist initiative. 
 
491 Trevor Redmond "Power to the People-Intervention to Restore Democracy" (2004) 12 ISLR at 6 
492 Tom Farer "Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm" (1990) 84 American Journal of International 
Law at 511. 
493 Brad Roth "Secessions, Coups and The International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline Of The 
Effective Control Doctrine" (2010) 11 Melb. J. Int'l L. at 440 
494 Brad Roth “Whither Democratic Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the 




Besides, democratic outcomes are highly dependent on normative concepts that vary 
because there are fluctuation in the practices of democracy. A report from the 2017 
Freedom House "Nations in Transits Report: The False Promise of Populism" shows 
that for the period ending 2017 more than 29 states had reported a decline in the 
practice of democracy, also 18 states scores on democracy drastically dropped.495                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Finally, the effective control doctrine has undergone various state practices 
and can now be called an established principle of customary international law. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the statehood approach for the recognition of a state 
cannot be met without the effective control doctrine. Likewise, military intervention 
by invitation to protect the sovereignty of a state from an armed attack cannot also 
occur without the effective control doctrine.496 Removing the effective control 
doctrine from the recognition of governments in international law would create a 
vacuum for these two international law principles. Moreover, the effective control 
doctrine has not been considered controversial under these principles to warrant 
replacement.  
 Given the above points, the effective control doctrine needs to continue to be 
maintained under international law and the recognition of governments because the 
removal of this doctrine could create more problems rather than the solution 
envisaged by the democratic legitimacy proponents. It is, therefore, necessary to 
revisit the recognition of governments controversies to determine whether there are 
validities in the claims against the effective control doctrine. 
 
495 Freedom House, Nations in Transit Report: The False Promise of Populism (2017) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2017> accessed on the 26 October 
2019.  
496 The concept of invitation is one of the non-Charter justifications by states for the use of force and 
intervention in the territory of another. Despite, the non-codification of this principle in international 
instruments, invitation as routinely finds its way into customary law. The concept of invitation deals 
with the issuing of a request from a lawfully recognised government who is in effective control of a 
state to another, permitting intervention and use of force on its territory to protect its sovereignty 
from armed attacks. See Davis R Robinson “Letter from The Legal Adviser, United States Department 
of State” (1984) 18 Int'lL. at 38 and James W Garner “Questions of International Law in The Spanish 
Civil War” (1937) 31(1) The American Journal of International Law at 67. 
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6.3. Recognition of Government Controversies Revisited: The Claims against the 
Effective Control Doctrine   
 A review of Chapter Two and Three of this study shows that there are limited valid 
claims against the effective control doctrine. It should be noted that the position of 
the author is not to assert the recognition of governments controversies are baseless 
or claim that the effective control doctrine is without problems. Instead, the author 
argues that these problems centre on the usefulness of recognition of governments, 
the structure of the recognition of governments itself or that some of the 
controversies are no longer valid or are limited.  
 For instance, the claims that some states have abandoned the practice of 
recognising governments and that the consequence of non-recognition on a 
government is limited. As such, the arguments that the functions of a recognised 
government should be performed by other apparatus such as diplomats and consular 
missions, centres on whether recognition of governments still serves any useful 
purpose rather than any drawback from the effective control doctrine.  
 Likewise, the point that recognition of governments is based on the 
discretionary decisions of states as a matter of their policy and political expediency 
rather than on international law rule.497 As such, states' decisions on recognition of 
government matters vary and often contain elements of inconsistencies. Further, it 
was argued that the inconsistency in state practice often results in the situation of a 
government being considered as constitutional by some states and deemed 
unconstitutional by others, thereby creating unnecessary confusion. A review of 
these debates demonstrates that the problem centres on the recognition of 
government structure rather than the effective control doctrine defects.  
 Similarly, some scholars claim that the political arbitrariness of many 
recognition decisions often results in problems and what makes this situation 
untenable is that an unrecognised government cannot sue or enforce judicial action 
on a deciding state if refused recognition. This point centres on the nature of 
recognition of government itself rather than the effective control doctrine. 
 
497 Brad Roth “Whither Democratic Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the 




Furthermore, the argument by some academics that the recognition of governments 
practice infringes on state autonomy by the denial of recognition to a government 
that has the necessary competence is premised on sovereignty violation and states 
actions, rather than the effective control doctrine itself.  
 The author does acknowledge the debates that the usefulness of recognition 
in curbing unconstitutionality has been defeated since an enquiry into the process by 
which a government originates is no longer tenable in international law. Also, the 
debate that the inability to analytically distinguish between the recognition of state 
and the recognition of government as subjects of international law raises questions 
as to what approach truly circumscribes the practice of recognition in international 
law as valid and centres on the effective control doctrine. The author rejects the 
continued insistence that the recognition of a government is a political rather than a 
legal matter and the ambiguous terminology issues in recognition is an effective 
control doctrine problem.  
 However, the author does acknowledge one valid primary argument against 
the effective control doctrine. This argument centres on claims that the effective 
control doctrine is antithetical to the “self-determination notion of the people's will” 
by overtly relying on the concept of "control" rather than popular acceptance as its 
main test. As a result, the doctrine is notorious for allowing unauthorised changes in 
government by the encouragement of revolutions and coups since the question of 
constitutionality is irrelevant to its application. Also, because the effective control 
relies on habitual obedience rather than consent of the governed.  In consideration 
of this point, the next section examines whether there are other drawbacks to the 
effective control doctrine than the one discussed in this paragraph.  
6.4. Identifying Other Effective Control Doctrine Drawbacks 
In the previous section, the antithetical nature of the effective control doctrine to the 
self-determination of the people was identified as its very remaining drawback in 
recognition of government controversies. The objective of this section to identify 
whether other drawbacks need to be considered before modifying the current 
effective control doctrine. In so doing, this section comparatively examines the 
similarities and differences between the effective control doctrine and other 
recognition of government approaches discussed in Chapter Four of this study. 
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 By comparing and contrasting the effective control doctrine with the other 
recognition of government approaches, the author can explore new hypotheses for 
the effective control doctrine. Also, a comparative analysis will help identify 
distinguishable characteristics of the other recognition of government approaches 
that need to be put into consideration when proposing new hypotheses for the 
effective control doctrine in the next section. 
 Also, it is important to note that the comparative analysis in this section is 
limited to the effective control doctrine and the other recognition of governments 
approach discussed in Chapter Four except the Genaro Estrada doctrine. The reason 
being that Chapter Two and Four of this study have extensively established that the 
Estrada proposal of abolishing the recognition of governments is not a solution. 
Instead, this section will be limited to study of the effective control doctrine, Carlos 
Tobar Doctrine, democratic legitimacy and Thomas Jefferson Approach. 
6.4.1. Is there any Similarity between the Effective Control Doctrine and the other 
Recognition of Government Approaches?  
 A comparative assessment of the effective control doctrine and the other recognition 
of government approaches discussed in Chapter Four of demonstrates a similarity of 
objective. The similarity of objective is that the effective control doctrine and the 
other recognition of government approaches confer a certain degree of legitimacy on 
regimes. Under the effective control doctrine, the legitimate representative of the 
state is the one who is in effective control of the state, similarly, under the Carlos 
Tobar doctrine, the legitimate government of the state is the authority that is 
constitutionally elected. Both the Thomas Jefferson approach and the Democratic 
legitimacy approach also confer a similar degree of legitimacy by ensuring that the 
legitimate representative of the state that deserves recognition, is the government 
that is substantially the will of the people. Furthermore, the effective control doctrine 
and the other recognition of government approaches are aimed at the elimination or 
reduction of the recognition of governments controversies. In other words, the 
primary function of all the recognition of government approaches developed from 
the sixteenth century to date centres on legitimacy confirmation and the eradication 
of the controversies affecting the recognition of governments in international law. 
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 Another similarity identified in all of the recognition of government 
approaches is deficits in the definition of terms; this problem is not just the problem 
of the effective control doctrine alone. An in-depth study of democratic legitimacy 
and other recognition of government approaches also reveals this same problem as 
an issue. For instance, the effective control doctrine lacks a definition in terms of what 
"effective and control" entail, similarly democratic legitimacy requirement, i.e. 
democracy, lacks clarity in meaning and what it involves. This same problem can be 
identified in Thomas Jefferson Approach and Carlos Tobar Doctrine and has been 
discussed under the unsuitability of each doctrine for the recognition of governments 
in Chapter Four.  
 Similarity in practices was another identification made with all recognition of 
government approaches. The effective control doctrine has been in operation since 
the sixteenth century and was adopted by states for more than 150 years until the 
recent arrival of democratic legitimacy that is challenging its usage. Similarly, the 
Thomas Jefferson approach emerged in the seventeenth century and was adopted by 
states for 114 years (1793-1907) until it was challenged and replaced by Carlos Tobar 
doctrine. Similarly, the Carlos Tobar doctrine which originated in the nineteenth 
century (1907) was adopted by some states for some decades and was used 
interchangeably with the effective control until 1992 when democratic legitimacy 
came into force. At present, the democratic legitimacy which originated in 1992 is 
concurrently applied interchangeably with the effective control and has been in used 
by states for the past 27 years (1992 till date).  
 Finally, the effective control doctrine and all other recognition of government 
approaches are enshrined in international instruments. The effective control doctrine 
is enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, and Hague Convention (IV) 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (annexed to the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; 205 CTS 277).498 
Similarly, the Thomas Jefferson approach is enshrined as self-determination rights in 
 
498 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 
October 1907 (entered into force 26 January 1910) annex (Regulations respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land’) S3. 
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Article 1(1) of the ICCPR,499 and democratic legitimacy in Article 21 of the UDHR while 
Carlos Tobar doctrine protects the rule of law which is enshrined in the domestic 
constitution of each state and can be identified in international conventions such as 
Article 5 of the Lome Convention IV.  
 It can be, thus, concluded from the discussion on the similarities between the 
effective control doctrine and the other recognition of government approaches that 
they all have a historical pedigree, similarity of objective, similarity of purpose, 
similarity of adoption having undergone states practices. Therefore, it makes sense 
to draw a comparison between them. 
6.4.2. Is there any Disparity Between the Effective Control Doctrine and Other 
Recognition of Government Approaches?  
Having established that there is a similarity between the effective control doctrine 
and the other recognition of governments approaches, this section examines the 
disparities between the approach.  
 There is not much disparity between the effective control doctrine, and the 
other recognition of government approaches at a first review. However, a close look 
demonstrates that all the approaches have a rebuttable presumption of consent 
except the effective control doctrine. For example, in Thomas Jefferson approach, the 
presumption of consent is derived from the popular will of the people. Likewise, 
Carlos Tobar Doctrine and democratic legitimacy approach presumption of consent 
are individually deriving from constitutions and democracy, respectively. However, a 
critical review of the effective control doctrine does not reflect any of these findings. 
Although, there is the presence of habitual obedience and a connection with some 
international law principles identified with the effective control doctrine. There is, 
however, no evidence of rebuttable presumption of consent. The habitual obedience 
identified in its definition of terms signifies submission and not consent. The next 
section will discuss a way to address this problem. 
6.5. Comparative Study Discussion: Towards an Effective Approach 
 A comparative study of the effective control doctrine with the other recognition of 
government approaches helped identify four characteristics in the approaches, which 
 
499 This reflects Article 1 of the ICESCR states that “all people have the right to self-determination".  
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are namely similarity of objective; similarity in historic pedigree; similarity of adoption 
and similarity in been enshrined in international instruments. However, when 
comparing the disparity of the effective control doctrine, only one disparity could be 
identified in forms of lack of a rebuttable presumption of consent.  Given this 
information, the author concludes that though the effective control doctrine is the 
oldest, substantially dominant approach to the recognition of governments in 
international law, the lack of a rebuttable presumption of consent makes it less 
problematic. 
 Therefore, a solution to the effective control doctrine deficit is the removal of 
habitual obedience and the addition of a rebuttable presumption of consent 
determined by the acceptance of the population to the factors that determine the 
effective control doctrine efficacy. In so doing the effective control doctrine could 
maintain its status as well as become the best solution, and most sustainable 
approach for the recognition of governments in international law. The reason for this 
suggestion follow.  
 Firstly, a modified effective control doctrine with a rebuttable presumption of 
consent projects a recognition of government approach that dogmatically presents 
itself with the promotion of the self-determination of the people and regime 
constitutionality. In effect, the international values that are currently lacking under 
the effective control doctrine are protected, and the vulnerability of the effective 
control which exposes it to replacement as a result of its political character would be 
eliminated. Additionally, the effective control would easily be consolidated by states 
having derived connectivity in enshrined principle of international law (self-
determination) that are embodied in international law instruments. 
 Secondly, with a rebuttable presumption of consent as an additional factor to 
the effective control doctrine, it will not only but also equalise the doctrine with 
factors that makes democratic legitimacy a better solution. It will surpass and replace 
democratic legitimacy due to its other commendable factors such as being the only 
recognition of government approach that fills the inherent void that occurs after the 
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decentralisation of a constitutional order such as a coup. 500 It would also transfer 
popular consent into governance. At minimum, citizens would be able to effectuate 
legitimacy after an undemocratic change by either consenting to governance or 
rebutting governance. For example, in 2011, Egyptian's from different backgrounds 
including Islamists, Liberals, anti-capitalists, nationalists and feminists took to the 
street demanding the overthrow of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. After 18 days 
of protest showing that despite the authoritarian president in effective control of 
Egypt, consent had beyond doubts been rebutted by the populace, Vice President 
Omar Suleiman announced the resignation of the president.501 In 2012, Egypt was 
handed over to the military who were in temporary effective control of the state until 
mid-2012 (consent rebutted with demands for election), when the Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate, President Mohammed Morsi through democratic process 
became the President of Egypt. 502  
 Thirdly, the current effective control doctrine lacks accountability and does 
not permit an enquiry into the actions of usurpers. By adding a rebuttable 
presumption of consent, the newly modified effective control doctrine would 
properly reflect accountability. Governments which come into power without their 
population acceptance will not be recognised despite being in effective control, and 
if recognise but abuse their population, their legitimacy and recognition can easily be 
withdrawn because consent to govern is rebuttable. For example, President Zine Al-
Abidine Ben Ali lost his legitimacy and recognition in 2011, after Tunisians rebutted 
consent to be governed by him.503 President Ali had been in effective control of 
Tunisia since 1987 after he came into power by a bloodless coup where he deposed 
President Habib Bourguiba. The rebutting of consent had to do with poor economic 
 
500 Brad Roth "Secessions, Coups and The International Rule of Law: Assessing the Decline of The 
Effective Control Doctrine" (2010) 11 Melb. J. Int'l L. at at 395  
501 Egypt Revolution: 18 days of people power  Aljazeera Politics 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution-160124191716737.html> 
accessed on the 10 November 2019. 
502 Julia Elyachar and Jessica Winegar Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt a Year after January 
25th Society for cultural Anthropology < https://culanth.org/fieldsights/series/revolution-and-counter-
revolution-in-egypt-a-year-after-january-25th> accessed on 17 November 2019.  
503 Adam Bernstein Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisian despot whose ouster helped spark Arab Spring, 





development, failure to input democratic processes and failure to observe 
international standards of political rights. 504 
 Fourthly, a rebuttable presumption of consent ensures that the burden of 
proof is on the government that effects a regime change or alters an established 
constitutional order. Also, it exposes the rationale behind a conflict and uncover 
which conflicts is of legitimate concerns, which is democratic, and which are 
pretentious or with ulterior motives.  A government which continues or intends to 
alter a constitutional structure must provide strong reasons to the population. For 
instance, the Boko haram insurgents in Nigeria are in effective control of the Northern 
parts of Nigeria but have been unable to prove that they are in control and accepted 
by the Nigerian population to deserve recognition. Similarly, in Libya, Gaddafi at a 
point, despite being in effective control of Libya was unable to show that he was 
accepted by majority of Libya's population during the revolt.  
 Finally, since, the Arab Spring, the international community has witnessed a 
surge in internal armed conflicts taking place across the globe in what is now refer to 
as democratic revolution.505 This global trend has culminated in  post-Cold War 
internal conflict in some Arabs and African states which has resulted in tremendous 
loss of lives and human rights violations.506 In numerous instance, these internal 
armed conflicts have prompted recognition from states as a result of humanitarian 
needs or to promote international security and peace.507 Between year 2000 to 2018 
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset had recorded a high surge in internal armed 
conflict where forcible intervention on behalf of a government, opposition or 
oppositions groups were recorded, and recognition took place due to such 
intervention.508 As provided by international law, most of these forcible interventions 
 
504 Paul Delaney  Senile Bourguiba Described in Tunis The New York Times 
<https://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/09/world/senile-bourguiba-described-in-
tunis.html?scp=2&sq=senile%20bourguiba&st=cseSenile> accessed on the 18 November 2019. 
505 Kalkidan Obse "The Arab Spring and The Question of Legality Of Democratic Revolution In Theory 
And Practice: A Perspective Based On The African Union Normative Framework" (2014) 27 Leiden 
Journal of International Law at 817-838. 
506 Maurice Ogbonnaya "Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya: A comparative analysis of causes and 
determinants" (2013) 12 Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations at 4-16. 
507 An example is the political recognition of Syria opposition.  
508 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset ( New Version), Peace Research Institute Oslo, Available At 
<http://www.prio.no/CSCW/ > accessed on the 14 November 2019.  
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have to occur by explicit or implicit consent of the warring faction that is in effective 
control of the state thus giving rise to the need for recognition. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, the general rule of international law had always been that whoever can 
show evidence of control, efficacy and command the habitual obedience of the state 
is the lawful holder of authority in such circumstance can call for military 
intervention.509 However, this serves as the greatest flaw against the effective control 
doctrine because commanding the habitual obedience of the population in such 
circumstance is tantamount to coercion rather than choice (self-determination will). 
With these, the values of international law in relation to self-determination rights of 
citizens, freedom of expression and participatory political rights enshrined in the 
UDHR, and the ICCPR are not reflected. However, with a rebuttable presumption of 
consent, the tacit consent of the governor is evidential as opposed to habitual 
obedience under the effective control doctrine which represents control and 
command. 
6.6.  Rebuttable Presumption: A Prima Facie Case of Consent  
A question that may arise with the use of the modified effective control doctrine just 
like every other recognition of government approach is what form of evidence would 
determine a rebuttable presumption of consent and when consent can be rebuttable. 
 Ultimately, a rebutted presumption means that consent to lead has been 
withdrawn and a regime changes would be effectuated. Therefore, the decisive test 
for consent could be populace acceptance, and the withdrawal of consent could be 
determined by popular revolt. It is, therefore, necessary for states to have internal 
procedures and structure in their constitution for the process of transition should 
consent be rebutted.  
 In the long term, it would help eliminate pro-democratic intervention and the 
problems of pre-mature recognition. In case of spontaneous regime change, a similar 
procedure like Egypt where the President resigned impromptu and handed over to 
the military who effected democratic elections could be sufficient. However, instead 
of a military regime, a state constitution or treaty should provide for a more 
 
509 David Wippman “Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in Internal 
Conflit” (1995) 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. at 435. 
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diplomatic and appropriate transition process that will promote the self-
determination rights of the governed to choose their government in any way and 
process they prefer.  
6.7. Rebuttable Presumption of Consent:  Libya Revisited  
This section explains how a modified effective control doctrine would create better 
outcomes than what is presently available by re-examining Libya conflict of 2011. It 
should be noted that Libya has been revisited in this section because it is the only 
state at present that has undergone all recognition circumstances.  
6.7.1. Forcible Overthrow of An Existing Government: The Negative Effect 
Libya, formerly known as the independent United Kingdom of Libya or 
Jamahiriya rests between three peripheries - Arab, Africa, and the Mediterranean.510 
More than ninety per cent of the state surface is inhabitable for agriculture and 
human settlement, despite the country being one of the largest in Africa with over 6 
million population.511 Libya's population is a mixture of Arabs, and the Berbers, who 
are the original indigenous settlers of Libya.512 Libya has the largest known oil reserve 
in Africa513 and is known as the major exporter of petroleum. As such the word Libya 
in Africa is synonymous with Oil.514 
Libya became an independent entity in 1951 under the established monarchy 
of Sayyid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi until 1969, when Qaddafi became the 
president of Libya after a successful bloodless coup d’ etat against the Monarchy. 515 
Qaddafi's government ruled and retained control of Libya as its sole legitimate 
government for forty-five years until early February 2011 when the democratic 
uprising began, which led to the de-recognition and death of Qaddafi.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 The negative effects of the old effective control doctrine became obvious after 
 
510 Richard Phelps “Ronald Bruce St John, Libya: From Colony to Revolution” 2012 17(4) The Journal 
of North African Studies AT 724-25. 
511 Ethan Daniel Chorin Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (Public Affairs, 
2012) at 13. 
512 Kimberly L Sullivan Muammar Al-Qaddafi's Libya (Twenty-First Century Books, 2008) at 13-6. 
513 Sam Halabi “Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in Historical and 
Theoretical Context” (2012) 27 American University International Law Review at 378. 
514 Ethan Daniel Chorin Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (Public Affairs, 
2012) AT 13. 
515 Sean Lynch “Invitation to Meddle: The International Community's Intervention in Libya and the 
Doctrine of Intervention by Invitation, An” 2011 2 Creighton Int'l & Comp. LJ 173 at 175 
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the coup because Qaddafi needed to maintain control and habitual obedience rather 
than the consent of the governed for him to retain power. To command full habitual 
obedience, Qaddafi eliminated parliamentary democracy and political parties.516 In 
replacement of democratisation, Gaddafi developed a form of democracy termed 
“Direct Democracy” which according to him relied on popular congresses and 
committees as substitutes for election participation.517 The application of the direct 
democracy led to the change of Libya's name to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, which neologism translates to “state of the Masses.”518 Qaddafi's new 
political system relied on powers deceptively being enshrined in the people through 
tightly controlled revolutionary committees who were not independently elected by 
the people.519  
As a result, Qaddafi was able to maintain full control of Libya by the suppression 
of the popular will of Libyans through the bugging of telephones and telex of Libyans 
in need to caution their activities. Libyans lived in fear of the government and were 
subdued from expressing their independent views against the government. Davis 
asserted that: 520 
In addition to carrying out secret executions, the Qaddafi regime sought to 
terrorise the populace through the frequently televised hanging of dissidents. Beyond 
overt brutality, the government forbade unauthorised gatherings in order to deprive 
Libyans of the opportunity to congregate outside government supervision. 
 
Also, unreasonable restrictions were made on the membership of the Arab 
Socialist Union, which was the only political party in Libya.521 Not only was 
membership in the political party restricted to specific work categories, but, the 
participatory rights of Libyans in the political structure and development of their 
 
516 Brian Lee Davis Qaddafi, Terrorism, and The Origins of the US Attack on Libya (ABC-CLIO, 1990) at  
2- 3. 
517 John Wright  Libya: A Modern History (Taylor & Francis, 1981) at 19. 
518 Brian Lee Davis Qaddafi, Terrorism, and The Origins of the US Attack on Libya (ABC-CLIO, 1990) at 
2-3. 
519 The new system described by Qaddaffi as democracy was a classic example of the leftist regime 
device of highly elaborate “orchestrated political participation that provides mechanism of social 
control and produces the illusion of popular support …. All Libyan were supposed to participate in 
“basic people’s congress, which featured speeches, endlessly repetitive chant of slogans and waving 
of fists (this resulted in a condition called Qaddaffi arms) and circumspect debate and voting show by 
hand. Delegates from these and various other congresses …deliberations were tightly controlled.” See 
Brian Lee Davis Qaddafi, Terrorism, and The Origins of the US Attack on Libya (ABC-CLIO, 1990) at 2-3. 
520 John Wright Libya: A Modern History (Taylor & Francis, 1981) at 194. 
521 Kimberly L Sullivan Muammar Al-Qaddafi's Libya (Twenty-First Century Books, 2008) at 32. 
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society were systematically control in such a way that parliamentary participation and 
representations was dependent on the government selected revolutionary 
committees who report directly to Qaddafi.522The effect of this was that political 
participation and freedom of expressions were centralised on the representatives 
rather than the people.523 Libyans lacked the political freedom to express their will 
undiluted and participate fully in given areas relating to the sovereignty of Libya. 
As discussed earlier, self-determination, freedom of expression and 
participatory rights are international law principles that are enshrined in the UDHR 
and ICCPR. By the content of these instruments, every Libyan has a right to determine 
their political status and freely choose their government and express themselves. 
However, the current effective control does not permit because the consent of the 
governed is missing in its legitimacy requirement and governments who come into 
power under the doctrine are mostly authoritarian in need to continuously maintain 
efficacy, control and command habitual obedience. However, with the modified 
doctrine of a rebuttable presumption of consent, the pressure to maintain control 
and command habitual obedience is eliminated. In replacement, the self-
determination rights, freedom of expression and participatory rights of citizen are 
promoted, and recognised government are caution that consent is rebuttable.  
6.7.2. Accession to Power of a New Government by a Procedure not Provided for By 
the Constitution of a State: Rebutted Consent 
In 2011, Libyans effected a regime change by a process contrary to Libya's 
constitution and Qaddafi democracy model for power accession. Ultimately, Qaddafi 
underestimated the regime change in Libya when the revolt against his government 
began because he felt the Libya security system (military and police force) would be 
able to handle the revolt. Qaddaffi even referred to the insurgents as cockroaches, 
whose regime change decisions needs to be purified, having believed that he could 
be able to achieve habitual obedience since he was in effective control of majority 
 
522 Active social forces within the state “who are eighteen years of age, in good legal standing, of sound 
mental health, and not a member of the former royal family or associated with the defunct 
monarchical government were the only welcome member. See, Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Libya: A 
Country Study. Washington: GPO Library of Congress 03 Mar. 2016 < http://countrystudies.us/libya/> 
523 Kimberly L Sullivan Muammar Al-Qaddafi's Libya (Twenty-First Century Books, 2008) at 32. 
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parts of Libya.524 However, he underestimated the internal armed conflicts, the NTC 
were prematurely recognised and NATO intervention did take place. Two issues were 
on grounds before the NATO intervention in Libya. On one part, Qaddafi was in 
effective control but lacked the habitual obedience to maintain full control. On the 
other, the NTC had habitual obedience of Libyans but lacked the machinery to effect 
full control of Libya until NATO and some states military Interventions.525  
 However, this situation could have been avoided had the rebuttable 
presumption of consent instead of habitual obedience as the main test of the 
effective control doctrine. Qaddafi could have handed over in a similar style as Egypt 
(2013) instead of continuing the conflict with the hope of submerging the revolts and 
commanding obedience. Also, the violation of laws of War by the premature 
recognition of the NTC, and military intervention in the armed conflict could have 
been avoided. Till date, Libya has not been able to recover from the intervention.  
 Had the new modified effective control doctrine been in operation during the 
Libyan conflict, the overthrow of Qaddafi by the NTC without assistance could have 
resulted in a similar regime change like the Sudanese revolution of 2019 that resulted 
in the deposition of President Omar al-Bashir after thirty years in power. The current 
unnecessary interference and political instability in Libya could have been avoided. 
Sudan is today more prosperous and stable than Libya because the Sudanese were 
able to choose their government and rebut consent to be governed without third 
party interference.                                                        
6.8. Conclusion  
The blur relationship between the effective control doctrine and other recognition of 
government approaches arose from the lack of rebuttable presumption of consent 
thereby projecting the effective control doctrine is antithetical to the self-
determination of the people. The addition of this new factor to the current effective 
control doctrine would to a considerable length attributes a moral dimension to the 
effective control doctrine. Also, it would dissuade unconstitutional regime changes 
 
524 Alex J Bellamy “Libya and The Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and The Norm” (2011) 25 
Ethics & International Affairs at 265. 
525 Ulfstein, Geir, and Hege Føsund Christiansen "The legality of the NATO bombing in Libya" (2013) 62 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly at 159-171. 
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because oppositions intending to destabilise a constitutional order would now be 
aware that the absence of a consent by the population would mean their regime 
changes would not be regarded. Besides, burden of proof will now rest on any regime 
or oppositions who tries to alter the constitutional structure of a state to assert that 
the state population want the regime to not only influence a change but want to be 
governed by it. In the long term, this would dissuade coups and revolutions that are 
backed with political intolerance and hidden agendas.  
 Justification for this assertion arose from the demerits of having democratic 
legitimacy as a replacement approach. Particularly, in recent times, where, there 
hasn’t been any recognition of governments policy to say non-democratic 
governments are illegitimate nor that the non-democratic character or origin of a 
government makes it an unconstitutional regime.526 Since the fourth wave of 
democracy (Arab Spring) what we have witnessed is silence.527 The European Union 
democratic conditionality on African states is being challenged and abandoned.528 
Democratic origin of governments has been de-emphasised and as at the time of 
completing this writing democratic legitimacy has been under attack by the same 
international legal scholarship that gave it a platform due to scepticism on the end 
product of democratic legitimacy. 529  The need to swiftly re-access and modify the 
effective control doctrine to meet current recognition of government demands as 






526 Jean d'Aspremont "1989-2010: The Rise and Fall of Democratic Governance in International 
Law" (2010) 3 Select proceedings of the European Society of International Law at 5. In the same vein, 
G H Fox "Election Monitoring: The International Legal Setting" (2001) 19 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal 295, 312. Christian Pippan "International Law, Domestic Political Orders, and the Democratic 
Imperative’’ at 34-35. This finding has led some authors to contend that there exist “doubles tandards” 
in that regard. See M G Kohen "La création d’Etats en droit international contemporain" (2002) 6 Cours 
euro-méditerranéens Bancaja de droit international at 619. 
527 As in Egypt, Libya and Zimbabwe.  
528 Thomas Carothers "The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion" (2006) 85 Foreign Affairs at 55. 
529 Jean D'Aspremont "1989-2010: The Rise and Fall of Democratic Governance in International 
Law" (2010) 3 Select proceedings of the European Society of International Law 3 at 10.   
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Implications, Challenges and Future Directions 
7.1. Introduction  
This research was undertaken to address two matters. The first was to investigate the 
claims that democratic legitimacy is a solution to the recognition of government 
controversies. The second was to establish whether democratic legitimacy could 
indeed be a suitable replacement of the current recognition of government approach, 
the effective control doctrine.  
 To achieve the study aims, after the presentation of an introduction (Chapter 
One), this study examined the rationale behind the recognition of governments, and 
the debates whether the recognition of government still serves any purpose in 
international law for it to be maintained (Chapter Two). 
  In contrast to academics who claim that recognition of governments has 
outlived its purpose in international law, this study argues that it should be 
maintained and is essential to both international law and states. As evidence, the 
merits of recognition of governments which includes facilitation of international 
relations, protection of state sovereignty, and promotion of political stability were 
examined, and the impact of non-recognition was discussed (Chapter Two).  
 An in-depth analysis as to why the recognition of governments is controversial 
from three additional perspectives to those discussed in Chapter Two was examined 
in Chapter Three. It was concluded that the lack of an objective approach is one of 
the primary causes of the problems affecting recognition of governments in 
international law (Chapter Three). 
 To address the question of what approach can best be applied to the 
recognition of governments, Chapter Four reviewed five approaches that were 
developed from the Sixteenth century until today to address the recognition of 
governments problem. The Chapter focused on the successes of these approaches 
but mainly the reasons why they failed in order to glean lessons from them.  
 Using a comparative analysis and case study approach, Chapter Five 
established democratic legitimacy as a better solution than the effective control 
doctrine but not a sustainable replacement of the effective control doctrine. Several 
justifications were from the lack of the definition of democracy to non-practise of 
democracy to its absolute core were discussed as the reasons for this claim. 
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Inferences drawn from Chapter Five led to the formulation of a modified effective 
control doctrine as the best and most sustainable solution to the recognition of 
government controversies (Chapter Six). 
 This current Chapter is divided into seven sections. The second section 
contains an overview of the research findings. The third section highlights the 
contribution made by this study to the current body of Literature. The fourth section 
discusses the future direction of this study. The fifth section discusses the challenges 
faced in this study of finding a solution to the recognition of government 
controversies. The sixth section demonstrates the study solution in the ongoing Libya 
conflict, and the seventh section concludes this study.  
7.2. Research Findings 
Recognition of governments is one of the essential components of governance that 
play a crucial role in the security, political stability and socio-economic advancement 
of a state.  Despite this, recognition of governments is one of the most challenging 
and murkiest topics of international law with many controversies. Recently, some 
academics believe that the use of a new approach that centres on the application of 
democracy to determine the most suitable qualified holder of authority in a state 
would solve the recognition of government controversies. Also, they claim that the 
new approach has arrived in international law to displace the effective control 
doctrine, which was formerly the most dominant recognition of government 
approach.  
 This study examines the democratic legitimacy claims and investigates the 
extent to which the new approach (democratic legitimacy) could be the best and 
sustainable solution to the recognition of government controversies. The findings of 
this study are as follows: 
7.2.1. Recognition of Governments Debates 
The debates surrounding whether the recognition of government serves any useful 
purpose in international law lead to an investigation of the problems affecting the 
recognition of governments in international law and the usefulness of recognition of 
governments to states. This study identified five useful reasons for the recognition of 
governments in international law, namely: confirmation of a regime status; 
143 
 
conferment of legal personality; promotion of political stability; determent of 
unconstitutionality and the protection of state sovereignty. Also, the study identified 
that the non-recognition of government has significant impact on a state such that an 
unrecognised government is unable to integrate into international society nor 
request mutual assistances that would ordinarily be easy for a recognised 
government. 
 Having concluded from the study findings that the recognition of government 
serves useful purposes, the study examined the debates against the recognition of 
governments. The examination resulted in the identification of eight debates against 
the recognition of governments. Also, findings in this study identified that most of the 
controversies centre on the structure and modes of recognition rather than the 
recognition of government approaches which most studies concentrated upon. Also, 
it was identified that some of the controversies are no longer valid or are limited in 
claims as a result of state practices.  
 Also, the study identified the main disparity between the effective control 
doctrine and all the other recognition of government approaches that have been 
introduced by states to address some of the recognition of government problems. 
The disparity centres on the effective control doctrine lacking a provision relating to 
the consent of the governed. Instead, habitual obedience which signifies command 
and at times coercion was identified in the effective control doctrine.  In effect, it was 
discovered that the current practice of the effective control doctrine promotes 
unconstitutional regime changes, lack of accountability, and is antithetical to the self-
determination of the people. As such, a modification of the doctrine is necessary for 
it to continue as recognition of government approach. 
7.2.2. Democratic Legitimacy  
Democratic Legitimacy arrived into the recognition of government practices as a 
result of an agreement that was signed in 1991 by the Latin American states under 
the aegis of Organisation of American States (OAS) in Santiago, Chile.530 The 
agreement was named Santiago Commitment to Democracy and The Renewal of the 
Inter-American System and consisted of various agreements affirming democracy as 
 
530 Roland I Perusse Haitian Democracy Restored, 1991-1995 (University Press of America, 1995) at 21. 
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a state priority and the only statutory instrument for the precise manifestation of the 
people’s will.531  
 Earliest documented evidence of democratic legitimacy in state practices 
point to the 1992 pro-democratic intervention in Haiti, where the OAS Council met 
and invoked resolution 1080 of the Santiago document denouncing Haiti coup and 
demanding the respect for the democratic administration of Haiti.532 The resolution 
also, provided for the use of any necessary measure that would result in the 
reinstatement of the democratic candidacy of Haiti President. The second collective 
state practice which evidences the promotion of democratic legitimacy occurred the 
same year of the Haiti coup when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
attempted a coup to oust the President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. 
However, the coup (known as August Putsch) failed on its third day as a result of 
alignments against the coup by state leaders in defence of democracy.533 
 The OAS agreement and numerous pro-democratic interventions that 
occurred in 1992 led a renowned United States academic, Thomas Franck to believe 
that a new approach for validating government had arrived in recognition of 
government practice. According to Franck, “inestimable human, political and 
historical import that demonstrates for those sensitive to trends that democracy is 
 
531AG/Res.1080 (XX1-0/91) (5TH Plen.Sess., June 5, 1991). Resolution 1080 specifically stated that To 
instruct the Secretary General on the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council 
in the events of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic 
political, institutional process of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected 
government in any organisation's member states. Within the framework of the charter, to examine 
the situation, decide on and convene an ad-hoc meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs or a special 
session of the General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day period 
532 The resolution state "To recognise the representative of the Government of President Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide as the only legitimate representative of the Government of Haiti to the organs, 
agencies and entities of the inter-American system. To recommend, with due respect to the policy of 
each member states on the recognition of states and governments, action to bring about the 
diplomatic isolation of those who hold power illegally in Haiti. To recommend to all states that they 
suspend their economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti and any aid and technical 
cooperation except that provided for strictly humanitarian purposes. Importantly, it affirmed, to 
adopt, in accordance with the OAS Charter and international law, any additional measures that may 
be necessary and appropriate to ensure the immediate reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide to the exercise of his legitimate authority. See CP/RES.567 (870/91 
533 Thomas Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 The American Journal of 
International Law at 74. 
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beginning to be seen as the sine qua non534 for validating governance.”535 Franck 
published an article to support his claims, and this was soon supported by numerous 
academics that a new recognition of government approach had arrived as a solution 
to address some of the recognition of government controversies and would be a 
sustainable replacement of effective control doctrine. However, more recently, some 
academics in Bahrain,536 Canada,537 Europe,538 South Africa,539 and United States540 
concluded that democratic legitimacy claims should be treated with caution. 
 A thorough investigation of the recognition of government approaches from 
the sixteenth century until today in this study indicates democratic legitimacy as the 
best approach to some, but not all of the recognition of government controversies. 
Furthermore, it was identified that democratic legitimacy promotes accountability by 
ensuring governments that come to power are based on citizens' will, which is 
expressed through electoral processes. Also, democratic legitimacy is connected to 
some international law norms such as human rights, self-determination and 
democracy.  
 Also, this study identified that democratic legitimacy is embodied in 
international law instruments such as UDHR and ICCPR, thus ensuring that 
sovereignty belongs to the governed and democratic rights are guaranteed. Some 
other inherent advantages of democratic legitimacy were identified. For example, it 
was noted that democratic legitimacy had been a conditionality for some state 
relations,541 states have practised it for twenty-seven years, it is being consolidated 
 
534 sine qua non refers to the main reason  
535 Thomas M Franck "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (1992) 86 The American Journal 
of International Law at 89. 
536 Alfadhel, Khalifa "Toward an Instrumental Right to Democracy" (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound at 84-88. 
537 Obiora Chinedu Okafor "Democratic Legitimacy as a Criterion for the Recognition of Governments: 
A Response to Professor Erika de Wet." (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 228-232. 
538 Jean Aspremont “The Rise and Fall of Democratic Governance in International Law: A reply to Susan 
Marks” (2011) 22(2) European Journal of International Law at 549-570, Jure Vidmar "Democratic 
Legitimacy between Port-au-Prince and Cairo: A Reply to Erika de Wet" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 
208-212. Susan Marks “What has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?” (2011) 
22(2) European Journal of International Law at 549-570 
539 Erika De Wet “From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic Legitimacy 
in Governmental Recognition” (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law. 
540 Brad Roth "Whither Democratic Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the 
Recognition and Non-recognition of Governments" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 213-218. Gregory Fox 
and Brad R. Roth "The Dual Lives of “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance" (2018) 112 AJIL 
Unbound 112 at 67-72. 
541 Rich Roland "Bringing democracy into international law" (2001) 12 Journal of Democracy at 29-30. 
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which makes it easily implementable and enforceable. Thus, it is reasonable based on 
inherent advantages to consider democratic legitimacy as the best recognition of 
government of approach among the other existing approaches. 
 Several serious drawbacks were however identified in respect of the 
application, operation and usages of democratic legitimacy which caused the author 
of this study to have a rethink in the conclusion that democratic legitimacy is the 
solution to put the recognition of government controversies to rest. For example, 
democratic legitimacy by itself cannot guarantee a solution to all the recognition of 
government controversies because there is a high level of inconsistency in state 
practice concerning pro-democratic interventions. Besides, there has not been any 
consolidated accepted global-level international rule or the presence of a similar 
policy to that of the OAS in international law against the recognition of 
undemocratically installed government.  
 Furthermore, the critical elements of democratic legitimacy for the 
recognition of governments is electoral processes. However, a serious threat to it is 
electoral intolerance. Also, different amorphous policies to quantify the definition of 
democracy, which is the most crucial factor of democracy, makes it a less desirable 
and sustainable approach.  
7.2.3. The Effective Control Doctrine  
For the above reasons, the effective control doctrine was revisited. A positive and 
significant finding was the discovery that if the effective control doctrine is modified 
it would serve as a better and sustainable solution than democratic legitimacy. 
Justification for this was the similarity discovered between the effective control 
doctrine and democratic legitimacy (Chapter Five), and some other added advantages 
of the effective control doctrine (Chapter Six). For instance, it was identified that the 
effective control doctrine plays a significant role in the identification of the better-
placed faction to recognise after the decentralisation of a state's constitutional order 
in circumstances such as coup d'état or revolution. Also, the effective control doctrine 
was identified as a significant promoter of autonomy, which is a strong advantage 
that is lacking in all other recognition of government approaches.  
  Additionally, given that the effective control doctrine has been in operation 
since the Westphalian period, it is linked to other international law principles such as 
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the recognition of states and military intervention by invitation. Thus, the removal of 
the effective control doctrine would create unnecessary enquiry into processes of 
some of these other international law principles such as intervention by invitation.  
 This study also identifies that the effective control doctrine serves the broader 
goal of inhibiting intervention by promoting autonomy and peace among states. 
However, it was identified that the effective control doctrine has a significant 
drawback such as the absences of consent. Based on this finding, the study concludes 
that the effective control doctrine plays a vital role in recognition of government 
practices, as such it should be modified to meet current recognition of government 
demands rather than being replaced.  
7.2.4.  Solutions Advanced by Academics 
In recent years, democratic legitimacy as a suitable and sustainable replacement of 
the effective control doctrine has received the attention of some academics. 
However, it remains a controversial discourse because academics are at variances as 
to whether the international system should settle on more modest alterations of the 
effective control doctrine, or whether alternatively, a solution would be provided 
through democratic legitimacy.  The following are the views of some academics 
concerning the effective control doctrine, democratic legitimacy and other suggested 
solutions to the recognition of government across the globe. 
 In 2018, an eminent constitutional law academic, Roberto Gargarella, argued 
for the amendment of democratic legitimacy using deliberative democracy, a process 
by which collective dialogue and discussion would replace elections or majority rule 
as the current democratic legitimacy practice. Justifying his recommendation, 
Gargarella provided example in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights claim that 
democracy cannot be perfectly realised without deliberation using the Uruguay case 
of Gelman v Uruguay. 542 However, the author of this study argues against Gargarella's 
claim on the basis that a deliberative democracy requires cross-multi engagements 
and deliberations which are not always readily available in some recognition 
circumstances that are beset with multiple ideologies and factions. Furthermore, 
 
542 Roberto Gargarella "Democracy's Demands" (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound 112 at 76, See also, Gelman 
v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 221 (Feb. 24, 2011).  
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deliberative democracy would require capacity building, consultations and training 
that needs to be directed towards citizens who are the primary decision-maker in a 
democratic society. However, some recognition circumstances such as revolution and 
coups make this unachievable.  
 Another academic, Professor Bojan Bugaric at the University of Ljubljana 
claimed that the current global democratic recession has undermined democratic 
legitimacy practices. As such, the survival of democratic legitimacy would be 
dependent on constitutional democracy and the availability of a democratic 
institution.543 Bugaric, claimed that a constitutional democracy with an institution 
putting checks and balances to democratic action would be a solution to the current 
democratic legitimacy drawback. However, the problems with Bugaric's argument is 
the lack of a constitutional paradigm when the recognition of government matters 
arises. In addition, not all states are democratic or practice a democratic form of 
governance.  
 Concerning the effective control doctrine, a Professor of International Law at 
the University of Pretoria, Erika de Wet claimed that although the "might is right" 
factor raises concerns with the effective control doctrine, the effective control 
doctrine should not be replaced.544 Justifying her claims, Professor De Wet relied on 
the absence of a customary obligation to withhold recognition from government with 
unconstitutional origins and the lack of a definitive trajectory in state practices. While 
the author partially supports Professor de Wet's claims, the lack of self-determination 
rights which is projectable through a rebuttable presumption of consent remains the 
most significant flaw of the effective control doctrine.  
  Professor Brad Roth from Wayne State University argued for an effective 
control doctrine with internal processes and popular sovereignty as a solution.545 
According to Professor Roth, the presence of popular sovereignty in the internal 
process of the effective control doctrine would result in a strong presumption in 
 
543 Bojan Bugaric "The Right to Democracy in a Populist Era" (2018) 112 AJIL Unbound 112 at 79-83. 
544 Erika De Wet "From Free Town to Cairo via Kiev: The Unpredictable Road of Democratic Legitimacy 
in Governmental Recognition" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 205 to 207. 
545 Brad Roth “Whither Democratic Legitimism? Contextualizing Recent Developments in the 
Recognition and Non-recognition of Governments” 2014 108 American Journal of International Law 
at 214 to 218.  
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favour of established patterns of rule, and an absence would indicate repudiation. 
For Professor Roth, an effective control doctrine that is enshrined in internal 
processes grounds a rebuttable presumption, such that the recognition standing of a 
government can still be denied if such governments lack plausibility to represent the 
community effectively. The author of this study agrees with Professor Roth's claims. 
 Other than democratic legitimacy and the effective control doctrine, some 
other approaches were postulated by some academics. For example, Professor Jure 
Vidmar of University of Oxford argued for a human rights approach as the basis of 
recognition of government international law. Relying on the failure of the Security 
Council to recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan (2001) and the de-
recognition of Gaddafi based on human rights considerations, Vidmar claimed that a 
human rights approach to recognition of governments is a new option for states to 
explore.546 While a human rights approach will help reinforce human rights that are 
associated with recognition implementation and enforcement would be a significant 
drawback because it would result into enquires on how a government is formed, 
which in the first place is what states are trying to avoid in order to promote their 
autonomy.  
7.2.5. Solutions Advanced by this Study 
Based on findings in this study, and after using a comparative analysis of the effective 
control doctrine and all the other recognition of government approaches, it was 
established that a modified effective control doctrine would be the most suitable and 
effective solution. To this effect, the author proposed the removal of habitual 
obedience in the recognition practice of the effective control doctrine and the 
addition of a rebuttal presumption of consent. One of the reasons for this proposal is 
that to achieve an effective and sustainable recognition of government approach 
there must be a relationship between the governor and governed and that the 
relationship must project a balance of power. At the moment, this is missing in the 
current effective control doctrine because power is consecrated on the governor who 
is apt to abuse power in order to maintain efficacy and control. 
 
546 Jure Vidmar "Democratic Legitimacy between Port-au-Prince and Cairo: A Reply to Erika de 
Wet" (2014) 108 AJIL Unbound at 210 to 212. 
150 
 
  Therefore, to prevent power abuse and ensure that power is under check,547 
governments must be accountable and governed by consent rather than habitual 
obedience. The advantage of this claim emerges in five different ways namely; (1) 
promotion of international law principle (2) constitutionality and self-determination 
promotion (3) accountability (4) burden of proof for regime changes and (5) Political 
stability.  
7.3. Research Contribution 
Notwithstanding the numerous literatures on the approach to recognition of 
government approaches, there is a considerable gap in literature on the modification 
of the effective control doctrine to meet current recognition of government 
demands. This lack of literature is probably due to the effective control doctrine being 
such a dominant approach. However, with high demand for the respect of self-
determination and constitutionality in recognition of government practices, it is now 
time to review and modify of the effective control doctrine. Against this backdrop, in 
contributing to the body of knowledge, this study identified the major flaw affecting 
the effective control doctrine in meeting with current recognition of government 
demands and other recognition of government approaches.  
 Also, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by introducing a new 
test of a rebuttable presumption of consent to the recognition of government 
practice. This new test would promote self-determination rights, reduce 
unconstitutional regime change and importantly, promote international law 
principles such as sovereignty and respect of state autonomy.  
 Additionally, several studies have advocated for the modification of 
democratic legitimacy. However, no detailed research or publication to date has been 
made towards the modification of the effective control doctrine as done in this study. 
In contributing to the body of knowledge, this has now been achieved.   
7.4. Future Research Directions  
The author invites future research on the use of the rebuttable presumption of 
consent in recognition of government practices and an elaboration of how the 
 




presumption can be rebuttable during spontaneous situations such as coup d'etat and 
revolutions. Also, the author hopes that more research on rebuttable presumption of 
consent as it relates to compliance in recognition of government practices will be 
conducted. 
7.5.  Research Challenges  
One of the main challenges that restricted this study in applying other research 
methodology is the inconsistencies in state internal armed conflicts. The 
inconsistencies makes information collection, assessment and analysis difficult as the 
author had to keep changing analysis position on democratic legitimacy and the 
effective                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
control doctrine.  
 A solution to mitigate the problem was the use of comparative analysis 
approach. For instance, when studying and collecting data on the current Libya 
conflict, the initial position of analysis was that democratic legitimacy would be a 
suitable and sustainable solution, as such the effective control doctrine should be 
replaced. However, in October 2019 it became evident that this analysis was incorrect 
because General Khalifa Haftar effected regime change was supported by some states 
such as France, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia. In effect, Chapter Five 
and Chapter Six of this study had to be re-written as more evidence became available 
that democratic legitimacy may not be the real solution the world has been waiting 
for  in relation to the recognition of government in international law because of 
inconsistent state practices on democratic legitimacy.  
 Another challenge encountered in this study was the measure of democracy. 
While the definition of democracy is unsettled in the academic world, measuring 
democratic states and applying a comparative qualitative analysis to determine the 
most recent numbers of democratic consolidation and democratic states was 
unachievable. One of the reasons for this was the various forms and practices of 
democracy by states, as a result, the author was unable to compare democratic 
values in states and democratic margins to an absolute core.  
 Another challenge in this study was different terminology used in describing 
the recognition of government and its approaches. Chapter Three of this study 
highlighted the terminology issues as it relates to government. However, during the 
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writing of this study, the author encountered problems as to the use of approach/ 
approaches in the singular or plural form or criteria/criterion as used in some 
publications. The author settles for the word approaches to minimise confusion. As 
discussed in Chapter One (1.5), inherent confusion often arises in some of the 
recognition of government terminology and their various usage due to multiple 
linguistic interpretations and meaning. On one part, the author was looking for 
evidence on the recognition of government approaches and on another part, the 
recognition of government criterions. 548 
7.6. Demonstration of Study Solution: Applying the Rebuttable Presumption of 
Consent to the ongoing Libya Conflict 
  As discussed in Chapter Five, multiple indices strongly demonstrate that Libya 
has become a failed State. As at the time of writing, there is ongoing conflict among 
rival factions seeking effective control of the Libya territory and the administration of 
Libyans.549 Therefore, subject to the rules of international law (a) democratic 
legitimacy electioneering  nor pro-democratic intervention cannot work in Libya as of 
today, (b) the laws of war and military intervention to restore peace would occur at 
the invitation of the government that is in effective control of Libya, or (c) the 
government in effective control could become the legitimately recognised 
government of Libya.  
 Regarding the first factor, democratic legitimacy failures are evident in Libya, 
and the suitability of the effective control doctrine is pronounced because democratic 
legitimacy cannot be achieved nor can it be a solution to the ongoing conflict. 
Previous attempts to initiate a democratic government had been flawed by political 
 
548 For instance, Saranti` used the terminology "Approach" in their publication while some studies use 
the word criterion. While Obiora in his publication used " Criterion". See Obiora Chinedu Okafor 
“Democratic Legitimacy as a Criterion for the Recognition of Governments: A Response to Professor 
Erika de Wet” (2014) 108 American Journal of International Law. Vasiliki Saranti “Democratic 
Legitimacy as an Approach for Recognizing a Government: Towards the Emergence of a Regional 
Customary Rule in the Americas? A Reply to A Reply to Professor Erika de Wet” 2014 108 American 
Journal of International Law at 233. 
549 Michael Cruickshank, 'Libya’s Second Civil War: How did it come to this?' Conflict News < 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150320232806/http:/www.conflict-news.com/libyas-second-civil-
war-how-did-it-come-to-this/> accessed on the 28 November 2019. The Libya conflict initially began 
with the HoR (Tobruk Government) and the GNC (National Salvation Government), however, other 
rival fractions of smaller group which consisted of Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL's) Libyan provinces,  Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna. 
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intolerance, ethnic issues, ideology spectrum and different agendas by contending 
parties.550 Similarly, a pro-democratic intervention cannot occur due to the lack of a 
successful democratic election and the presence of different factions who are in 
effective control of different regional areas of Libya. The only recognition of 
government approach that can be invoked is the effective control doctrine which 
leads to the second factor – the invocation of the law of wars (jus ad Bellum) and the 
conduct of warring factions (Jus in Bello).  
 Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello permits the faction that is in effective control to 
invite outside machinery to use force on Libya territory.551 General Khalifa Haftar of 
the Libyan National Army (LNA) has been in effective control of major Libya territory, 
including Libya Airport in Tripoli where he declared a No-fly Zone on the 25 November 
2019.552 He has invited other states for assistance in the use force in Libya and states 
such as France, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and now Russia has assisted and 
supported his faction.553  
 Meanwhile, the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) though 
in control of some parts of Libya population and territories is not in absolute effective 
control as General Khalifa Haftar. One other factor that has played a significant role 
against the GNA is political Islam because General Khalifa Haftar is supported by those 
in the Libya population who are Muslims.554 As such, determining who is in absolute 
effective control of Libya at the moment is difficult given the external and internal 
supports received by both warring parties.  
 
550 Mohamed Eljarh, 'The Supreme Court Decision That’s Ripping Libya Apart' Foreign Policy News  
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-supreme-court-decision-thats-ripping-libya-apart/> 
accessed on 10 November  2019. 
551 Davis R Robinson “Letter from The Legal Adviser, United States Department of State” (1984) 18 Int'l 
L., at 381. See also, Trevor Redmond “Power to the People-Intervention to Restore Democracy” (2004) 
12 ISLR at 5 
552 'Libya's Khalifa Haftar declares 'no-fly zone' over Tripoli Aljazeera 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/libya-khalifa-haftar-declares-fly-zone-tripoli-
191124115453657.html> accessed on 26 November 2019                         
553 'Libya's Khalifa Haftar declares 'no-fly zone' over Tripoli Aljazeera                  
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/libya-khalifa-haftar-declares-fly-zone-tripoli-
191124115453657.html> accessed on 30 November 2019 
554 Ibrahim Sowan, 'Khalifa Haftar’s offensive in Libya' 
< https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/10/haftar-libya-offensive/>  
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 Presuming the UNSC ceasefire embargo on ammunition and interferences is 
abode by all states supporting the conflict,555 the question moves to the third factor, 
who deserves recognition in Libya? And how can stability be achieved in Libya based 
on the effective control doctrine?  
To the first question, the general rule of recognition concerning the effective control 
doctrine applies. However, instead of the old effective control doctrine, the modified 
effective control with a rebuttable presumption of consent is invoked. Ideally with 
the new doctrine, states will examine (a) who is in control and administration of 
majority of Libya territories (b) who can maintain permanent control (c) who has the 
rebuttable presumed consent of the majority population irrespective of age, sex, 
ethnicity and religion. 
  Much available evidence would point to the GNA on two grounds because 
Firstly, before the July coup by General Khalifa Haftar, majority of Libyan population 
were in support of the GNA which consists of different ethnicity and groups in terms 
of age, sex and occupation. Secondly, because Libyan self-determination cannot be 
determined during conflicts as majority of the population has fled, states will rely on 
a rebuttable presumption that majority population still consent, as such the GNA 
would be recognised as the recognised legitimate governments of Libya and would 
be expected to begin the rebuilding of Libya. 
 Should General Khalifa Haftar or any other faction arise against the recognised 
government of the GNA, then the burden of proof will be on the warring faction of 
why a regime change is necessary before recognition is granted or external supports 
are given to such warring fraction. In effect, there will be reduction in 
unconstitutional regime changes, more compliance with international law principles 
and importantly political stability.  
 However, should the old effective control doctrine be applied, General Khalifa 
Haftar, with the support of other states' military intervention, would become the 
recognised government of Libya and in order to maintain effective control, he would 
continuously aim to achieve habitual obedience of the population  and may commit 
undemocratic acts in order to dissuade other factions from coming to power the same 
 
555 UNSC PV8588, dated 29 July 2019.  
155 
 
way he achieved power in Libya. The disadvantage of this has been discussed in 
Chapter Six.  
7.7. Research Conclusion  
It is inevitable in the light of the fluctuation in state practice reported in this study 
that a sustainable change will occur in recognition of governments practices and the 
controversies affecting the principle.556 However, apart from the effective control 
doctrine, problems relating to the formation and structure of the recognition of 
governments in international law remains a challenge. As noted in Chapter Four, 
some of the approaches towards eradicating this problem have been unsuccessful 
due to unsuitability and sustainability of some of the approaches.557  
 Therefore, this study concludes by asserting that eradicating the controversies 
surrounding the recognition of governments in international law does not necessarily 
entail a "democratic means" or democratic origin of governments. There are arrays 
of diplomatic and international instruments that could solve the recognition of 
government problems other than the abolishment of recognition of governments in 
international law and the replacement of the effective control doctrine.  
 It is argued that a modified effective control doctrine serves as a more 
sustainable solution than the acclaimed democratic legitimacy norm because it has a 
firm Westphalia foundation, tested by other international law principles and fills a 
vacuum in recognition of government practices. As demonstrated in Chapter Six, 
despite some disadvantages, the effective control doctrine continues to play a crucial 
role in promoting the autonomy of states, and the decentralisation of 
unconstitutional order. Its modification rather than replacement is therefore 
essential.  
 That being said, the author concludes this study by asserting that despite 
efforts of states and academics, the recognition of governments will likely remain a 
controversial principle of international of law surrounded by complexity and 
ambiguity. This study, therefore, in consideration of current recognition of 
government demands proposes the modification of the effective control doctrine to 
 
556 fluctuations in states practice discuss in Chapter Four, Five and Seven. 
557 The unsuitability of democratic legitimacy to democratic origins and its inability to address popular 
rebellion makes acceptance as the most compelling approach difficult. 
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include a rebuttable presumption of consent by keeping in mind the advice of Hans 
Kelsen that: 558 
The problem of recognition of states and governments has neither in theory nor in 
practice been solved satisfactorily. Hardly any other question is more controversial or 
leads in the practice of states to such paradoxical situations.  
The fact being that recognition of governments in international law would remain 
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